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Being a part of social studies of finance, i.e. a perspective that, in its narrow sense, 
investigates the role of science and technology in financial markets, the thesis suggests 
that one can understand science in a wider sense, as an expert knowledge domain. The 
social studies of finance, then, can be broadened out to encompass the different ways in 
which expert knowledge shapes financial practices. Legal expertise is another 
instantiation of expert knowledge in the sense that both (science and law) are different 
forms of power; therefore this research aims at answering the question how finance is 
shaped by legal expert knowledge.  
 
The study employs the method of ‘opening the black box’ of regulation, and thus it 
argues that technicalities of regulation, which embody legal expertise, are crucial for the 
construction of financial markets. The thesis demonstrates how ‘just’ a concise 
amendment to Article 1062 of the Russian Civil Code has had significant ramifications 
for the interbank USD/RUB cash-settled forward market, and explores the controversies 
involved in and details of the law making process. 
 
The amendment was made in 2007 and changed the legal status of non-deliverable 
forwards, which had been classified by Russian courts as gambling transactions under 
Russian law in 1998-1999. Based on the evidence obtained from the study of the legal 
developments that resulted in the amendment, the thesis shows that the politics of the 
law-making process, as well as shaping the outcome, can in equal measure be disruptive 
and result in a delay in legal changes that market participants felt were much-needed. 
After almost a decade of painstaking negotiations, the amendment stated that cash-
settled derivatives are legally enforceable under the Russian law. It rendered cash-settled 
forwards legally secure, hence encouraged cross-border transactions and enhanced the 
market’s liquidity; it is also made possible the introduction of netting as a risk 
management tool in the market. The contested, long-delayed amendment is thus an 
example of a pervasive process: the constitutive role of law (including esoteric law, little 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
It is a mild September evening in Moscow in 2007. I am in the office of a deputy 
managing director of one of the leading investment banks in Russia. He kindly agreed to 
answer my questions about the Russian derivatives market, and I start our conversation 
with a question which, at that time, I considered as most important of all, that is how it 
happened that up until 2007 derivatives had been regarded as bets under Russian law. 
My interlocutor replies:  
 
E. I will tell you one thing […]. I heard it from a very respectable man from an 
exchange, who deals with derivatives… This is his story, word for word. Visiting 
[Russian] regions, he was discussing oil futures with a midsized oil supplier… 
You know, [being a] midsize [business] in [oil industry in] Russia is prolific. So, 
he [the man from the exchange] was saying that it is necessary to manage risks. 
S.M. Something like, ‘Please, do come [to the exchange] and buy the futures’? 
E. Yes, that’s right. Notably, he [the man from the exchange] was a high official, 
very respectable… The other [the oil supplier] was listening with great attention, 
asking questions. This continued for about 45 minutes and then he [the oil 
supplier] concluded, ‘I say! How exciting! It is most amusing how people 
ransack their brains when they’ve got no oil!’ You see, this is a problem. 
Financial law making, especially law on derivatives in Russia – who needs it (E 
interview)!        
 
Indeed, (1) who does need a law that regulates derivatives? Further still, (2) who needs 
to know how this law is made? As for the first question, one could ask it, albeit 
ironically, in 2007, i.e. at a time of financial and economic boom; however in 2009, in 
the midst of the credit squeeze and recession, and with derivatives widely held 
responsible for the setback, such a question would sound rather odd. At the present time, 
a common view is that financial regulation should be tougher, or more restrictive. 
However, regulation does not always imply restriction. It also produces expansion, 
nascence of a new trade, not necessarily hazardous, however difficult it is, amid the 
current economic situation, to think of such trade. What sort of trade is it? How can 
derivatives be not risky, but insure against risks? Perhaps it might not conform to the 
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currently accepted view, yet derivatives emerged as a risk management tool. After all, 
the recession will last ‘until credit starts to flow and the real economy starts to recover’ 
(Krugman 2008: 188). How can derivatives still be of help? And how does law facilitate 
their usefulness?  
 
With reference to the second question, the one that asks whether it is necessary to 
explore how financial laws are made, an enquiry into financial law-making indeed 
remains merely a study of specific legal technicalities. These details could be considered 
to be dull and trite as well as complicated; besides, what is done, probably, is what 
needed to be done, and as long as it works it is of no use to explore the process of its 
making. This logic is the logic of black-boxing law: 
 
The word black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery or 
a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw a little box about which 
they need to know nothing but its input and output. […] No matter how 
controversial [its] history, how complex [its] inner workings, how large the 
commercial or academic networks that hold [it] in place, only [its] input and 
output count (Latour 1987:3, emphasis in original).  
 
Yet, I would argue that the technicalities of financial law-making and the controversies 
of its making matter: if, as I am going to demonstrate, law embodied in a regulation (a 
statute), can produce or ‘perform’ a derivatives market, then I will reiterate the question 
asked by MacKenzie (2006: 275), ‘what sort of a world do we want to see performed’?           
 
In this thesis I will demonstrate how a derivatives market, a financial trade which is 
central to a market economy, comes into being, and what role law, controversial in its 
making, plays in this process. My research employs a recent legislative passage, namely 
the Amendment to 1062 Article of the Russian Civil Code and its consequences for the 
non-deliverable foreign exchange forward market. Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of 
the theoretical perspective behind the research. Firstly, I identify social studies of 
finance as the research field in which my study is located; I also explicate the theoretical 
claims I am addressing to in the thesis, such as the consequentiality of legal expert 
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knowledge to finance, and the performativity of economics. I then discuss a range of 
findings in related research areas (e.g. sociology of financial markets, economic 
sociology of law and others) which are important to my analysis.     
 
Chapter 3 describes my research in its making. It begins with a theoretical perspective 
on the notion of the social which is adopted in my research, thus justifying the way I 
conducted my study and its qualitative nature. This is followed by a detailed account of 
the starting point of the investigation, its events and journeys, discoveries of insightful 
connections and failures in obtaining desirable data. It finishes with an extensive 
depiction of the interviewing process, given that ‘opening black boxes can be done only 
by speaking with those involved’ (MacKenzie 2005b: 570).  
 
Chapter 4 begins the discussion of the essentiality of law to derivatives markets by a 
retrospective journey into the history of the U.S. dollar/ Russian rouble non-deliverable 
forward trade and its collapse in the context of the 1998 default in Russia. The fall in the 
rouble led to Russian banks incurring a colossal outstanding debt. The Chapter also 
follows the unsuccessful legal attempts to recover the debt, the i.e. the court trials which 
resulted in unenforceability of these cash-settled derivatives under the Russian law.  
 
Which derivatives trade did the legal unenforceability of cash-settlement affect in 
particular? Why is this trade important and what are the consequences of non-
deliverable forwards being defined as betting transactions? Chapter 5 answers this 
question by, first, focusing on the aims and forms of interbank foreign exchange forward 
trade; it then centres around the rouble forward trade that is settled only in cash and 
examines its current1 condition. Finally, the Chapter explains how recognition of these 
forwards as sound financial transactions under the Russian law would affect market’s 
liquidity and safeness.  
 
                                                
1 At the time of my fieldwork, i.e. in the year of 2007.   
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Chapter 6 develops my argument that a financial law and the law making process are of 
crucial importance to the market by looking into the controversies around a particular 
statute of the Russian Civil Code that makes cash-settlement enforceable. Through an 
analysis of how the amendment to Article 1062 was made, the Chapter explores the 
conflicting interests of regulators, the two opposed ways of developing a regulatory 
framework which were formed under the influence and in the context of the ‘turf war’ 
between two Russian financial regulators - the Bank of Russia and the Federal Financial 
Markets Service.             
 
The thesis ends with Chapter 7, which sums up the key claims made throughout the 
study. The conclusion contains an assemblage of arguments about the extent to which 
legal knowledge shapes finance, the performativity of law, and the materiality of 
seemingly virtual derivatives markets. It also addresses a range of other issues that in 
some way or another contribute to the studies of financial markets.           
 
Chapter 2.  Analytical Framework and Literature Review 
 
The Analytical Framework 
 
A starting point for this research was puzzlement or, as Muniesa et al. (2007: 1) put it, 
‘epistemic discomfort’. The puzzlement over how such a vast and ubiquitous domain of 
sale and purchase as the global derivatives market, the domain which, as revealed by the 
current financial crisis, is of crucial importance to the global economy, eludes a distinct 
perception or clear understanding of what it is made of. Economics alone, as a science 
based on the theoretical assumption of rationally acting individuals, does not suffice to 
answer the question as, for example, behavioural finance demonstrates by highlighting 
the irrationality of investors (Shleifer 2000). But neither does behavioural finance.  
 
In his analysis of the financial crisis of 2008, Paul Krugman (2008: 184, emphasis 
added), a prominent economist and Nobel Prize winner, admits ‘what lies behind the 
credit squeeze is the combination of reduced trust in and decimated capital at finance 
institutions’. The credit squeeze, as everybody knows it these days, is a situation when 
market liquidity is in deficit, i.e. there is not a great lending supply in the economy for 
those who want or need to borrow money. Thus, while economists recognise that a 
notion of trust is of the utmost importance to financial markets, this notion, however, is 
not the focus of attention of economics. The social nature of liquidity was, indeed, 
identified ten years ago, in 1999, by Bruce Carruthers and Arthur Stinchcombe, who 
claimed that liquidity is ‘an issue in the sociology of knowledge’: it is produced by 
‘public knowledge’ which is based on valuation and assessment  and generates 
trustworthy facts that lay the foundation of market liquidity (Carruthers and 
Stinchcombe 1999).     
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In fact, the first regular sociological investigations of financial markets1 date back to the 
1980s as attempts to examine the rapid expansion and advancement of these markets; 
over the years sociological enquiries have focused on various forms of financial 
markets’ complexities, thus formed different approaches to the subject (Preda 2007). 
Yet, however divergent the perspectives of the markets’ analysis are, all of them are 
concerned with the social in financial markets, they study the sociality of the financial 
world. As opposed to rationally (or irrationally) behaved atomistic individuals, the 
sociological approach to financial markets is based on an argument that stresses the 
importance of the fact that human beings’ are not atomised actors, individuals’ actions 
are ‘embedded in concrete, ongoing system of social relations’ (Granovetter 1985: 487). 
Thus, the sociology of finance locates financial practices in social settings; it 
demonstrates the existence of the social as the constitutive essence of financial markets.   
 
Having adopted this sociological approach to the markets as an analytical ground for   
the research, my study, nevertheless, belongs to the social studies of finance (SSF) 
research field.  Alongside the sociology of financial markets, social studies of       
finance employ the analytical tradition of science and technology studies (STS)2.    
There are two reasons for applying this perspective to studying financial markets: first, a 
practical field of finance is inextricably entwined with theoretical knowledge, namely 
                                                
1 Following Fligstein and Dauter (2007: 106) I differentiate economic sociology as ‘the general study of 
the conditions of the production and reproduction of social life’ from the sociology of markets as ‘the 
study of one kind of social exchange, that of markets, […] [that ] includes the study of firms, product 
markets, and labor markets […]’. Furthermore, following Knorr Cetina and Preda (2005: 4, emphasis in 
original) I distinguish the sociology of markets from the sociology of financial markets, given that 
‘financial markets are not primarily concerned with the production of goods […] but with the trading of 
financial instruments not designed for consumption […] [they] belong to a second-order economy where 
the “goods” are contracts (equities, bonds, currencies, derivatives) that circulate rather than being 
channelled to end consumers’.        
2 Social studies of finance (SSF) ‘in its broad meaning’, as MacKenzie (2009: 2) puts it, ‘signals the 
application to financial markets of social science disciplines beyond economics[…], such as anthropology, 
gender studies, human geography, political science, and sociology’.  However, in ‘a more specific 
meaning’ SSF ‘refers to approaches to markets that are inspired by social science research on science and 
technology[…]. Perhaps the most prominent name for the latter research is “social studies of science”, 
hence the analogous expression “social studies of finance”’.  
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financial economics3; secondly, technologies are conduits of the financial worlds, they 
make financial markets possible (Mackenzie 2005b). In this regard, the science and 
technology studies epistemology is indispensable to financial markets research.   
 
Science and technology studies investigate the ways scientific knowledge and 
technologies are produced. As in many research fields, there are diverse research 
precepts4, yet they all share the core assumption that it is the very process of 
construction of scientific knowledge or technological objects that should be scrutinised 
and the notion of the social becomes pivotal under such scrutiny5. The acknowledgement 
of the social in the production of scientific knowledge leads to the other core claims: 
science and technology are ‘active – the construction metaphor suggests activity’ and 
‘do not provide a direct route from nature to ideas about nature; the products of science 
and technology are not themselves natural’ (Sismondo 2008: 14, emphasis in original).             
 
The research field of the social studies of finance attempts to answer, amongst other 
questions, ‘to what extent is finance shaped by science and technology?’ (Preda 2008: 
901). The aim of my research is, however, to extend this question by asking to what 
extent finance, as in the example of derivatives markets, is shaped by expert knowledge 
at large, not confining the inquiry only to scientific knowledge. Science is an expert 
knowledge domain, but so is law.  
 
                                                
3 The scientific status of financial economics, argues MacKenzie (2005b), could be recognised due to the 
fact that ‘demarcation criteria [between science and non-scientific knowledge] must be regarded as 
conventional, and their application in all cases as situated human action’ (Barnes et al. 1996: 142).  
4 For example, there is an approach which is widespread in the field, that advocates studying ‘the 
fabrication of scientific facts’ by analysing existing controversies: ‘when someone utters a statement, what 
happens when the others believe it or don’t believe it’ (Latour 1987: 21, but there are many other 
researchers who adopted the approach). Another influential perspective in the field is the one that argues 
that it is an agreement over a subject which is taken as existing, say, a gene, that should be studied. This 
agreement (true or false), or a knowledge, is ‘shared conventions and institutionalised concepts’, and a 
social researcher’s aim is to discover ‘the range of interpretations that might have been put on […] 
observations, the way […] questions were framed, and […] techniques for dealing with the uncertainties 
and unresolved problems in […] data’ (Bloor 1999: 90-91). 
5 Although the key notion of the social is understood in different ways: as a ‘connecting element’ (Latour 
2005: 5), a ‘component’ of a ‘network’ produced by ‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law 1987: 113), or a 
‘distribution of knowledge’ (Barnes 1988: 44).     
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Certainly, scientific and legal knowledge differ in nature and outcomes of their 
expertise6, yet both domains ‘emphasise the virtues of a disinterested and unprejudiced 
approach, based on distance and precision, […] in both domains participants speak 
esoteric languages and reason in carefully cultivated styles, [and] both […] seem to 
attract a kind of respect that unknown in other human activities’ (Latour 2004: 73). 
Jasanoff (2008: 762, 767) refers to law as ‘humanity’s other most indispensable 
instrument of authority-making’ alongside science; furthermore, she, insightfully points 
out that ‘each [science and law] plays a part in deciding how things are in the world, 
both cognitively and materially; each also helps shape how things and people should 
behave, by themselves and in combination’. Jasanoff (2008) also shares Latour’s (2004: 
73) view on the same crucial characteristics of science and law, namely detachment and 
scrupulousness: 
 
Both science and law are committed to ascertaining the facts of the matter as 
accurately as possible; indeed, the law’s capacity to render justice depends on 
finding the right facts and finding them right […]. The authority of both 
institutions depends […] on appeals to transcendental truths; neither can allow 
itself to be seen as subjective, arbitrary, or mired in the specificities of particular 
cases (Jasanoff 2008: 775).             
 
In fact, the research field of science and technology studies has been investigating law 
and its interactions with science for years, and Jasanoff (2008) gives an account of such 
research. Yet, within the social studies of finance perspective there would seem to be no 
research that,  based on the core assumptions of STS, analyses to what extent financial 
markets are shaped by legal expert knowledge, despite MacKenzie’s (2005b) call to 
view law as ‘the black box of global finance’ and open it.      
 
MacKenzie (2005b: 556) argues that ‘to open the black box’ is another approach offered 
by STS, the ‘heuristics’ that should be employed for studying finance as ‘a “scientized” 
and “technologized” domain’ in order to understand what it is made of. The approach 
                                                
6 For a brilliant analysis that differentiates the essence of these two areas of expert knowledge see Latour 
(2004).   
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suggests examining technicalities because ‘scales aren’t stable’: although small, obscure 
and unobvious, they are nuts and bolts of a mechanism, which is expected to produce a 
sought full-scale result (MacKenzie 2009: 33)7.  This mechanism, ‘a black box’, is ‘a 
device whose internal structure can be disregarded’ as long as it ‘transforms given inputs 
into predictable outputs’ and that is what ‘recognized expertise’ in general, and law in 
particular, does (MacKenzie 2005b: 557).    
 
Here it should be once again emphasised that my research, which, by employing the 
perspective of STS, investigates to what extent financial markets are shaped by legal 
expertise which resulted in financial regulation, belongs to the SSF perspective:  
 
The study of the regulation of financial markets is certainly not virgin territory, 
with scholars in the ‘law and economics’ tradition and in international political 
economy having played particularly important roles. What is at issue in regard to 
regulation is not to open an unopened black box but to go deeper into it: to 
encourage more fine-grained studies, and to examine connections between the 
apparent ‘detail’ of regulation and larger issues in the construction of financial 
markets (MacKenzie 2005b).     
 
Furthermore, there is the last but not least theoretical claim I will address in my research, 
namely the performativity of economics, ‘the most challenging recent theoretical 
contribution to economic sociology’ (MacKenzie and Millo 2003: 107)8. Despite the fact 
that, as an academic discipline, economics does not suffice to answer the question of 
how financial markets are constructed, or ‘has failed by neglecting to develop a theory 
of real markets and their multiple modes of functioning’, this domain-specific expert 
knowledge is constitutive to the markets: economics ‘performs, shapes and formats the 
                                                
7 Annelise Riles, a legal anthropologist, urges ‘to take on technicalities’ for an equally important reason: 
as opposed to instrumental scholars that view law ‘as a tool’, cultural researchers, among other reasons, 
have to investigate technicalities ‘because the kind of politics that they purport to analyze is encapsulated 
there, along with the hopes, ambitions, fantasies and day-dreams of armies of legal engineers’ (Riles 2005: 
974, 975).     
8 Here I refer to the performativity of economics as an academic discipline, whereas in his statement that 
economics is performative Michel Callon refers to economics in a broad sense, as an assemblage of 
participants of all kinds – organisations, consumers, government units, hi-tech engineers, moreover not 
just human beings but also technical systems (Callon 1998, 2005, 2007).  
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economy, rather than observing how it functions’ (Callon 1998: 1-2). It is ‘an engine, 
not a camera’, states MacKenzie (2006).  
 
The ‘Introduction’ by MacKenzie et al. (2007) contains a thorough description of the 
term’s origins and traces the appearance of the concept throughout the social sciences’ 
body of research; it also gives a detailed explanation of the way it applied to economics. 
MacKenzie et al. (2007) explain that the term ‘performative’, employed by Michel 
Callon in claiming the performative quality of economics, was ‘coined’ by the 
philosopher J.L. Austin. Indeed, Austin (1962: 6, emphasis in original) gives us 
examples where, he argues, ‘to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate 
circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be 
doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it’. He also suggests considering this kind 
of a sentence (or statement) as ‘a performative sentence, or performative utterance, or, 
for short, “a performative”. […] The name is derived, of course, from “perform”, the 
usual verb with the noun “action”: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the 
performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (Austin 
1962: 6-7, emphasis in original): 
 
One of our examples […] [is] the utterance ‘I do’ (take this woman to be my 
lawful wedded wife), as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony. Here we 
should say that in saying these words we are doing something – namely, 
marrying, rather than reporting something, namely that we are marrying (Austin 
1962: 12-13, emphasis in original).   
 
Applied to economics, the notion of performativity has provoked conceptual polemic 
among social researchers in economy and economics, and it would be an inaccuracy to 
regard the concept of performativity as something sociologists have unanimously agreed 
upon. The statement that economics performs the economy in general and financial 
markets in particular, was identified by its critics as the ‘proposed pact with neoclassical 
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economics’ (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2007: 191; see also Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2008) 
and relegating the sociological approach to the background (Miller 2002; Fine 2003)9.  
 
However, a number of investigations did embrace the notion of performativity of 
economics; moreover, they have corroborated it. MacKenzie (2007a: 54) argues 
economics, ‘in the academic sense’, is, indeed, performative in such a way that ‘it does 
things, rather than simply describing (with greater or lesser degrees of accuracy) an 
external reality that is not affected by economics’; he demonstrates it by revealing the 
crucial role that financial theory, namely the theory of options, has played in the 
transformation of the global derivatives market (see also MacKenzie 2003a, 2004a, 
2006). Used as analytical tool, the concept helped to demonstrate how the social 
authority of economics has made the derivatives market possible (MacKenzie and Millo 
2003). The performativity of economics concept was also involved in examining 
experimental economics (Guala 2001, 2007; Muniesa and Callon 2007).  
 
The performative character of economics as an academic discipline or, in other words, 
an expert knowledge, cannot but lead to a further question of whether such a domain of 
expert knowledge as law is performative with regard to derivatives markets. Notably, in 
his work on performative utterances Austin (1962) uses a number of juridical examples. 
For instance, he refers to the American law of evidence where ‘a report of what someone 
else said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance of our performative kind: 
because this is regarded as a report no so much of something he said […], but rather as 
something he did, an action of his’ (Austin 1962: 13, emphasis in original). Moreover, in 
his search of an exact term for some statements that perform rather than describe, Austin 
is even tempted to use the legal technical term ‘operative’, given that ‘it is used strictly 
by lawyers in referring to that part, i.e. those clauses, of an instrument which serves to 
effect the transaction […] which is its main object, whereas the rest of the document 
merely “recites” the circumstances in which the transaction is to be effected’ (Austin 
1962: 7). If operative legal clauses are performative utterances, and if they perform 
                                                
9 See Callon (2005) and Holm (2007) rebutting the criticism.    
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rather than describe, how does law perform a derivatives market? The links between a 
legal technicality and production of a market, which MacKenzie (2005b) urges us to 
explore, may have variously important outcomes: from formatting an already existing 
market to ultimately producing a particular trade. These outcomes remain to be seen by 
way of opening the black box called ‘regulation’.  
 
Review of the literature                  
 
I have identified the regulation of the cash-settled derivative trade of the US dollar/ 
Russian rouble exchange rate as a particular box to open10.  Clearly, this subject of 
enquiry makes the study interdisciplinary: it requires examination of various related 
research fields. First of all, what are the findings of the enquiries into derivatives 
markets beyond economics? Are there any sociological investigations of relationships 
between law and the economy? How can the existing analysis of state-market relations 
help my enquiry? How are law and regulations made; are there any investigations of 
financial law-making?  
 
Derivatives beyond economics  
 
Research fields other than economics hold scant investigations of derivatives markets, as 
confirmed by MacKenzie (2007, 2009) and Arnoldi (2004). Most of them are focused on 
‘the overall nature of derivatives’ (MacKenzie 2007: 357). There would seem to be two 
dominant characteristics of derivatives the researchers agreed upon: these financial 
instruments are both virtual and concerned with risk and uncertainty.  
 
Pryke and Allen (2000: 265) argue financial innovations, such as derivatives, 
transformed the speed and interactive properties of risks and therefore appeared to be 
‘new forms of money, a new monetization of time-space’, embodying ‘money’s “new” 
                                                
10 The rationale for this choice is going to be discussed in the next Chapter of the thesis.  
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adaptability and flexibility in a post Bretton Woods world’11. LiPuma and Lee (2004, 
2005) insist derivatives represent ‘the notion of abstract risk’, and thus facilitate ‘the rise 
of circulation’. Production is no longer a ‘fundamental reality’ of the global economy, 
therefore we witness ‘the increasing autonomy of circulation’ and derivatives are crucial 
to this process: 
 
The notion of abstract risk, embodied in the derivative and propelled by a self-
expanding speculative capital, is globally significant because abstract risk 
function as a social mediation, creating a new form of interdependence in the 
sphere of circulation even as circulation itself grows increasingly autonomous 
from production (LiPuma and Lee 2005: 422).   
 
Arnoldi (2004: 39) agrees with the concept of derivatives as risks’ embodiment, 
pursuing the discussion by stating that this ‘objectified uncertainty’ is ‘only possible by 
means of technologies that render the possible virtual, that is, which give future risks 
being “in practice”’. Thus, his central argument is that as a technology derivatives 
produce and exploit risk at the same time, and such employment of risk (or uncertainty) 
is possible by ‘virtualizing it’: 
 
When something comes to exist ‘in practice’, but not in reality in the strict sense, 
it can be said to be virtual. Hence, we shall […] talk about derivatives as virtual 
assets or virtual goods (Arnoldi 2004: 24).      
 
However, ‘virtuality is always a material effect, indeed an elaborate, sophisticated and 
expensive one’, argues MacKenzie (2007b: 357, 2009): 
 
To be sure, one should not reduce materiality to physicality alone. The 
materiality […] involves physical objects, technological systems and human 
bodies, but also the legal system, cultures, procedures, beliefs and social relations 
that objects and bodies express, make possible, are shaped by and enmeshed in. 
Financial derivatives, abstract though as they appeared, are particular material 
configurations (with material read in this broad sense).   
                                                
11 For other research that also analyses derivatives as a form of money, although viewing them ‘beyond the 
discourse of risk’, see Bryan and Rafferty (2007). MacKenzie (2009: 65) also thinks that ‘the development 
of derivatives markets can be seen as a further stage of the abstraction of monetary forms’.   
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For example, MacKenzie and Millo (2003) and MacKenzie (2006, 2007a) illustrate the 
complex, perplexingly entangled materiality of virtual derivatives by a historical 
sociology narrative of the establishment of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE), demonstrating the impact of the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing theory 
(1973) on option trading, hence the process of the market construction. Effectively, 
MacKenzie (2007b, 2009) suggests three issues that can facilitate the exploration of ‘the 
material production of virtuality’: ‘innovation, cultural geography and facticity’. 
Comparing financial derivatives with technological innovation, he argues they bear 
resemblance in, for instance, the essential role of science12. As for the ‘facticity’ and 
‘cultural geography’ issues, MacKenzie claims they have not yet been fully developed, 
although he refers to the works of Millo et al. (2005) and Maurer (2001, 2005) 
respectively.  
 
‘Facticity’ is a theme to delve into while looking at the materiality of highly virtual cash-
settled derivatives. Derivatives are contracts that can be settled in two ways.  Physical 
settlement signifies that the item of the contract, say a currency, is to be delivered to the 
buyer at a certain day in the future. But what if there is nothing to deliver, for example, 
an interest rate or a financial index? Cash-settlement helps to resolve this: on a day the 
contract is due a buyer and a seller pay the difference between a contracted price and a 
current price of an item13. This appears as an excellent solution for financial derivatives, 
yet on one very important condition: ‘the measure used to determine cash-settlement 
sums – whether it be a price, an index level, an interest rate […] – must be a fact’ 
(MacKenzie 2007b: 368, emphasis in original), i.e. ‘it must be acceptable representation 
of the reality of which it speaks, and not be subject to manipulation’ (MacKenzie 2009: 
                                                
12 As MacKenzie (2007b: 360) puts it, ‘academic economics has underpinned derivatives trading both 
technically and by providing legitimacy, especially against the charge of gambling […]. However, key 
innovations in exchange-traded derivatives have involved economists who left academia to work in the 
markets […]’.  
13 The mechanics and importance of cash-settlement are to be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
thesis.  
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66). The introduction of LIBOR (an interest rate) serves as an example of construction 
of an ‘adequate representation of the underlying market’ (MacKenzie 2007b, 2009: 79).    
 
The ‘fact’ construction machinery, or rather one of its developments, is explored by 
Millo et al. (2005). A clearinghouse machine14 is at stake here, and the authors believe 
that ‘those very “detachment technologies” that developed in order to organise and 
simplify financial transactions introduce new complexities to contemporary financial 
markets because of the additional calculative power’ (Millo et al. 2005: 243). This 
‘calculative power’ has been granted to the disentangling apparatuses by derivatives 
themselves, due to the necessity of estimating and managing these risky instruments, 
thereby the ‘risk-based clearing methods’ have ‘introduced the market scene back again 
into the calculative space’ (Millo et al. 2005: 242).     
 
As for the ‘cultural geography’ perspective on derivatives and their materiality, 
ethnographic studies are of crucial importance here. Bill Maurer’s investigations (2001) 
started from the question: ‘How do people […] in different financial cultures understand, 
transform and use derivatives when they are working with their own financial practices 
which may not have been derived from Western economic principles?’ (Maurer 2001: 
8). The answer is that the derivatives circulating in ‘different financial cultures’ are 
‘contingent’, i.e. they are circumstantial, therefore  liable to materialise or not, 
depending on existing varieties of local settings. For example, Islamic culture and 
contemporary politics are settings that specify technicalities of financial practices, thus 
originate a so called ‘Islamic future’ (Maurer 2001: 8, 11).  
 
Unfortunately, ethnographic studies that explore how cultural settings shape and format 
derivatives trading or, as Pryke and du Gay (2007: 347) put it, ‘how these markets relate 
to wider “parent” cultures’ are limited: ‘“place” no longer matters greatly’ (MacKenzie 
                                                
14 A clearinghouse is a system that enables settlements between trading parties. As Millo et al (2005: 233) 
put it for the purpose of the paper, it is ‘an institution that interposes itself between the counterparties and 
operates as a “third party” in the disentanglement of trades and the resolution of obligations between 
counterparties’.  
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2009: 65). Alongside aforementioned Maurer (2001, 2005) there are ethnographic 
narratives of the history of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (MacKenzie and Millo 
2003; MacKenzie 2006) where, for example, ‘the cultures of the Chicago markets’ 
which were ‘created by collective action’ is one of the themes explored (MacKenzie and 
Millo 2003: 112, 116). 
 
MacKenzie (2007b, 2009: 73-74) argues ‘the establishment of LIFFE15 highlights [that] 
[…] trading is a cultural as well as an economic activity’: situated in London, therefore 
being at the heart of gentlemanly trading culture, described as being scornful of ‘small-
minded pursuit of pecuniary advantage’, the exchange, nevertheless, ‘plumped 
unequivocally for Chicago culture over gentlemanly capitalism, opting symbolically for 
Chicago’s brightly coloured trading jackets rather than the dark suits and black shoes 
traditional in the City’. On the other hand, a ‘market maker who moved from Chicago to 
LTOM [the London Traded Options Market] in 1986 […] found the attempt to translate 
Chicago attitudes and practices to London sometimes uncomfortable’. Chicago and 
London trading cultures were also delved into by Zaloom (2003, 2006).  
 
Ethnographic enquiries into arbitrage, which is a form of derivatives trading16, made by 
Miyazaki (2003, 2007), also reveal the importance of ‘cultural geography’. For instance, 
the process of ‘importing the U.S. arbitrage market to Japan’ was not straightforward: 
admittedly, ‘Japanese culture’ did not let it proceed in the same ‘go-getting’ vein as U.S. 
arbitrageurs would trade (Miyazaki 2003: 258).      
 
Given that the foreign exchange global market is a market where derivatives account for 
about 66% of the total trade17 (BIS 2007: 4), its analysis is essential to the ‘cultural 
geography’ approach. The study of Clark and Thrift (2005) maintains that the Forex 
interbank trade is ‘a global but also a spatially sensitive process’ (Clark and Thrift 2005: 
                                                
15 LIFFE is the London International Financial Futures and Option Exchange.   
16 But not just that; arbitrage will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
17 Chapter 5 of the thesis will discuss this in detail.  
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230): the researchers relate the importance of spatiality to bureaucracies, given that ‘the 
broad contours of [Forex trading] activity are understood and subject to the power of 
bureaucratic routine’ (Clark and Thrift 2005: 245).   
 
Although the ‘cultural geography’ of derivatives trading is a research direction 
embodied by very few studies, the importance of ‘spatial and cultural location’ 
(MacKenzie 2007b: 357) for economic and financial activities has been recognised for 
years. For example, the ethnography of the New York Stock Exchange trading floor and 
a number of the U.S. investment banks has resulted in the statement that cultural norms 
shape trader behaviour: ‘opportunism on the trading floor, like all other economic 
behaviours, is embedded in a specific social and cultural milieu’ (Abolafia 1996: 10). 
There are studies in economic geography that urge a focus on spatialities of global 
finance (Thrift 1994, 2000, 2002, 2004; Tickell 2000). Moreover, the term ‘the cultural 
economy of finance’ has appeared (Pryke and du Gay 200718).    
 
As a part of the ‘cultural geography’ perspective on derivatives, legal technicalities are 
crucial, argues MacKenzie (2007b: 368): ‘“Culture” is […] not simply “the context” 
within which derivatives trading takes place. Via matters such as the law of gambling, it 
shapes and is intermeshed with the detailed mechanics of this trading’. Innovative 
financial practices have not been instantly recognised as respectable and legally 
enforceable, there is, as MacKenzie (2007b: 365) puts it, ‘the trace left in the legal 
system of hostility to gambling’. In fact, how is it that ‘modern finance has acquired the 
reputation of economic necessity and scientific respectability when less than two 
centuries ago it stood condemned as irreputable gambling and fraud?’ (de Goede 2005: 
ix). Undoubtedly, this is the question of paramount importance; however it has been 
assessed by very few investigations; notably the work by de Goede (2005), also Preda 
(2005a), MacKenzie and Millo (2003), MacKenzie (2006), and Millo (2007).  
                                                
18 Pryke and du Gay (2007) give a detailed review of studies that investigate modern finance with a ‘focus 
on the heterogeneous ways in which objects and persons (firms, markets, consumers) are “made up” or 
“assembled” by the discourses’ (Pryke and du Gay 2007: 340).  
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Based on a detailed historical account of attitudes to gambling, de Goede (2005) argues, 
that as an alternative to prohibition, the eighteen century’s ‘moral problematization’ of 
gambling, which ‘sought to moderate, regulate, and condition’, caused ‘the emergence 
of speculation as a legitimate practice’ (de Goede 2005: 54). Also applying a historical 
sociology approach, Preda (2005a) links the legitimisation of gambling to the 
‘transformation of investment into a science’ and to the emergence of so called ‘true 
speculation’: the nineteenth century French socialists’ idea of speculation as ‘an intrinsic 
feature of human nature and as an expression of human freedom’ has underpinned the 
equal ‘social access to financial investments’ (Preda 2005a: 155-156). Also in the 
nineteenth century the attempts to distinguish an enforceable cash-settled contract from a 
bet were made. The settlement of the contract made in cash, not by delivery of goods, 
allowed for viewing such contracts as wagers. However, the ‘intent test’ (Swan 2000: 
212-213) served as a tool that drew a line between a wager and a cash-settled future: if 
there was an intention to deliver the goods of the contract, such contract was considered 
to be legitimate. A century later the acknowledgement of the legitimacy, moreover, the 
necessity of speculation was facilitated by the appearance of the notion of financial risk; 
however, ‘the discursive separation between gambling, speculation, and finance 
practices remains unstable and continues to haunt modern credit practices’, due to the 
fact that ‘the possibility of the distinction between gambling and finance hinges on 
perception of morality, character, and excess rather than being inherent in nature or 
economics’ (de Goede 2005: 85, 84).      
 
Nevertheless, according to MacKenzie and Millo (2003: 113-114) economics came to 
the rescue when the re-introduction of potentially successful options happened to be 
‘culturally problematic’ in late 1960s – early 1970s in the U.S.: 
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As CBT officials began to float the idea of options trading with SEC19 in late 
1960s, they encountered what they took to be instinctual hostility, based in part 
upon corporate memory of the role options had played in the malpractices of the 
1920s (MacKenzie and Millo 2003: 113-114).   
 
However, economics helped to justify options, thus bolstering the contract with their 
authority (MacKenzie and Millo 2003). Moreover, the same study demonstrates that the 
legal implementation of the demarcation between gambling and investment activities in 
the United States caused the delay of the introduction of an index futures contract: 
 
The most attractive foundation for a derivative exchange was a futures contract 
on a stock market index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average. That idea, 
however, fell foul of how the moral distinction between gambling and legitimate 
futures trading had been crystallized legally early in the 20th-century United 
States. A futures contract was legal, the Supreme Court ruled in 1905, if it could 
be settled by physical delivery of a commodity such as grain. If it could be 
settled only in cash, it was an illegal wager. Since an index was an abstraction, 
there was no straightforward way in which an index future could be settled other 
than in cash (MacKenzie and Millo 2003: 113).     
 
‘In consequence,’ continues MacKenzie (2007b: 366), ‘although the Chicago exchanges 
had wished to introduce futures on stock indexes from the late 1960s onwards, they were 
unable to do so until 1982’.  
 
I would argue that the legal implementation of the demarcation between gambling and 
investment activities was still problematic at the beginning of 21st century and in this I 
will join de Goede (2005) in her claim that the gambling status of derivatives ‘continues 
to haunt modern credit practices’. As with index-based futures (MacKenzie and Millo 
2003, MacKenzie 2006, Millo 2007), or insurance (O’Malley 2003), the cash-settlement 
of currency forwards made problematic their status, and thus their legal enforceability in 
Russia in 1998-2007. It is exactly the attempts to get around the problem of the 
                                                
19 CBT is the Chicago Board of Trade; SEC is the Securities and Exchange Commission, the main U.S. 
financial market regulatory body.  
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gambling status of these contracts that I will employ to demonstrate the importance of 
legal expertise in a market construction process.  
 
The ‘facticity’ and ‘cultural geography’ perspectives that reveal materiality of virtual 
derivatives (MacKenzie 2007b, 2009) are both, in fact, a part of the ‘material sociology’ 
(Beunza et al. 2006), and the latter recommends yet more ‘devices’ to explore in 
derivatives markets: 
 
The notion of ‘device’ can […] suggest a bifurcation of agency: the person on 
one side and the machine on the other, the trader on one side and the trading 
screen on the other […]. In our view this bifurcation needs to be avoided […]. 
Instead of considering distributed agency as the encounter of (already ‘agenced’) 
persons and devices, it is always possible to consider it as the very result of these 
compound agencements20 (and this applies to economic action in particular) 
(Muniesa et al. 2007: 2).     
 
 For example, in investigating market settings and depicting a particular market, such as, 
say, the cash-settled derivative trade of the US dollar/ Russian rouble exchange rate, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that ‘equipment matters: it changes the nature of the economic 
agent, of economic action, and of markets’ (MacKenzie 2009: 13). For instance, Sassen 
(2005) explains that the global proliferation of financial markets was due to 
technological innovations (‘digitalization’). She discerns three major aspects of this 
correlation: complex computer products caused the spread of innovations and upsurge of 
liquidity followed by ‘the possibilities of liquefying forms of wealth hitherto considered 
non-liquid’; ‘digitalization’ made possible ‘simultaneous interconnected flows and 
transactions, and decentralized access for investors’; lastly, all these transformations 
‘contribute to multiply the number of transactions, the length of transaction chains (i.e. 
                                                
20 The term ‘agencement’ emphasises the importance of inseparability of agencies and arrangements. In 
this respect agencements are arrangements which are capable ‘to act and give meaning to action’ (Callon 
2005: 4; see also, for example, Callon 2008; Hardie and MacKenzie 2007b; MacKenzie 2009).  
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distance between instruments and underlying asset), and thereby the number of 
participants’(Sassen 2005: 19) 21.  
 
As for foreign exchange or currency markets, equipment is constitutive there, since these 
are markets ‘on screen’ and the screen ‘is not simply a “medium” for the transmission of 
pre-reflexive interactions’, argues Knorr Cetina (2005a) in her study of global Forex 
trading: ‘the screen is a building site on which a whole economic and epistemological 
world is erected’ (Knorr Cetina 2005a: 48)22. However, there is more to it: the interbank 
currency trade is an excellent example for analysing what the global is made of. Knorr 
Cetina (2005a, 2005b) argues Forex markets ‘have become disembedded and decoupled 
from networks and exhibit […] a flow architecture’ (Knorr Cetina 2005b: 122).  The 
latter is a structure that maintains the ‘flow’, i.e. ‘[the] forwarded features as well as the 
aggregate positions and accounts that circle the globe while changing continuously with 
activities and events’ (Knorr Cetina 2005a: 58). Yet, to be able to grasp the essence of 
the globality and fluidity of the interbank currency trade, one has to use a micro-
sociological approach: ‘microsocial structures and relationships are what instantiate 
some of the most globally extended domains’ (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002a: 907). 
The researchers claim the ‘microstructures’ are ‘regular patterns of integration’, they are 
‘global in scope but microsocial in character’ (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002a: 905). 
 
Here I would emphasise the link between the global and the local which is finely defined 
by the researchers; however, I would argue that the microstructures are not detached 
from ‘local settings’ as Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002a: 907) and also Knorr Cetina 
(2005: 39) would claim. Their studies stress the disengaged character of the global 
interbank currency trading facilitated by an electronic brokerage system (EBS):  
 
                                                
21 For more research on the importance of technical equipment see, for example Beunza and Stark 2004; 
Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie 2006; Knorr Cetina and Grimpe 2008; Muniesa 2007, 2008; Preda 2006, 
2008a.   
22 In Chapter 5 of the thesis I will illustrate the depiction of the USD/RUB derivatives market with a 
snapshot of such a screen: the screen is clear and straightforward for currency traders and opaque for 
outsiders. 
22 
[…] The electronic interconnections which […] link all participating institutions, 
including the service provider firms, are not simply coextensive with social 
networks through which transactions flow. As electronic networks they 
correspond to different construction criteria, involve electronic nodes and 
linkages irrelevant to social relationships, and what flows through them 
frequently does not derive from social and financial relationships […] (Knorr 
Cetina 2005: 45, emphasis added).  
 
Such irrelevance of local settings to the flows of the electronic brokerage system does 
not seem to be the case. On the contrary, along with prices, the flows of EBS contain 
other crucial information, and the effectiveness of this electronic tool, both ‘reflexive 
and performative’ (Knorr Cetina 2005: 46, emphasis in original), depends on, for 
example, whether settlement of transactions takes place as expected. Thus there is a 
linkage to another electronic system called the Real Time Gross Settlement System 
(RTGS). The RTGS is, in fact, a variety of geographically located systems and not all of 
them function efficiently, due to specific politics affecting their performance. For 
example, Riles (2004) gives an ethnographical account of ‘the politics of Real Time 
[RTGS]’ (Riles 2004: 400) and ‘technocratic knowledge’ involved in the 
implementation of RTGS in Japan. Chapter 5 of the thesis will also discuss this link 
between EBS and Russian RTGS and the way it affects USD/RUB trade.  
      
Economic sociology of law – Sociology of law and the economy 
 
It would seem as if ‘no effort has been made to develop a systematic and general 
[sociological] analysis of the role that law plays in economic life’ (Swedberg 2003: 
210). Therefore, works of Swedberg (2003) and Edelman and Stryker (2005) are the 
pioneering studies that attempt to establish such an analysis. What is more, these studies 
claim they do not represent merely sociological contributions to the knowledge 
regarding the extent to which the law shapes the economy. The researchers make 
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programmatic statements by countering the ‘law and economics’23 tradition with 
sociological explorations of the relationship between law and the economy:  
 
[…] Law and economics assumes that individuals are rational actors who seek to 
maximize their preferences. Law and economics scholarship generally treats 
preferences as fixed and exogenous; the social (and indeed, legal) origins of 
preferences are outside of the economic model (Edelman and Stryker 2005: 527).  
 
Swedberg (2003: 189, emphasis in original) argues that ‘law and economics’ research is 
‘explicitly normative in nature and advocates how judges should behave and how 
legislation should be constructed – usually so that wealth is maximized’. On the 
contrary, sociological explanations of the bond between law and the economy would be 
able to explicate the social embeddedness of law and economic practices, due to the fact 
that that both these practices have an underlying social nature (Swedberg 2003; Edelman 
and Stryker 2005).  
 
However, being united in their criticism of ‘law and economics’ scholars, and in their 
advocacy of the sociological approach, the researchers claim they are then split from this 
point forward over the analytical framework guiding their investigations. As an 
analytical tool, Swedberg (2003) employs the Weberian approach, notably the ‘society-
centred scheme for social economics’, which postulates the necessity of ‘analysis in 
which law is subordinate to the general development of society (including the economy), 
rather than one in which law and its evolution is seen as primary’ (Swedberg 2003: 190-
191). Hence the researcher advocates using the term ‘economic sociology of law’, and 
insists upon the objective ‘to produce careful empirical studies of the role that law plays 
in the economic sphere – drawing primarily […] on an analysis that highlights […] 
social relations’ (Swedberg 2003: 190): 
 
                                                
23 Based on the assumption of rationality of atomised economic actors whose economic behaviour aims at 
acquisition of gain, the ‘law and economics’ researchers treat law and regulation as a tool to deal with 
market malfunctions.  
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[…] The few studies that exist in this genre testify to such a degree of complexity 
in the interaction of law and economy that one would like to issue a general 
warning for studies that produce sweeping answers to the question of how legal 
institutions function in the economy, including the question of the overall role of 
law in the economy. To study the role of law in ongoing economy, would be one 
way to describe what the main task of the economic sociology of law should be 
(Swedberg 2003: 190, emphasis added).  
 
To make the economic sociology of law approach more explicit, Swedberg (2003) 
summarises investigative aims of allied research fields, such as sociology of law, 
Marxist sociology of law and ‘law and economics’. He argues that their tasks, which 
respectively are to demonstrate social properties of the law in the economy, the 
economic impact on law, ‘the way in which the legal system helps to further economic 
growth’ and ‘can slow down and block [it]’, should be taken up by studies of the 
economic sociology of law (Swedberg 2003: 190).  
 
Edelman and Stryker (2005) suggest a different analytical agenda, called ‘sociology of 
law and the economy’: 
 
Whereas the former term [economic sociology of law] would suggest that we 
were using existing economic sociology perspectives to explain the role of law in 
society, the latter term [sociology of law and the economy] implies theorizing 
and empirically investigating the multiple social mechanisms or processes 
through which legal and economic action and institutions become part of an 
interconnected causal dynamic (Edelman and Stryker 2005: 527, emphasis in 
original).   
 
In this way the researchers establish a claim that economic sociology, as well as the ‘law 
and economics’ scholars, see law as ‘state-promulgated formal rules’, attaching no 
importance to law as ‘a broad set of norms, customs, schema, and symbols […] [which] 
include, but are not restricted to, formal rules’ (Edelman and Stryker 2005: 529). For this 
reason the authors put forward the ‘political-institutional perspective on the intersection 
of law and the economy’, which means that ‘socially constructed’ markets and law are 
interconnected by two ‘social processes’: 
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[…] Institutional processes that involve the production and widespread 
acceptance of particular constructions of law and compliance, and political 
processes that help to shape which constructions of law are produced and 
become institutionalized and who benefits from those constructions (Edelman 
and Stryker 2005: 531, emphasis in original).              
 
I would emphasise two important arguments in these discussions. First, Swedberg (2003: 
190) insists on the ‘careful empirical studies’ to reveal ‘the role of law in ongoing 
economy’. I would argue that this suggestion may indeed be equivalent to the ‘studies of 
technicalities’ which social studies of finance aim at. Secondly, Edelman and Stryker 
(2005: 537, emphasis on original) are advocates of the ‘political-institutional 
perspective’ in their arguing that ‘questions of what the law facilitates and for whom 
should be important guides to empirical research’. This insight can be completed with an 
assumption that any delay in legal development can be linked to, or caused by the ‘meta-
bargaining’ (Carruthers and Halliday 1998) as politics that affects law-making. 
Moreover, a ‘turf war’ as ‘intrajurisdictional competition’ (Partnoy 2001) or 
disagreement among the regulatory authorities is known to have an effect on the 
duration and the outcome of debates over a piece of legislation that shapes a particular 
market.     
 
State-market relations: the ‘condominium’ tested by globalisation 
 
Undoubtedly, ‘we cannot say of an organized market activity that it exists without the 
state’; yet, the state’s activities ‘do not organize the actions and economic behaviours 
which already exist, outside of state action; they format these actions’ (Callon 1998: 40-
41).  
 
In fact, the practice of separation of the state and economy has also been challenged by 
the international political economy and economic sociology scholars. The discipline of 
international political economy has become possible by enunciating a principle of 
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collaborative political and economic analysis (Polanyi 1957, Moran and Wright 1991, 
Strange 1994, Stubbs and Underhill 2006). It postulates that ‘the political and economic 
domains cannot be separated in any real sense [and][…] political interaction is one of 
the principal means through which the economic structures of the market are established 
and in turn transformed’, and calls for more empirical research based upon so called ‘a 
state-market condominium’ (Underhill 2000: 806, 820-821, emphasis in original).  
 
The economic sociology scholars offer the ‘economic sociology of politics’ subject area 
and one of the principal tasks is to demonstrate ‘how the state establishes and polices 
many of the basic rules of the economy, including the legal rules’ (Swedberg 2003: 
160). The economic sociologists also reject the state-economy schism urging a ‘focus on 
the state in the economy rather than discuss the state and the economy’ (Swedberg 2003: 
161, emphasis in original), given that ‘state and economy are not analytically 
autonomous realms but are mutually constituting spheres of activity’ (Block and Evans 
2005: 505). The researchers use the concept of embeddedness to demonstrate the way 
the state and economy interact and their notion of the embeddedness is that ‘both states 
and economies are embedded in societies that have specific institutional structures’ and 
these structures ‘reshape the ways that states and economies intersect’ (Block and Evans 
2005: 505). Thus, the ‘specific institutional structures’ is a framework which formats 
each individual economic or political actor and their interactions.  
 
Also employing a notion of embeddedness, the ‘political-cultural approach’ is another 
attempt to escape the analytical state-market opposition and in so doing it situates social 
action in ‘fields’ which connect the state and the economy through collective actors’ 
‘interpretive frameworks’: 
 
Market orders are governed by a general set of rules. These rules are the common 
understandings and laws that allow capitalists firms to exist. General ideas of 
market orders are embedded within a particular society and a government and 
reflect the society’s peculiar history. The dominance of different groups in 
society means that those rules tend to reflect one set of interests over another. 
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[…] Using the idea of markets as fields requires one to specify what a market is, 
who the players are, what it means to be an incumbent and a challenger, and how 
the social relationships and cultural understandings that come into play create 
stable fields by solving the main problems of competition and controlling 
uncertainty (Fligstein 2001: 16-17). 
 
The notion of embeddedness employed by both approaches within an economic 
sociology – the economic sociology of politics and the political-cultural approach – is, 
however, different from the one adopted in this research. My research is guided by the 
concept of embeddedness as it is understood by Granovetter (1985) and Callon (1998). 
They argue that a network of relations does not shape or connect already existing 
individual actors; it is an ‘ongoing’ (Granovetter 1985: 487) co-performance of actors 
and a network or, as Callon (1998: 8) puts it, ‘not a network which connecting entities 
which are already there, but a network which configures ontologies’: 
 
The agents, their dimensions, and what they are and do, all depend on the 
morphology of the relations in which they are involved. […] The network, in this 
sense, does not link agents with an established identity (that is to say, endowed 
with a set of fixed interests and stable preferences) to form what would be a rigid 
social structure constituting the framework in which individual actions are 
situated. […] The agent is neither immersed in the network nor framed by it; in 
other words, the network does not serve as a context. Both agent and network 
are, in a sense, two sides of the same coin (Callon 1998: 8). 
 
The ‘cultural political economy’ approach (Jessop 2005) sees the economy as a 
knowledge-based domain, i.e. as ‘a complex, heterogeneous, and variable assemblage of 
social relations which are articulated to a distinctive set of subjectivities and mediated 
through material objects and social institutions’ (Jessop 2005: 142). Considering the 
state in the same vein, i.e. as an aggregation of social relations, the researcher builds up 
the following link: these social relations ‘orient political actions that influence the 
institutional architecture of the state and the exercise of its various state powers’, such 
as, for instance, the ‘juridico-political powers’ that constitute ‘the globalizing KBE 
[knowledge-based economy]’ (Jessop 2005: 155). 
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In order to demonstrate the existing co-performativity of economic and political 
activities, Barry (2005) suggests the ‘anti-political economy’ approach. The researcher 
places an emphasis on the non-political aspects of the state’s politics, since the political 
implies a disagreement, whereas he insists ‘the vast technical apparatus of politics’, such 
as regulatory technicalities, authorities, experts and so on, changes the nature of political 
activities (‘governments have become less concerned with questions of distribution and 
public ownership, and more concerned with fostering a culture of regulation, monitoring 
[…]’) alongside with the fact that ‘the organisation of economic activity becomes a 
political matter’ (Barry 2005: 95).   
 
Based on the overall recognition of existence of the ‘state-market condominium’, 
numerous researchers explore the interconnection of the state and financial markets. As 
Fligstein (2001: 210) points out, there is an undeniable crucial role state authorities 
played in financial markets’ development and argues historically ‘governments have 
been instrumental in creating financial markets to benefit themselves and their most 
politically connected elites’. Moreover, ‘almost all of the recent crises are the result of 
intended or unintended governmental policy that was framed around the politics of 
domestic constituencies’ (Fligstein 2001: 211). 
 
Whether financial globalisation makes the state-market condominium less obvious and 
the state and global financial market less interconnected is a pivotal question asked by 
the researchers at the time when ‘the markets are predominantly global, while the 
authorities are predominantly national’ (Strange 1994: 91). Strange (1997: 21) thinks of 
the international financial markets as a ‘system in which the gamblers in the casino [of 
capitalism] have got out of hand, almost beyond, it sometimes seems, the control of 
governments’, thus articulating the viewpoint predominant amid the economic recession 
of 2008-2009. Mosley (2003) also pictures financial markets as challengers to 
governments. She argues that ‘governments’ responses’ to the challenge are determined 
by ‘the magnitude of financial market influence, the vulnerability of governments to 
financial market influence, and the ability of governments to avoid blame for the results 
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of financial market penalties’ (Mosley 2003: 158)24. Seemingly, the structure and 
development of international financial regulation examined by Underhill (1997) also 
confirms that the globalisation of financial markets rather negatively affects state 
authorities’ power: 
 
The transnationalisation and marketisation of financial markets has placed great 
pressures on exchange rate and monetary policy and has added volatility to the 
external balance of many states. These external constraints make it increasingly 
difficult for democratically elected governments to adopt policies against the 
preferences of ‘the markets’. Capital flight undermines the choices of legitimate 
political authorities and propels them towards a particular financial orthodoxy 
(Underhill 1997: 19).        
 
Using quantitative methods, Quinn (1997) attempts to evaluate the impact of 
‘international financial liberalization’ on the state-markets relations. By establishing 
links between the ‘openness’ measure and such variables as ‘government expenditures’, 
‘economic growth’ and ‘corporate taxation’, the researcher argues ‘economic growth is 
enhanced by liberalization’ and related to economic growth ‘higher corporate taxes and 
higher expenditure’ serve the government interests since ‘voters are notorious for 
preferring higher government expenditure paid by someone else’ (Quinn 1997: 541). 
Moran (1991:122) insists on ‘greater institutionalisation, codification and juridification’, 
seeing the latter as ‘the growing tendency to translate codified rules into statute, backed 
by state power and governed by legal reasoning’. The still influential, but ‘reorganised’ 
role of state authorities is advocated by Vogel (1996), who rejects deregulation, a widely 
accepted characterisation of financial liberalisation: 
 
[…] What we witnessed has been reregulation, not deregulation. That is, the 
governments of the advanced industrial countries have reorganised their control 
of private sector behaviour, but not substantially reduced the level of regulation. 
[…] In most cases of ‘deregulation’, governments have combined liberalization 
with reregulation, the reformulation of old rules and the creation of new ones. 
                                                
24 Though she is also careful to note large differences in various governments positions in respect to these 
facts. 
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Hence we have wound up with freer markets and more rules (Vogel 1996: 3, 
emphasis in original).     
 
Enquiries into financial law-making  
 
The manufacturing of rules and laws, however, is a process which is not politics-free. 
The political economy perspective suggests analysing ‘the politics of financial 
regulation’: 
 
Rather than take regulation as given, the political economy approach attempts to 
provide a positive analysis of how and why regulations evolve as they do and 
what forces can lead to their durability as well as their potential for change 
(Kroszner 2000: 25).   
 
 Thus, according to Pagano and Volpin (2001: 504), the application of this approach 
would help to comprehend ‘why some countries end up with “poorly designed” financial 
institutions’. Rajan and Zingales (2003: 7) also maintain that ‘the strength of political 
forces in favour of financial development is a major […] factor’ that explains varieties in 
maturity of national financial market structures. For example, ‘legislators’ voting 
decisions on financial services regulations [are influenced by] […] competing interest 
groups’ (Stratmann 2002: 345; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). Regulatory outcomes are 
also defined as ‘the result of the balance of power between social and economic 
constituencies’ (Pagano and Volpin 2001: 503).   
 
In political economy, the notion of interest is notably present in all above mentioned 
studies of financial legislation politics. The same can be said about the enquiries within 
economic sociology. While mapping out the ‘sociology of markets’ field, Fligstein 
(2001) encourages the investigation of legal rules dominant in markets; in so doing he 
advocates an interest-based approach to investigation of market regulatory frameworks. 
He argues that laws indicate the most influential groups’ interests: rules that ‘govern’ 
markets are ‘embedded within a particular society’, thus narrowing them down ‘to 
reflect one set of interests over another’ (Fligstein 2001: 16). Accordingly, it would 
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seem that processes of making laws and regulations – those that shape and transform 
financial markets - are reduced to conflicting interests: as soon as the balance is found a 
rule is set.  
 
Carruthers and Halliday (1998: 5) observe ‘deep-seated socio-legal and sociological 
disinterest in the origins of statutory law […] [and] financial legislation in general’. 
Although this observation was made ten years ago, there is still lack of concern in 
politics and/or technicalities of financial law-making in sociology25. A few exceptions 
are the study of insider trading regulation undertaken by McCahery (1997), the large-
scale work of Carruthers and Halliday (1998, 2007) that delves into details of the British 
and American bankruptcy reforms, and the examination of the legal implementation of 
netting in Japan undertaken by Riles (2000).     
 
In his analysis of the development of the U.S. and European insider trading regulation, 
McCahery (1997) looks at national ‘pressure groups’ and the way they influence the 
dynamics of regulation. The study goes into the conflict of ‘market professionals and 
corporate insiders’ and demonstrates its impact on regulation; in conclusion it highlights 
the importance of ‘the strategic relationship between regulated interest groups, the 
national regulator and political incumbents’ (McCahery 1997: 71). 
 
To understand ‘the origins of statutory law’ Carruthers and Halliday (1998) explore the 
bankruptcy law reforms in the United States and Britain in the 1970-1980s. Primarily, 
the researchers aim to ‘reverse the classic treatment of law on the books in relation to 
law in action, and trace the complex interplay among political ideologies, private 
interests, and professional expertise that separated the real-world practices that 
precipitated legal reform, from the ensuing legal revisions (on the books)’ (Carruthers 
and Halliday 1998: 7). In so doing, the study introduces the term ‘meta-bargaining’ as a 
                                                
25 In fact, this can be also said about socio-legal researchers, since they seemingly ‘have quite 
impoverished understanding of the very thing that defines [the] field, of what makes law as opposed to 
literature or economics or cognitive science: the technicalities of legal thought’ (Riles 2005: 974).    
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process of negotiation of legal constructs not within a given legal framework 
(bargaining), but about a ‘legal framework itself’: 
 
[The meta-bargaining] occurs in the polity rather than in the market. Yet meta-
bargaining is highly consequential for bargaining. How people transact in the 
market depends on the rules […] and these rules are set by meta-bargaining 
(Carruthers and Halliday 1998: 15-16).    
 
What I would consider as a pioneering and distinct quality of this research is its 
‘recursive account’ of a law-making process:  
 
Legislatures create statutes, government departments issue regulations, courts 
hand down decisions. Law flows from the ‘books’ into ‘action’. This enormously 
fertile area of study nevertheless remains one-sided […]. [However] Law in 
action [also] influences law on the books. This effect is also often mediated by 
professions, who because of their recognized expertise in interpreting and 
applying statutory law in the first place […] are frequently incorporated in 
statutory reforms (Carruthers and Halliday 1998: 53-54).  
  
Based on the above, I shall attempt to exemplify the recursive account of law-making 
that is to demonstrate, first, how law from the books goes into action and declares cash-
settled derivatives unenforceable. I shall then give a detailed account of the impact of the 
law in action (professional legal expertise) on the amendment of the law on the books, 
namely the Russian Civil Code.  I would also argue that the dominant interest-based 
approach to law-making results in the belief that the observed clashes of interests had 
been taking place in ‘an object-less social world’ or in ‘discursive dimension’ (Latour 
2005: 82, 84) with no constraining or enabling presence of objects, say, a law that 
already exists in a form of statutes, a ‘law on the books’ (Carruthers and Halliday 1998). 
However, ‘objects’ [e.g. textual entities] action is […] varied, their influence […] 
ubiquitous’ and cannot be disregarded in sociological investigations (Latour 2005: 85). 
The thesis is going to demonstrate the consequentiality of the existing statute, the 
Russian Civil Code, to the legal developments concerning interbank currency 
derivatives, i.e. to exemplify my argument which states that, alongside the law in action, 
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the existing law on the books also impacts the emergent law on the books. Finally, I am 
going to complete the account by clarifying the potential impact of the changed law on 
the books on the law in action and on the financial area regulated by the statute26.     
 
I would also emphasise the following statement made by Carruthers and Halliday (1998) 
that provided a useful insight for my study: ‘[…] meta-bargaining outcomes rest on two 
related processes: the dynamic of law-making itself, and the politics of those professions 
trying to control jurisdictional rights’ (Carruthers and Halliday 1998: 45). In fact, ‘any 
theory of law-making that involves professionals must be alert to struggles among 
professions, or fractions of professions, for control of jurisdictions’ (Carruthers and 
Halliday 1998: 54, emphasis in original).   
 
Indeed, to be able to understand the result of lingering negotiations and heated debates 
over the ‘just technicalities’ of legal wording, one has to bear in mind that these 
technicalities might as well be an outcome of ‘a turf war’, i.e. tensions between 
jurisdictions involved in regulation provided by the legislation in question. For example, 
there is a body of research that delves into the development of a regulatory framework 
for single-stock futures and the way a competition between two regulators, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), affected the ‘introduction’ of the financial instrument ‘to the financial world’ 
(Esau 2001: 917, Brodsky 2001, Partnoy 2001)27.    
 
The ‘recursivity of law’ tenet, put forward and exemplified by the bankruptcy reforms 
by Carruthers and Halliday (1998), finds its substantiation in ‘an integrated theory of 
                                                
26 Since the Russian Civil Code was amended only recently, by the moment of writing the thesis (2008-
2009) there were no court trials involving the statute. This is why I shall specify the potential, not the 
effective impact of the change.  
27 In fact, this regulatory competition between the SEC and CFTC was caused by the ‘overlapping 
jurisdiction’: ‘Before December 2000, the Sec and CFCT competed over regulation on single-stock futures 
for nearly two decades […]. Originally, the SEC [regulates stock trade] claimed it should have jurisdiction 
because single-stock futures behave like the underlying individual stocks and bonds; the CFTC [regulates 
futures trade] claimed it should have jurisdiction because such single-stock futures behave like futures. 
The result was stalemate, and a Congressional ban of trading of single-stock futures’ (Partnoy 2001: 644).  
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globalization and law’ (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). Here, the researchers argue that 
the neglect of law in studies of globalisation has an impoverishing effect on the latter: 
    
To the world polity school of globalization theory, the case of corporate 
bankruptcy reveals a set of processes by which global norms are generated, how 
division of labor and diversity of products and legitimation warrants can be 
melded into a single universal standard, and how these global norms are diffused 
through specific actors employing discernible mechanisms (Halliday and 
Carruthers 2007: 1196).   
 
In her examination of the legal implementation of netting in Japan, Riles (2000) also 
demonstrates how the rise of global derivatives triggers corresponding legal changes in 
national jurisdictions. The author argues that ‘the case of the Netting Law [netting is a 
technique that lowers all outstanding obligations between two parties thus minimizes the 
final sum to be settled between the parties; it cancels out mutually offsetting obligations] 
becomes particularly interesting for an inquiry into the character of global financial 
markets, their effects on the character of transitional law, and of the legal constitution of 
globalization and its relationship to “local” economic interests more broadly’ (Riles 
2000: 23, emphasis added). In this regard the study is an attempt to reinforce 
sociologically ‘the understanding of transnational legal processes’ in such a way, that to 
analyse ‘the character of interactions among transnational state and non-state actors’ 
instead of questioning ‘why actors obey’, since ‘formal […] rules are adopted 
internationally only to be given a multiplicity of local meanings at the implementation 
stage’ (Riles 2000: 56, 59 emphasis in original). With the objective of exploring the 
nature of the interactions that eventually fill the transnational ‘empty’ rules with local 
meanings, Riles draws heavily on technicalities of the process, thus substantiating ‘the 
sociology of legal reform [that is] the mix of institutions, individuals, organizations and 
interests’ implementing ‘the Netting Law’ (Riles 2000: 60). In my thesis I shall attempt 
to make a similar enquiry into ‘the legal constitution of globalization’ based on the case 
of the amendment of the Russian Civil Code and its implications for netting used by 
banks trading cash-settled forward contracts.  
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In the account of the analytical framework and literature existing on (and relevant to) the 
subject of my enquiry, I have sought to locate my research in particular theoretical 
settings, such as discussions within the social studies of finance (SSF), sociological 
explorations of the relationship between law and the economy, the examinations of state-
market relations and enquiry into financial law-making.  I have also identified a number 
of challenges my research aims to answer. In the next chapters of the thesis, which 
explore the legal developments crucial to the cash-settled currency forward market, I am 
going to address questions of the performativity of law, the materiality of virtual 
derivatives, the recursive character of the law-making process, and the crucial role of 
law in globalization.   
 
Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
If a chapter on methodology ‘transparently documents the research process’ (Silverman 
2005), then most definitely I have to start with reinforcing what my research is about.  
It all started in October 2005, while I was approaching a subject – derivatives markets – 
equipped with previous sociological learning, thus being convinced that all activities, 
whether financial, political or any other, are deeply rooted or embedded in the social. 
However, the latter, the notion of the social, was somehow rather vague. Surely, there 
are numerous and various definitions of the social in sociological literature and research, 
and I mentioned few of them in the previous Chapter. And yet, as soon as the adjective 
‘social’ is applied to a particular type of activity, i.e. as soon as this activity is put into ‘a 
social context’, the social becomes fuzzy and indistinct, it becomes everything and 
nothing, ubiquitous and invisible at the same time.   
 
Still, I strongly believed in the powerful social; for me there was no doubt it could serve 
as a key to better understanding of the subject I was fascinated with, namely derivatives 
markets. ‘Reassembling the Social’, the title of a new book by Bruno Latour (2005), 
seemed to be engaged with a similar problem and I approached the book for help. In 
fact, it is this work that helped me to formulate my confusion, to identify the nature of 
uncertainty about the social as a crucial notion in understanding different domains of 
human activity. With its help I could articulate my research discomfort in the way I just 
have.  
 
The practical guidance I have received from this book has indeed turned out to be 
abundantly productive. It resulted in my collecting such rich empirical data that it could 
not be all used and described in my thesis; I had to leave out a great number of episodes 
and stories. Yet, I shall relate the events as they actually happened.    
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Latour (2005: 4, 5, emphasis in original) states ‘“society”, far from being the context “in 
which” everything is framed, should rather be construed as one of the many connecting 
elements’ and ‘“social” is […] what is glued together by many other types of 
connectors’. Therefore, one has to abandon the notion of ‘social’ upon entering a field. 
First and foremost a researcher has to search for the connecting elements, by ‘tracing 
[…] associations’ as Latour puts it (2005: 5), ultimately assembling them into the social. 
In other words, a sociologist should not explain everything by referring it to the social, 
but should find and amass this social. The social is not an explanatory tool but an 
ultimate objective of the research. The only way to achieve this objective is to follow 
actors, notably human and non-human, to trace the associations and reproduce them in 
an account of the accumulated social. Clearly this must be done with specific reference 
to the place, in certain habitat, drawing on particular actors and associations. Applied to 
derivatives markets, it meant it will add no clarity if I explore the markets in their 
globality, staying outside and taking no interest in what happens on-site, in a particular 
site; in reality, ‘any candidate with a more “global” role […] sit[s] beside the “local” site 
it claims to explain’ (Latour 2005: 174, emphasis in original).  As Michel Callon (1998: 
51) puts it in his manifesto propounding ‘an anthropology of markets’, 
 
The market is no longer that cold, implacable and impersonal monster which 
imposes its laws and procedures while extending them even further. It is a many-
sided, diversified, evolving device which the social sciences as well as the actors 
themselves contribute to reconfigure.     
 
Seeing derivatives markets as ‘many-sided’, the initial theoretical assumption my 
research was grounded in was a pivotal role of legal expert knowledge in construction of 
a derivatives market. Moreover, this pivotal character of legal expertise was, in fact, a 
performative one, I hypothesised. This meant legal expertise embodied in a statute (or a 
regulation) was able to establish a certain financial activity, say derivatives trading, 
which had not been in place before the statute was enacted. With this in mind I faced 
another important question: where do I start?  
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Start with ‘controversies’, Latour (1987, 2005) replies. Controversies are debates and 
disagreements that take place ‘at earlier stages in the construction of facts’ and can be 
treated as signals of something being at an initial stage of its construction; besides, those 
who participate in controversies express their viewpoint and idea very explicitly, thus 
‘half of the job of interpreting the reasons behind the beliefs is already done!’(Latour 
1987: 25, 26).       
 
In a legal domain, Annelise Riles (2005: 980) also sees conflicts as a perfect terrain ‘to 
account for the agency of technocratic legal reform’. What is more, in legal practice the 
term ‘controversy’ also implies a lawsuit. Ultimately, all of these insights led me to a 
starting point for my research: a chain of lawsuits in Russia in 1998-1999, almost all of 
which resulted in court decisions that announced or confirmed unenforceability of one 
particular derivative contract, namely a cash-settled (non-deliverable) currency forward. 
Indeed, as Carolyn Jackson (2002), at that time an associate in the Allen & Overy 
international legal practice put it, ‘enforceability presents the greatest risk participants 
face in derivatives transactions’ and the Russian derivatives market seemed to be 
fighting the same enforceability battle the U.S. market went through in the 1970s 
(MacKenzie and Millo 2003, MacKenzie 2006).    
 
To find out more about this legal development and also about the current state of 
derivatives trading in Russia, in May 2006 I was lucky to get waiver of a fee of £12501, 
to allow me to attend an annual industry conference titled ‘Derivatives in Russia: Avoid 
the Risks and Outperform the Market’. The conference was held in London and Russian 
derivatives market participants were in the overwhelming majority at the event. In the 
market’s discussion the general voice was that the legal unenforceability and lack of 
adequate regulation were the main impediments for the development of a derivatives 
trade in Russia. Foreign counterparties also emphasised: 
 
                                                
1 Such a high fee for participation is typical for financial industry conferences, since I would assume that 
they are a crucial networking events that may turn out to be very profitable in the long run.   
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Our presence and activity in the Russian derivatives market would be much more 
intensive if we could work in a more market friendly legal environment (Sergei 
Avramov, General Counsel of BNP Paribas in the Russian Federation, Avramov 
2006).   
 
The unenforceability of cash-settled derivatives under Russian law was indeed a key 
matter, a controversy around which I found the most heated disputes. The two main 
points were: first, why after seven years of the debates, cash-settled forwards were still 
unenforceable and, second, what is the best and quick way to make them enforceable 
under Russian law. From that moment on I knew into what I was going to delve.  
 
I have chosen interviewing as a main method for collecting data on parliamentary or 
professional debates about legal enforceability of cash-settled derivatives. This choice 
was due to the fact that the substantial part of the debates is not publicly available, 
unfortunately. Later on my interviewees shared my concern:  
  
Z. After all, I liked the way it is in the U.S. A story of a [certain] legislation 
would be normally [publicly] available. And [its] discussion in legislative 
committees, and when it’s put to vote in the Congress. And this [story] is taken 
into consideration as a concept of the legislation, as its purposes. [I mean] in 
legal proceedings. We [in Russia] do not have it. Although I think… Well, we 
have it quite as a mere formality… All arrangements are made in advance, 
therefore [limited publicly available] polemic is of no consequence ( From an 
interview with Z, a lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with 
coordination, protection, and control of securities market participants, who is 
also known as one of the authors of the legislation I was looking into).   
 
J. This [a process of legal debates] differs fundamentally from [discussions at] 
the British parliament. At the moment all politics in Russia is absolutely behind 
the scenes. Absolutely. […] It is pointless to look for it in [transcript of Russian 
parliament] plenary sessions. May be in transcript of [Russian parliament] 
committee meetings, but they aren’t on the Internet2. […] In the parliament [there 
is] a new [political] arrangement. […] In this sense ‘the parliament is not a place 
                                                
2 In fact, the printed version of the transcripts cannot be accessed either, as I found out while trying to get 
hold of them at the State Duma of Russian Federation in Moscow.   
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for discussions’3 [any longer, laughing] (J, a financial law expert with one of the 
Russian authorities).        
  
My next task was to identify legal experts, regulators and market participants involved 
in the debates on how to make cash-settled derivatives enforceable under Russian law. 
Since the market in question is an interbank (over-the-counter, or OTC) currency 
derivatives market, the Bank of Russia (the Central Bank) was one of the key 
regulators4. Hence, I had to meet those in the Central Bank who monitor and control the 
OTC derivatives trade5. Yet, in parallel with the Bank of Russia, there was another key 
regulator whose actions in one way or another affected the interbank currency 
derivatives trade, namely the Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS)6. Thus I had to 
make sure I could find out the viewpoints of the FFMS officials on the market’s 
regulatory matters. Lastly, the mechanics of making changes in the Russian Civil Code 
meant that the Russian parliament had to approve any amendments to it; the parliament 
also could initiate changes in Russian law and suggest the way to do so. Therefore, I 
made appointments with a number of legal experts in the State Duma of the Russian 
Federation who had been involved in drafting a law on derivatives or conceptualised the 
amendment of the Russian Civil Code.     
 
I also had to meet and talk with those who traded these contracts. At first I thought that it 
would be a very straightforward task: since it was the USD/RUB exchange rate that was 
traded, it was logical that a significant part of the trade would take place in Russia, in 
Moscow. However, there was another important peculiarity: the USD/RUB interbank 
forward trade was cash-settled, or non-deliverable, that is the contract’s parties were not 
interested in getting Russian roubles; all they were interested in was the dynamics of the 
USD/RUB exchange rate. The Russian rouble was one of those emerging market 
                                                
3 The famous statement of Boris Gryzlov, a speaker of the Russian Parliament, which was gibbeted in the 
press.   
4 The terms will be explained and the market will be described in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
5 Unfortunately, I cannot be more specific and name my interviewees for reasons I will explain later in this 
Chapter.  
6 The regulators and their responsibilities regarding the market will be accounted for in detail in Chapter 6 
of the thesis.   
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currencies with restricted convertibility, and there was hardly any research on the nature 
and mechanics of these non-deliverable currencies forward trading in economic 
literature. The enquiry into the non-deliverable currency markets made by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (Lipscomb 2005) could be, from my point of view, a rare 
exception, as it contained the most detailed description of the trade. (In my 
correspondence with Laura Lipscomb, at that time a researcher at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and an author of the report, she also confirmed that ‘It seems that 
very little is written about NDFs [non-deliverable forwards]’ and even expressed her 
hope for my research possibly contributing to it (Laura Lipscomb, electronic mail 
message to the author, December 11, 2007)). It clarified that the distinguishing feature 
of the non-deliverable currency markets was their offshore-onshore segmentation, and 
thus imbalance of the trade7. The participants in the industry conference I attended made 
it clear that the substantial USD/RUB interbank forward trade was taking place offshore, 
mainly in London, whereas onshore Moscow trade was slack, with just a few Russian 
banks involved in the trade. To be able to get a full picture of the market affected by the 
lawsuits in 1998-1999 and possible amendment of the Russian Civil Code, I had to 
interview market participants based in London and in Moscow. Thus, my research 
involved fieldwork in London, as well as in Moscow.  
 
To sum up, I can discern three groups among those I interviewed. The first group, were 
the market participants based in London, mainly brokers in big brokerage firms known 
to be very active on the USD/RUB cash-settled forward market. The second group, were 
those involved in trading of these derivatives contracts in Moscow, traders and analysts 
in banks, and officials from the two major Russian stock-exchanges (the Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange and the Russian Trading System). The third group of 
interviewees were the participants in the legal debates on how to make non-deliverable 
derivatives enforceable under Russian law, namely legal experts in financial regulatory 
authorities (the Central Bank of Russia, the Federal Financial Markets Service, the 
                                                
7 For more on the offshore and onshore trade and the causes of such segmentation, see Chapter 5 of the 
thesis.  
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Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation), experts in Russian parliamentary 
committees (committees of the State Duma), financial lawyers representing Russian and 
foreign banks (so called in-house lawyers) and also lawyers in big legal firms based in 
Moscow.  
 
Given the specific nature of my potential interviewees’ activities - the continuity of 
foreign exchange trade and over-commitment of policymakers - I expected both market 
participants and regulators to be pressed for time, and thus reluctant to meet me and 
answer my questions. I did, indeed, have several negative though polite responses. 
Nevertheless, being prepared to face considerable access difficulties, I was surprised by 
my informants’ goodwill and sympathy for my research. 
 
In total I conducted 35 interviews. The interviews were semi-structured, i.e. they were 
combinations of focused and in-depth interviews and ‘oral histories’, where the 
interviewees were ‘asked to recount aspects of their lives and/or the lives of their 
contemporaries, and to discuss their perceptions of the process involved and the changes 
they have seen’ (Blaikie 2000: 234). Normally, I would start with a question I wanted to 
ask in particular, but then I let my interviewees talk about matters they thought were of 
crucial importance. In such a way I interviewed 19 regulators and legal experts and 16 
market participants. The shortest interview lasted about one hour, and most of them 
continued for about two or two and half hours, but the longest interview was four and a 
half hours long. The interviews were all recorded using a digital voice recorder and then 
it took about two months to transcribe them fully. The confidentiality of the information 
revealed by the interviewees was not a straightforward matter. When asked at the 
beginning of each interview, all but one of my interviewees yielded a ready consent to 
their names being revealed in the thesis. However, in the process of transcribing the 
interviews I became conscious of the fact that quite often my informants had been very 
candid about fairly sensitive issues, such as, for instance, the inner mechanics and 
politics of decision making processes at both chambers of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation. Besides, since the debates were so recent, every so often my 
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interviewees had been overtly hostile to one another and I did not wish to add more 
bitterness to the controversy. As a result, after careful consideration, in order to do no 
harm to my informants I decided to keep all the interviewees anonymous in the thesis.  
 
My interviewing experience was, indeed, similar to the one described by Donald 
MacKenzie (2005b: 570, emphasis in original): 
 
An interview […] is not a simple process of ‘knowledge extraction’: it is a face-
to-face human interaction at a variety of levels. At least in the form of science 
studies I practice, one goal is to learn to see the world as the interviewee sees it. 
If one succeeds, even partially, one is thereby changed. […] Inevitably, this 
involves a certain blunting of oppositional political passion. Even if this blunting 
does not take place, the ethics of hospitality constrain. To grant an interview is 
an act of hospitality – indeed, it often does involve sharing food and drink […]. 
What one can subsequently say about one’s host is then constrained.   
 
What I discovered while interviewing in London and in Moscow was the world of my 
interviewees: the traders’ passion for setting up a profitable trade, the lawyers’ 
enthusiasm to make the legal framework right, once and for all. There were also diverse 
treatments of political situation in Russia; when negative, oftentimes unspoken but 
implied. What I also learned was the existence of two worlds: the world of those trading 
derivatives, and the world of financial lawyers and regulators. Although inter-
constitutive, these were two different realities that revealed themselves at the interviews. 
In brief, a great deal of effort was going into getting brokers and traders talking about 
the market, or reflecting on its establishment or future development – their world did not 
seem to favour generalisation and expatiation; ‘what if’ made them frown. On the 
contrary, the interviews conducted with lawyers and regulators for the most part were 
long lasting and monologic; these were exciting and often emotional oral histories one 
could listen to for many hours.          
 
Given the nature of my enquiry, which is an attempt to understand the law-making 
process and how the result of this process shapes financial markets, at the initial stage of 
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my research I planned to use solely qualitative data gathered by in-depth interviewing, 
which would allow me to employ actors’ perspectives and interpretations of the legal 
development in question, events that caused it and ways of dealing with the 
consequences. This, in turn, would be and in fact was, crucial for understanding driving 
forces and motives behind existing legislative initiatives and actions: 
 
[…][Qualitative research] involves discovering their [social actors] […] reality 
and penetrating the frames of meaning within which they conduct their activities. 
To do this, it is necessary to master the everyday language that social actors use 
in dealing with the phenomenon under investigation, in short, to discover their 
‘mutual knowledge’, the concepts, and the meanings associated with these 
concepts. The investigation of this reality, and the language in which it is 
embedded, requires […] involvement in the lives of the people […] through 
extensive in-depth interviewing (Blaikie 2000: 251, emphasis in original).  
 
Yet, as soon as I started exploring the ‘site’, it became clear that without quantitative 
data I could not get an adequate picture and sense of the dynamics of the market affected 
by the court decisions of 1998-1999, i.e. USD/RUB non-deliverable interbank forward 
trade. I realised that triangulation, as an employment of the combined methods (from my 
point of view these are quantitative as well as qualitative) to ‘crystallise’ a picture of the 
market, is a technique I had to use in my research (Blaikie 2000: 269-270). Therefore, 
for help I referred to the existing statistics, namely the Triennial Central Bank Surveys 
of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, assembled and analysed by the 
Bank for International Settlements. The data were very helpful in providing the context, 
a general picture of the interbank derivatives trade, to allow me to appreciate the use of 
forward contracts, the general structure of the market, and the global trends. Alas, there 
were not enough data on the market in question. I also approached the Emerging Market 
Trading Association, an association of banks which trade emerging markets currencies, 
Russian rouble included. The Association kindly sent me the only report it had produced 
on the non-deliverable forward market published in 20038, and it did contain quite useful 
                                                
8 I was lucky again - as well with regards to my conference fees, and presumably for the same reason - the 
financial industry reports are very expensive and I believe my research student status was an advantage in 
both cases.    
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but, again, very general data. In these circumstances in order to obtain more specific data 
on the market, going and asking market participants and those involved, i.e. interviewing 
them, was the best thing I could do. Thus, in my research an interview, a qualitative 
data-gathering method, became a method that also helped to me obtain quantitative data.  
 
As a main method of collecting the data in my research, an interview, however, had its 
shortcomings: understandably, my interviewees tended to put themselves in a favourable 
light and thus to convince me that their viewpoints were those I should adopt. In other 
words, it was easy to fall under the influence of those with whom I spoke. How to avoid 
the danger? By comparing and contrasting the perspectives of my interviewees, I found. 
Here is an example. In February 2007, on my way to Moscow for the first round of 
interviews, I was asking myself that if, from a market participants’ viewpoint, it was 
desirable to make cash-settled forwards enforceable in Russia and the amendment of the 
Russian Civil Code was the most efficient way to do it, why it had taken so long to make 
it. While in Moscow, in February and then in September 2007, I learned there had been 
numerous attempts to set up legal framework for derivatives. Moreover, I found myself 
in a situation where, sympathising with the opponents of the Civil Code’s amendment, I 
thought of the latter as an unfortunate development and favoured the attempts to write an 
all-embracing law on derivatives, so irresistible was enthusiasm of those advocating the 
law! It could not but affect a narrative of the thesis: I was no longer certain of the 
existing viewpoint on the Civil Code’s amendment being the only possible and effective 
way to solve the problem, thus in such a way being accounted for in the thesis. I wanted 
the alternative to be also known, as well as the arguments in favour of the amendment 
that were also convincing.     
 
Looking back at the interviews, there is one thing I would do differently if I was at the 
start of my fieldwork again. I would transcribe my interviews as soon as they were 
conducted, not waiting until I complete all of them, as I did. The instant transcription of 
the interviews, and thus reflection on what my informants said would help to make a 
better use of the information provided and names given by my interviewees.  
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Although my research valued and relied on interviews as they were particularly effective 
in following the legal debates and building up a description of the foreign exchange 
derivatives trade, I also extensively used a document analysis method. The range of the 
documents included media articles and analytic reports, statutes (laws and regulations), 
typescripts of parliamentary debates available on the State Duma website, published 
statistics of Russian, European and U.S. exchanges, statistics available on financial 
regulators’ websites etc. Financial markets on the whole, and the Russian Forex trading 
specifically, are highly dynamic domains of economic activity. Thus, in order to follow 
the rapid development of and changes in the market, it was crucial to monitor the daily 
financial news. The Russian business newspapers Vedomosti (published in association 
with The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times) and Kommersant, The Financial 
Times and The Economist were all of great help.   
 
So, at the beginning of January 2008 the collected data were filed and systematised, the 
interviews transcribed and ready to develop my arguments. What has resulted from the 
data? The next three chapters of the thesis are going to unfold the claim that making the 
market is making the law.    
 
Chapter 4.  ‘He That Never Climbed Never Fell’? The 
Russian Interbank Derivatives Market 
 
This Chapter enters into discussion of how markets come into existence and disappear 
based upon the specific example of the Russian derivatives market. In so doing, it aims 
to firstly detail the emergence of the interbank foreign exchange derivatives market in 
Russia. Secondly, the Chapter accounts for the role that non-deliverable forwards (a type 
of a derivative) played in the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. Being eventually declared 
unenforceable under Russian law, these derivative contracts ceased to exist for a few 
years, causing the financial market – in the view of, for example, overseas banks – to 
possess insufficient risk management facilities available onshore (i.e. in the local 
Russian market, thus producing an impediment to international investments. A detailed 
examination of these events, I would argue, will facilitate an understanding of how 
financial markets emerge and cease to exist, and the role which law plays in market 
making. 
 
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section A describes the emergence of Post-Soviet 
spot currency trading, its relocation from the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange to 
the over-the-counter market, and the subsequent start of the forward interbank trade. The 
Section also accounts for the intermittent character of the forward market resulting from 
the banking crises of 1995, and the government financial policy of the exchange rate 
corridor which was consequential to the currency crisis of 1994. 
 
Section B gives a detailed account of the GKO market’s establishment and growth, since 
the evolution of this short-term bond trading is crucial to understanding of the causes of 
the USD/RUB interbank forward market’s surge. The Section then goes on to discuss 
the roots and sources of the 1998 Russian default, and briefly delineates the sequence of 
events before and during the crisis; it closes the examination of the stormy development 
and collapse of both the GKO and forward markets with a claim that, contrary to popular 
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belief, the outstanding debt in the forward market was incomparably greater than the 
total GKO outstanding payment.  
 
Based on this argument, Section C furthers the narrative by detailing the legal actions 
taken by those who suffered great losses in connection with the forward defaults. All the 
litigations were ultimately unsuccessful for those who insisted on forward payments. 
The legal ground for the dismissal of such claims was a reference to the fact that the 
contracts were to be settled in cash, and therefore regulated by the Civil Code statute on 
betting that makes such activity unenforceable. The Section ends by emphasising the 
widely recognised and officially confirmed necessity of developing an efficient 
regulatory framework for cash-settled derivatives.               
 
a. The Nascent Interbank Derivatives Trade of the 
1990s 
 
What is the Russian interbank foreign exchange derivatives trade? When and how did it 
start in Russia? These are the questions that need to be answered with a view to tracing 
the very beginning of this activity, which was previously unknown before in Russia. 
This will facilitate the understanding of the foundations for the subsequent snowballing 
events in the market that led the derivatives trade to near disappearance due to its 
unenforceable status.   
 
The Russian interbank foreign exchange derivatives trade is a market where currency 
derivatives are bought and sold by banks of Russian residency. Take, for example, a 
currency forward. It is an obligation to buy or sell a certain currency at a determined 
date in the future at a fixed price (an exchange rate). The main purpose of the contract is 
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to eliminate the risk of exchange rate movements by fixing the exchange rate for the 
duration of the contract1.  
 
Morozov (2002: 59) suggests that the first forward transactions were cross-border deals 
made between the government-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB) and western 
counterparties back in 1988. Today Vnesheconombank is known as the ‘State 
Corporation “Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs”’, and  it is ‘an 
agent for the Government of the Russian Federation in managing government foreign 
Soviet-era debt and Russian foreign debt’ (VEB 2008). Back in 1988, 
Vnesheconombank was one of the five specialised banks established as a result of the 
1987 banking reform in the Soviet Union, together with Promstroibank (Industry and 
Building), Agroprombank (Agro-industry), Zhilsotsbank (Communal Services) and 
Sberbank (Savings Bank) (Lane 2002: 12). Being in charge of foreign trade money 
flows, by trading forward contracts Vnesheconombank managed the currency risks of 
Soviet companies (also government owned) that traded worldwide. However, such 
forward trade could hardly be called the Russian interbank foreign exchange derivatives 
market: firstly, the currency forward trade took place entirely outside the USSR, and 
secondly, due to the absence of an independent banking sector in Russia, the trade did 
not involve enough Russian participants for it to be called a ‘market’.  
 
Clearly, the emergence of the genuine Russian interbank derivatives market is tightly 
bound to, and thus cannot be examined without, the incipience of the Russian interbank 
foreign exchange market, or the spot market. The difference between a spot market and 
a derivatives market will be discussed extensively in the next Chapter. For the moment, 
suffice to say that in a spot foreign exchange market settlements take place within the 
two days after a deal is made. On the contrary, in a derivatives market all settlements are 
purposely deferred for a certain predetermined period of time.  
 
                                                
1 This definition serves the aims of the current Section. A more detailed examination of a currency 
forward contract and its use will be offered in Section B of the current Chapter and in Chapter 5. 
50 
The rise of the Russian foreign exchange spot market certainly required quite a few self-
sustaining commercial banks. The manner in which commercial banks emerged in 
Russia in the late 1980s – 1990s is a topic outside this inquiry; however, here is a quote 
that allows us to appreciate the changing nature, potential and dynamics of that time in 
Russia:  
 
The ‘new’ [non-state] banks evolved in a spontaneous manner. One head of a 
now prosperous provincial bank explained to the author [David Lane] that as a 
communist functionary he saw that the old system was on its way out; he looked 
for an alternative and thought of going into financial services. He phoned some 
of his colleagues and, working out of his office, began trading in foreign 
exchange. The first non-state banks emerged in the summer of 1988 […], and by 
the end of 1989, 150 [!] non-state banks had been founded (Lane 2002: 12-13).     
 
The emergence of the interbank rouble spot trade was not instantaneous. In the 
beginning, newly formed commercial banks traded only foreign currencies on spot, 
whereas the interbank rouble spot trade, i.e. the rouble/US dollar trade, occurred a little 
later. What follows below is a brief account of the respective events. 
 
By the end of 1990, a few fledgling Russian commercial banks were becoming banks 
licensed to carry on foreign exchange (Forex) trade: 
 
Banks, in facilitating their clients’ currency operations, had to convert one 
foreign currency in to another (the most popular were clients’ conversions of US 
dollars, which the clients traditionally were getting and holding export revenues 
in, into other European currencies to settle [the clients’] import contracts) 
(Piskulov 2002: 182).  
 
It must be noted, however, that although the banks’ foreign currency trade started in 
1990, the new Russian commercial banks did not trade the rouble. The rouble market, or 
the rouble/US dollar trade to be precise, first emerged in November 1989 as currency 
actions organised by Vnesheconombank. Alexander Potemkin, at that time an officer of 
the Planning and Economics Department of the bank, recalls: 
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It needs to be remembered what sort of time it was. On the one hand, it is the 
climax of the Perestroika, the changes, the talks about reforms. On the other – it 
was not yet referred to the market, but to the reforming of the socialistic 
economy. And the [rouble] rate of exchange was an important ideological 
position which opponents of the transformation did not want to give up. In the 
country there was a currency monopoly of the state and a unitary rate of 
exchange (62 kopecks for one dollar2), which was getting still further from the 
reality. At the same time many state-owned enterprises had already got a right to 
independent foreign economic activity.  Consequently, exporters have had an 
opportunity to sell currency earnings and get roubles […]. Whereas importers 
[have had an opportunity] to purchase a currency they needed. […] In fact, our 
bank [Vnesheconombank] has held the state monopoly in currency dealings. All 
flows of export earnings and payments were concentrated in here [in the bank], 
and it was also here where enterprises, starting from 1987, had got an 
opportunity to open currency accounts. Therefore, the only feasible place to 
organise the auction at was Vnesheconombank (Alexander Potemkin, cited in 
Dokuchaev 2004).                
 
The way in which these actions were set up and run also seems to be fascinating: 
  
The technology was as follows: in newspapers we announced that all holders of 
currency accounts are welcome to take part in the auction and to send their 
currency bids and offers to the Vnesheconombank Auction Committee address. 
After that the list of sellers and buyers was formed according to the usual auction 
practice – from the highest price to the lowest. And a computing programme 
calculated an exchange rate. But the auctions themselves were closed bids – all 
the most interesting things took place on the computer’s monitor, without 
participants’ presence. The fairness of bids’ selection and results of the auction 
was controlled by the Auction Committee. The rules were defined very clearly. 
And there was no ‘telephone justice’3, which existed in many other areas in those 
years. During the auction it was all summarised in one price …. The trading 
volume of the first auction that took place 3 November 1989 was about 14 
million US dollars. […] The first market exchange rate, obtained in such way, 
was 8.92 roubles for 1 US dollar [compare with the official US dollar rate of 62 
kopecks!]  (Alexander Potemkin cited in Dokuchaev 2004).  
 
In commenting on the Vnesheconombank auctions Aleksey Mamontov, the President of 
the Moscow International Currency Association, made the following significant point: 
                                                
2 There are 100 kopecks in 1 rouble, therefore 1 dollar cost less than 1 rouble in 1988-89.   
3 The ‘telephone justice’ expression refers to a situation when existing rules are not applicable to a certain 
case, due to a phone call made by a high official requesting an exception.   
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This auction has battered the Soviet mentality. You know, currency operations, 
foreign economic activity, export and import were associated with some different 
world, with strict rules, whose violation was followed by severe punishment. 
And suddenly these operations came to earth. In actual fact, this precisely 
auction was a starting point for the genuine market-oriented reforms. A foreign 
currency has become a normal element of everyday life for people of whom the 
majority had not even known before [the auctions] how the [US] dollar looked 
like. […] The auctions themselves were developing – not only state-owned 
enterprises started participating, but also joint ventures and later on - 
cooperatives. […] Furthermore, in 1991 not enterprises but arising at that time 
commercial banks would take part in the auctions. And at this point the auctions 
were moved from Vnesheconombank to Gosbank. And these were no longer 
currency auctions, but exchange trading […] (Aleksey Mamontov, cited by 
Dokuchaev 2004).  
 
Thus, with the advent of banks in to the currency auctions the new phase in the 
formation of the rouble market - the emergence of the interbank rouble spot market - has 
begun. Accordingly, at its origin the interbank rouble spot market was exchange-based: 
 
F. I, for example, remember it perfectly well – the times when the [interbank 
rouble] spot market in Russia was in the making. There was an exchange first. 
An exchange-based trade. At that time it was all happening at [the] exchange. It 
was the beginning of the OTC [over-the-counter, as opposed to exchange-based, 
centralised] market. This very interbank market, which is gigantic all over the 
world, in Russia it sprang, at first, as an exchange-based one (from an interview 
with F, a market participant who witnessed these events in early 1990s and who 
set up currency trading, or dealing, in one of the commercial banks in Moscow at 
that time).  
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1.1 The first currency auctions took place in one of the Bank of Russia’s halls.  
Courtesy of MICEX Museum.    
 
In the opinion of those who witnessed the rise of a currency market in Russia the 
Gosbank Currency Exchange was a response to the needs of a nascent interbank market: 
 
The interbank trading demanded a different [from the Vnesheconombank’s 
currency auctions] market institution, which would provide an open bid and offer 
system and transparent exchange rate determination. Under these circumstances 
the idea of creation of an interbank currency market based on exchange-traded 
technologies was born (Potemkin 2005: 4).   
 
The same idea of an exchange-based interbank currency market underlay the 
establishing of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. The Gosbank Currency 
Exchange ‘has outgrown a role of a unit within Gosbank of the USSR’ (Kondratiev 
2003) and in January 1992 it became ZAO MICEX, a closed joint stock company4, 
whose 30 founding members were of the largest commercial banks, the Central Bank of 
the Russian Federation, the Association of Russian Banks (ARB), and the Moscow City 
                                                
4 A closed joint stock company is  Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshestvo (ZAO), which is a company, whose 
shares are privately held by no more than 50 shareholders and not available for public distribution.   
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Government. Yet the newly formed exchange was still heavily controlled by the central 
Bank of Russian Federation – the Bank of Russia5. Aleksey Mamontov, at that time the 
MICEX broker, looks back on how the trade began: 
 
At the beginning there was just one trading day [a week] – Thursday. On 
Wednesday night banks sent preliminary information about their [intended] 
currency sales or purchases to the [MICEX] exchange. The info went to the 
Central Bank [of the Russian Federation]. If the CB thought somebody sent an 
oversized bid, it would initiate investigation and take action if necessary. The 
exchange played only a technical role by accumulating bids, narrowing it down 
to one price, and fixing a dollar/rouble rate based on demand and supply. 
Besides, it was a clearing house. There were not many bids as there were about 
30-40 banks. It was publicly announced trading. Playing a role of a currency 
broker, I would emerge and, delighted in my own significance [the author is a 
former actor], announce to dealers sitting in the room: ‘Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen! The Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange is announcing the 
opening of yet another US dollar [versus the rouble] trading session […]’. 
During the trade dealers could either drop their bids or make more bids until bids 
are balanced up. There were practically no surprises due to the clearly developed 
scenario and control of the Central Bank. The trade would take about 10 minutes. 
[…] I used to end the trade […] by declaring ‘Fixing, gentlemen!’ That meant 
that hitting such and such exchange rate the sum of a currency on offer matched 
the sum of a currency for purchase. Settlement would take place at one clearing 
price (accorded recollections of Mamontov (n.d.)).    
 
Thereby these MICEX trading session served two aims. First, MICEX was a currency 
market that brings buyers and sellers together. And second, it was an infrastructure that 
generated a unitary USD/RUB exchange rate, and this ‘one clearing price’ was an 
enormously important point of reference: 
 
Throughout the country trading firms, shops would instantly start dealing 
according to this [MICEX USD/RUB] new [exchange] rate. […] Individuals 
would also revise their financial situation according to the newly determined rate 
[of exchange]. In those years it was a common joke that the MICEX dollar 
exchange rate is the second top news after the weather forecast (Kondratiev 
2003).    
 
                                                
5 The Bank of Russia stays a principal shareholder of the MICEX Exchange holding 29.8% of total 
ownership capital (http://www.micex.ru/group/profile/structure, accessed August 22, 2008).   
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1.2 MICEX currency trading in one of the hired premises near ‘Krasnye Vorota’ 
underground station (Moscow). Courtesy of MICEX Museum.  
 
Such high popularity of the MICEX trading can be explained by a chain of political and 
economic events taking place in Russia at that moment. The collapse of the USSR, 
officially announced in December 1991, resulted in a whole range of economic 
downfalls. Among them was the plummeting rouble: in April 1991 the 
Vnesheconombank currency auction’s exchange rate was 31.68 roubles for 1 US dollar 
(Potemkin 2005: 4), whereas the first MICEX trade in July 1992 indicated that one had 
to pay 125 roubles for one dollar6. Under such economic conditions general public and 
commercial organisations were actively buying US dollars, thus increasing demand for 
this currency. This table shows the average daily trading volumes on the spot currency 
market (in million US dollars): 
 
Year Total MICEX OTC MICEX Share, % 
                                                
6 According to the official statistics published by the Bank of Russia on www.cbr.ru (accessed August 22, 
2008).   
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1992 36.3 28.3 8 78.0 
1993 163.3 63.3 100 38.8 
1994 318.2 98.2 220 30.9 
1995 298.6 98.6 200 33.0 
1996 3800 22.8 3777 0.6 
1997 4130 22.4 4108 0.5 
Source: Potemkin 2005.  
 
However, these statistics demonstrate that beginning with 1993 the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange had gradually been driven out of the market and, as the table shows, 
in 1996-97 formed just a tiny fraction of the total interbank currency trading in Russia. 
The currency trade had moved from the exchange to the over-the-counter market. It 
happened due to the fact that by 1993 the nascent Russian commercial banks (such as 
Inkombank, Tokobank) were able to start currency trading through installing Reuters 
dealing equipment and trading actively on the Forex market. According to experts within 
the year of 1993 the average trading volume of Russian banks increased tenfold, surging 
from just US $50-60 millions up to US $600-800 (Piskulov 2002: 182). F, who actively 
participated in organising such currency dealing in one of the Moscow banks at that 
time, comments: 
 
F. [Reuters equipment] is set up, traders are in place, they [the traders] get credit 
line from one or two Western banks, for instance Bank Austria […] was willing 
to accept security deposit from the [Russian] banks and make the market for 
them. Deliverable deals. And many banks indeed traded [US] dollar/DM 
[Deutsche Mark], [US] dollar/GBR and even gained something. Eventually they 
all have blown up since there was no sensible risk management. […] So these 
technologies, knowledge, and experience were applied, because in 1993 
[Russian] banks said ‘Let’s try quoting dollar/rouble. […] Let’s quote to each 
other. Will you deliver dollar/rouble to me?’ – ‘Well, let’s try!’ They phone to 
the other department [of another Russian bank]: ‘Are you buying or selling 
[foreign currency] today?’ Those answer ‘We need to buy’. Thus [...] the banks 
came out with the bid-offer quote on the interbank market. Not on the exchange. 
[US] dollar/rouble. This was the beginning of the OTC [over-the-counter] 
market. After that this interbank market was going up, up, up. It was 
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skyrocketing. Due to huge increase in the dollar rate, in 1994, 1995… Especially 
at the beginning of 1995, since there was high inflation, hyper issuance [of 
roubles], therefore banks would immediately buy dollars, individuals would buy 
dollars, the dollar was gaining rapidly. It was moneymaking even throughout the 
day to buy and sell the currency [US dollars], and also quote to one another, 
because the quoting business of market makers [is also profitable]… [You are] 
quoting, spread [the difference between the sale price and the purchase price for 
the currency] is considerably good, so you simply profit. […]The [Russian] 
banks quickly shifted from the international Forex [market to the USD/RUB 
market] and started using Reuters equipment to trade USD/RUB (F interview).    
 
On March 1, 1994, the Moscow government introduced the special 0.1% tax on the 
exchange currency trading volume. Complete with the strict Central Bank’s control over 
dollar rate’s movements at the MICEX, resulted in the infeasibility of currency 
speculations at the exchange, this was a cornerstone event that later had been recognised 
as a crucial point for the maturation of the over-the-counter rouble interbank market. 
Here is what one could read at that time in ‘Kommersant’, the authoritative Russian 
newspaper: 
 
The expiring year of 1994 one can rightfully call a year of the interbank currency 
market’s establishment. […] According to the results of the       bankers’ poll, 
which was conducted by the authors of this brief, the majority of [Russian] banks 
entered upon active operations on the over-the-counter currency market in the 
middle of this year. […] Normally, small banks would be the ones most 
commonly participating in exchange trading, whereas large [banks] prefer to 
transact on the [OTC] interbank market. […] The MICEX trading volume has 
plummeted to the unprecedented in its size level – $5-6 million, whereas the 
over-the-counter market had about $100 million of an average daily volume. At 
the same time the Central Bank [of Russia] entered upon active operations on the 
over-the-counter currency market and quoted a higher buying rate of the [dollar] 
currency, compare to an exchange-based rate.  As a result, a number of large 
banks-participants of the Russian currency market (for instance, […] ‘Imperial’, 
MDM Bank and others) have practically stopped trading at MICEX (Bazhenova 
1994).   
 
Here it should be noted that the interbank currency trade produced very high profits due 
to possibility of arbitrage, i.e. gain that results from the price difference either in 
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USD/RUB exchange rates within a day, or between the exchange rates on the OTC 
market and MICEX. As a consequence, the OTC interbank currency spot trade throve.       
 
Now, with the rapidly gaining pace of the USD/RUB interbank trading in place, it was 
time for the first forward contract to appear on the market. Golikov (2007: 44) claims 
that the first USD/RUB forward position was taken by MDM Bank and 
Promradtechbank in 19947. However, even though in the summer of 1994 the USD/RUB 
forwards were quoted by few Russian banks (namely Toribank, Inkombank8), the 
forward interbank trade did not grow as quickly as the spot OTC trade. It can be 
explained by the chain of events, although various but interrelated, that took place in 
Russian financial markets in the autumn 1994 – summer 1995.                
 
What is a forward contract? Before everything else it is a tool that helps fix a price of 
something, for instance of an exchange rate, for a certain period of time. As a result, for 
the duration of a forward contract one does not have to worry about exchange rate 
fluctuations that are potentially able to generate financial losses. Bearing this in mind, 
while profiting highly from skyrocketing USD/RUB exchange rate (and/or the 
plummeting rouble), Russian banks would enter forward contracts in an attempt to either 
fix their profits, or insure (or hedge) themselves against reverse exchange rate       
movement. Logically, forward contracts are wide spread providing there are significant 
exchange rate fluctuations.    
 
On July 6, 1995, such exchange rate fluctuations were tamed within the fixed range, or 
‘currency corridor’ introduced by a joint statement of the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Central Bank of Russia. The ‘Kommersant’ newspaper gives 
coverage of the event: 
 
                                                
7 Although Morozov (2002: 60) insists that on May 10, 1994 ‘the first officially registered forward deal 
between two Russian parties was made. The parties were the banks “Lefortovsky” [not Promradtechbank] 
and MDM; and the deal was brokered by MFD (Mezhbankovsky Finansovy Dom)’.    
8 These banks ceased to exist in 1999 and 1998 respectively.   
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‘CB [the Central Bank] decided to bring undertaking of the financial stabilisation 
to a triumphant conclusion’ 
All is for the best in the best of possible worlds: what would be a bolt from the 
blue in the end of 1994 – beginning of 1995, it is almost not a sensation today. 
As a result of three-week proceedings taking place in strict secrecy, and having 
received the green light from the President, the Central Bank and the 
Government have announced a co-decision on soft fixation of the [RUB/USD] 
exchange rate in the 4300-4900 RUB/$ corridor from July 6 to October 1 (Bardin 
1995).     
 
Why does Kommersant insist on foreseeability of the currency corridor? Note that the 
article refers to the process of ‘undertaking of the financial stabilisation’, i.e. to the 
campaign with the ultimate goal to bring down inflation. Anatoly Chubais, at that time 
the Deputy Prime Minister, confirms:  
 
The decision was taken today at the meeting with the President. It was preceded 
by large-volume estimations, consultations with the highest authorities in 
currency regulation. It is a result of a lot of effort applied during the first half [the 
1995] year to lower the inflation rate… (Anatoly Chubais, cited by Bagrov 1995, 
emphasis added). 
 
This fight against inflation was, in its turn, initiated as a consequence of the so called 
Black Tuesday, or the currency crisis of 1994 in Russia. Back then, on October 11, 
1994, during the MICEX trading session the exchange value of the rouble slumped 
27.4% - from 3081 roubles for one US dollar at the beginning of the trade to 3926 
roubles for the dollar (http://www.micex.ru/online/currency/archive/, accessed August 
28, 2008). The plummeted rouble was allegedly an outcome of the inconsistent policy 
carried out by the Government and the Central Bank9. In its attempt to finance budget 
deficit through direct lending to the Government the Central Bank was simply issuing 
more roubles. And yet it kept the rouble overvalued in order to restrain price increase, 
since ‘the comparatively cheap [US] dollar allows reducing the price of import, hence to 
                                                
9 This is precisely why the Black Tuesday occurrence cost Viktor Gerashenko and Sergei Dubinin their 
positions of the Chairman of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance respectively in 1994. However, 
soon afterwards both officials took up the government authority’s duties again – Sergei Dubinin became 
the Chairman of the Central Bank in 1995, whereas Viktor Gerashenko followed him as the head of the 
CBR in 1998 (CBRF 2008).       
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hold down prices for domestically produced goods’ (Travin 1999: 56). Such 
inconsistency eventually resulted in the plummeted rouble, hence in a new policy – an 
introduction of the currency corridor.           
 
The detailed examination of these events allows demonstrating the circumstances that 
ultimately caused slow growth of the interbank forward market.  Moreover, Black 
Tuesday of 1994 and consequential to it the fixed exchange rate corridor were among 
the factors that triggered the subsequent crisis of August 1995, also known as the Black 
Thursday: 
 
[…] with the introduction of an exchange rate band in July 1995, the commercial 
banks lost their most valuable source of arbitrage profits: this precipitated the 
‘August 1995 liquidity crisis’, when more than 150 banks failed to meet their 
obligations on overnight credits on the interbank money market, forcing the CBR 
[the Central Bank of Russia] to intervene to solve the crisis. Yet, the Central 
Bank did not accommodate the shock and offered liquidity only to some bank 
[…]. In addition, new sets of reserve requirements10 were introduced and 
extended to a larger range of financial instruments including foreign exchange 
deposits (Buchs 1999: 707).    
 
Such turn of events could not but affect the interbank currency forward market. And it 
did. Yet, the market participants’ accounts of the ways the crisis had an impact on the 
forward trade diverge. Some claim that the 1995 interbank liquidity crisis hit the 
derivatives trade indirectly, not by actually triggering a range of defaults on the existing 
interbank forward obligations: ‘[forward] deals were made in gathering, therefore, due to 
fact that people all knew each other, the minimisation of losses caused by payment 
defaults was succeeded’ (Golikov 2007: 44). Others, who also witnessed the events, 
insist: 
 
The banking crisis happened in August 1995 […]. Back then [before the crisis] 
the whole banking business was based mainly on the increase in the [US] dollar 
rate and inflationary profits. […] All these banking activities were in fact risk 
                                                
10 Reserve requirements are regulations that order to place a certain amount of a bank deposit holdings 
with a central bank to ensure the bank’s ability to meet payments.      
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free and win-win. It was Klondike, diamond fields! In this situation the interbank 
[market] functioned based on absolute trust, since paying back was the same easy 
as borrowing. Dealers trusted each other unconditionally and unblinkingly! It all 
was scattered in an instant! The Golden Age was over! The romantic chapter in 
the history of the Russian financial market was over. The dealers’ world tasted 
the affliction of defaults and cheatings. Banks started establishing financial 
analysis departments, effective risk management, [also] introducing stringent 
credit risk procedures (accorded recollections of Mamontov (n.d.)).       
 
However different the accounts are, it is clear that the interbank forward market, 
appeared in 1994, did not gain momentum for growth and shortly after the interbank 
crisis, by the end of 1995, amounted to merely sporadic interbank forward deals that 
could hardly be called ‘an interbank currency forward market’. Nevertheless, three years 
down the line and banks on the market are cashing in on an unprecedented boom in 
transactions: the volume of forward deals on the USD/RUB interbank market, including 
transactions with non-residents, in 1998 was variously estimated at from $50 billion 
(Ivanov 2007: 39) to $250 billion (Makarevich 2004). The account of such 
unforeseeable development will be given in the next Section of the Chapter.  
 
b. The Market’s Second Wind: Non-Deliverable 
Forwards and the 1998 Default 
 
The previous Section of this Chapter discussed the beginning of the interbank 
derivatives market in the context of the post-Soviet development of currency trading.  
The currency trading, and it could not have been otherwise, was the cradle of the 
USD/RUB forward market. Accordingly, all crises that hit the nascent spot trading some 
way or other affected the fledgling derivatives market. It is to be recalled that being a 
retaliation strategy against the 1994 currency crisis, the financial stabilisation introduced 
such measure as the fixed exchange rate corridor. Along with tightening reserve 
requirements now demanding foreign exchange deposits, this left the interbank market 
shattered, since banks could not profit from currency trading as before. Moreover, their 
gains were largely discounted by losses resulting from Black Thursday of August 1995.       
 
However, quite a few banks survived the crisis. GKO (Gosudarstvennaya 
Kratkosrochnaya Obligatsiya, or State Treasury Obligation), a short-term Russian 
government bond, was a financial instrument that pulled the banks through the liquidity 
squeeze of the summer 1995. Konstantin Korishenko, at that time the Head of the 
Department of Open Market Operations at the Central Bank, gives an account of the 
events: 
 
[…] in August 1995 there was quite a serious crises combusted in the interbank 
market, which largely resulted from massive speculations of the market’s 
participants […]. That was the time when we [the Central Bank of Russia] had to 
buy up government securities [GKOs] in bulk – just to render liquidity to the 
[…] market (Korishenko 2008).  
  
In this context, the ‘liquidity’ term implies banks have enough funds to meet payments 
that are due, hence not to default on their obligations. It appears that in 1995 Russian 
banks held enough GKOs for the Central Bank to be able to supply the interbank market 
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with more reserves1, which eventually helped the Russian banking system to overcome 
the crisis. Having played a key role in the 1995 events, GKOs established a reputation as 
reliable securities to hold, a reputation that was also secured by rapid-growing earnings 
the government bonds provided. However, it took GKOs less than three years to become 
‘a very serious financial weapon’ (Zlatkis 2008) and then, according to the widespread 
belief, to trigger the 1998 ‘national catastrophe’ (Makarevich 2004) in Russia. Why is a 
thorough account of the GKO market relevant to the narration of the Russian interbank 
forward market? Due to the fact that the USD/RUB forward market got its second wind 
through the GKO market’s growth, thus what follows is a story of this interconnection.  
 
The beginning of the sovereign debt market is carried back to 1992. Bella Zlatkis, who 
administered and supervised the GKOs’ legal and technical implementation, and who is 
widely regarded as a founder of the Russian government securities market, recollects 
those days: 
 
We [who were] at the Ministry of Finance [of the Russian Federation], upon 
coming to the former Ministry of Finance of the USSR after the collapse of the 
[Soviet] Union, discovered the situation with the [Soviet] Union finance and 
what we have had fell heir to. It became apparent to us that the budget can be 
reconciled either through emission [of more money], or through borrowing, since 
the budget did not have any sustainable income basis – it had only debts. 
Therefore [we] started developing [the idea of] how to finance the revenue side 
of the budget without surge of inflation, i.e. by the world-known yet unknown to 
us method (Zlatkis 2008).         
 
Adopting the method is one thing, implementing it is quite another. ‘It is unlikely that 
anybody knew exactly the way the market must be’, continues Konstantin Korishenko, 
who joined the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange at the time of market making and 
later was responsible for Central Bank activity on the market: 
 
                                                
1 However this assertion is valid for 1995 only, given that two years later the participants’ pattern on the 
GKO market seemed to be quite specific and will be described later in this Section.   
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At that period, in the end of 1992, I joined MICEX, and on my second or third 
day at work I was participating in the meeting which was held in the hall where 
the currency trade would normally took place. The meeting was conducted by 
Andrei Kozlov, the head of the securities department at the CB [Central Bank] 
[…]. The first draft of the project that Andrei presented was a two-three page 
document. The remaining details of the market’s structure he started drawing 
right there, on the board. […] Straight away the task was to set up the 
government securities trade electronically. Hence the question of where to trade 
and how to trade. Nowadays we all live at Internet age and know that can 
instantly send a message from one place to another. Whereas at that time 
networks were local, there were practically no global networks. That is why the 
first version of the trading network was a local trading network, which was 
located at the [MICEX] currency exchange on Zubovsky 
http://www.multitran.ru/c/m.exe?a=sa&t=13883_2_1&sc=14Boulevard 
(Korishenko 2008).     
 
 
1.3 Pioneers of the GKO market. The picture is taken in the MICEX trading hall on 
Zubovsky http://www.multitran.ru/c/m.exe?a=sa&t=13883_2_1&sc=14Boulevard. 
Moscow. 1993. Bella Zlatkis is second from the right in the bottom row. Andrei Kozlov 
is far right in the bottom row. Konstantin Korishenko is second from the right in the 
upper row. Courtesy of MICEX Museum. 
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The first GKO auction was held on May 18, 1993, four months after the deadline. Such 
tardiness has had a weighty reason: there were attempts to tackle technical and 
infrastructural issues in most advanced ways in order to enhance the security and 
reliability of GKO circulation. In her recollections Bella Zlatkis argues that these efforts 
were worthwhile and insists that the GKO market would have not happened without 
Andrei Kozlov, who was ‘a main figure and driving force [for the market], although did 
not hold a high post’ at that time2 (Zlatkis 2008). In those far-off days he was the one 
who tuned up the market infrastructure:  
 
B.Z. We run all relevant testing […] and Andrei Kozlov was that person who 
said ‘No, we have to perfect the technologies’. And in [19]98, after the default, I 
believe there was not a single day I would not have woken up and said: ‘God 
grant Andryusha [Andrei Kozlov] with everything he deserved for this’. Nobody 
understood and understands, besides those who know the process technology, 
what an important role in the instrument’s reliability he played by insisting on 
the delay in start of the project.    
B.G. [Business Guide] And what was the problem? 
B.Z. The question at issue was identification of an owner [of the security].  
That is why I mentioned [19]98. In 98 law-enforcement authorities and general 
public were able to find out easily who and how had been participating in the 
market, who had been profiting and in which way […]. Absolutely everything 
had been identified. […] Andrei Kozlov insisted on developing a ‘delivery 
versus payment’ system3. It was a breakthrough technology […]. I remember it 
clearly when later on the Americans visited the [MICEX] exchange, including, 
by the way, the president of the New- 
York Stock Exchange, they were very surprised that such, in their view, 
technologically backward country, especially a country with no experience in 
owed debt and with very underdeveloped public and government finance sectors, 
had managed to establish such [advanced] system of government securities trade 
(Zlatkis 2008).  
                                                
2 Andrei Kozlov was killed in September 2006 and his death has been prompted by his anti-corruption 
activity in the capacity of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. 
3 ‘Delivery versus payment’ is a settlement mechanism which provides simultaneousness delivery to the 




The first GKO trade hall on Zubovsky 
http://www.multitran.ru/c/m.exe?a=sa&t=13883_2_1&sc=14Boulevard. Moscow. 1993. 
Courtesy of MICEX Museum.   
 
Thus, the GKO market was up, and what only remained was to make it running. The 
latter means the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, i.e. those pursuing the policy 
of financing the budget through government debt, had to persuade the market 
participants, namely banks, to buy the securities. Here it should be noted that back in 
1991, 2 years before the GKO market started functioning, the decision to allow banks’ 
participation in the securities market was not a verdict reached without difficulties. 
Dmitry Tulin, at that time a head of the Gosbank securities department, recalls:  
 
[It was the time] The RF [Russian Federation] Government Resolution ‘On 
Approval of the Regulation on Issuance and Circulation of Securities and Stock 
Exchanges in RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic]’ was in 
work. After the long-lasted controversy the opponents reached a compromise and 
agreed that, after all, banks have to participate in the securities market within the 
Central Bank regulatory framework. […] The government session, that took 
place on December 28, 1991, was presided over by B.N. Yeltsin. Matyukhin [a 
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head of the Central Bank at that time] sent me to it [the government session] to 
represent the Central Bank. In the document that was given for my inspection, to 
my surprise, I learnt that banks are banned from the securities trading! This 
comment was inserted after the final reconcilement, clearly in reliance on [the 
fact] that ‘success is never blamed’ and it will not be paid attention to. It was the 
first time I had attended such high profile meeting, hence was not aware of the 
[existing] procedure. Our item [of the agenda, the securities resolution] was 
‘throw-away’ one and was not perceived to be discussed. However, when Boris 
Nikolayevich [Yeltsin], pro forma or, indeed, for a sake of following democratic 
conduct, asked if those present have objections or comments, I, to the audience’s 
surprise, started putting out the hand and getting up. […] Being permitted to 
speak, I took a roundabout approach to the subject, sincerely wishing to deliver 
the foundations of the securities market to the President of RF [Russian 
Federation, ironically]. Whereupon [I] received an abrupt remark of Boris 
Nikolayevich [such as] ‘Could you make it short, young man?!’ Then I just 
suggested cutting out some paragraph in the text [of the resolution]. Yeltsin gave 
a glance around the room and asked the next ritual question: ‘Are there any 
objections [to this]?’ There were no same daring [people such as him, ironically] 
(Tulin 2007).   
 
Thus, eventually Russian banks were given permission to trade securities. Moreover, in 
1993 they were treated as the essential participants of the GKO market. However, the 
banks understandably hesitated: 
 
It was hard to convince the market participants in the ability of Minfin [the 
Ministry of Finance] and CB officials to produce something that will be civilised 
enough, transparent, [something worth] to participate in. […] Just picture [the 
year of19] 93 and the [negative] attitude toward the state, and the [devil-may-
care] attitudes in the society in general at that time. For this reason we [the 
Ministry of Finance] and CB gathered the 10 largest banks and talked to them. 
On the back of this I remember an interesting episode. At some moment Dmitry 
Tulin [a deputy chairman of the Central Bank at that time] phoned and suggested 
to meet with two big banks – Konversbank and MENATEP […]. And we went to 
the MENATEP building. […] We were staying by the board, explaining, 
sketching, drawing how it looks, how the [interest] rate is formed in the trading 
system. You know, I will remember for the rest of my life the thing 
Khodorkovsky [a chairman of the board of management of MENATEP bank in 
1993] told me then. He […] said that he does not believe anything that officials 
aged 40 and over may say.       (Zlatkis 2008).             
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Apparently, this episode confirms the strong distrust in bureaucrats and government 
officials that dominated at that time.  Despite the collapse of the Communist Party 
governing, amid the discredit they came into, they have stayed in power and kept 
running government authorities. As for Mikhail Khodorkovsky, he has become a 
prominent figure in Russian business and politics, famous for going all the way from 
being a billionaire, ranked by Forbes as among one of the wealthiest people4,  to the 
well-known Russian inmate found guilty of tax avoidance and fraudulence and 
sentenced to nine years in prison in 2005, and whose sentence was seen by many as due 
to ‘his support of liberal opposition to the Kremlin’ (Levin 2006).       
  
And yet it is a measure of success of the undertaken promotional strategy that two years 
after this conversation took place, in August 1995, the banks’ ownership of GKO 
rescued the Russian banking system – the Central Bank had a financial instrument that 
facilitated the pouring of so much needed liquidity into the banking sector, hence it 
enabled the CB to pull banks through the liquidity crisis. However, at this moment it is 
necessary to recall what the fundamental reason for establishing the GKO market was. 
The rationale was to finance the adverse budget. Under these circumstances, has the 
market ever fulfilled the plan to supply what was wanted, and if so, when did it happen? 
Finally, when and how does the forward market enter the story? 
 
According to those who witnessed the market’s beginning and its further development, 
the GKO market started performing the budget financing in 1994-1995 under the 
pressure of the agreement signed between the Russian government and the International 
Monetary Fund: 
 
The market kept expanding quite rapidly, but it widened seriously in 1994. The 
reason was as follows. In 1994 the program of our [Russian government] 
relations with the IMF was adopted, which prohibited the Central Bank direct 
crediting of the budget deficit [through issuing more roubles] as from the second 
                                                
4http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/10/2001/LIR.jhtml?passListId=10&passYear=2001&passListType=
Person&uniqueId=M1IF&datatype=Person, accessed September 19, 2008.  
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quarter [of the year]. The question of where the budget will get money from 
came up. That was precisely the time the GKO market started surging… 
(Korishenko 2008).  
 
In fact, Konstantin Korishenko refers to the standby agreement between the International 
Monetary Fund and the Russian government as of April 11, 19955. The credit tranche, 
indeed, ‘could be used to help cover the budget deficit in accordance with the 
government’s new strategy of non-inflationary financing’ (Gould-Davies and Woods 
1999: 11), upon condition that there is such non-inflationary financing brought into force 
by the Russian government. F, who observed the above-mentioned developments in the 
capacity of a bank’s currency dealer, recalls:   
 
F. In 1995 the changes in financial policy began. [Anatolii] Chubais become a 
Minister of Finance6, and they [the government] started financing the budget 
deficit [in a different way]. [Before that, the Head of the Central Bank in 1992-
1994 and 1998-2002] Gerashenko had been financing it [the budget] in a very 
simple way. Gerashenko had just been printing money. This had caused 
hyperinflation. He would say ‘What would you want? Industrial enterprises have 
to pay salaries’. An old model. Whereas Chubais says ‘No, we have to suppress 
the inflation, this is a task set [for Russia] by the International Monetary Fund, 
the public does not understand us, and they are fed up [with the inflation]. Let us 
to finance the budget deficit through domestic borrowing’. The GKO market 
appears. Well, technically it appeared earlier on, but its [the market’s] 
booming… Chubais, Paramonova [the Head] in the Central Bank [are 
responsible for]. They call the bankers in and say… Chubais says ‘That’s that! I 
promise [that] there will not be any further increase in the [US] dollar exchange 
rate7, you can forget about it, which means do not invest in to dollars’. […] So 
they launch the GKO market where there is a high return [one gets] instantly. 
They say ‘Please, do invest in the government securities; we will have the same 
[budget financing] as in the USA […]’ (F interview).     
 
                                                
5 Different figures are given by different researchers for the tranche, since the amount officially stated by 
the IMF is given in SDRs (the Special Drawing Rights), a unit of account created by the IMF. It is a few 
currencies unit; therefore the tranche amount varies according to the exchange rates. Gould-Davies and 
Woods (1999: 11) claim the amount of $6.8 billion, whereas Odling-Smee (2004: 19) calculates it was 
$5.5 billion tranche.           
6 In fact, Anatolii Chubais became a Minister of Finance in 1997. In the same year, aged 42, he was voted 
as the Finance Minister of the Year by Euromoney magazine (Kommersant 1997). As for the year of 1995, 
he was appointed as a Russia governor to the IMF by the President Boris Yeltsin, which is why he was 
associated with the budget financing in Russia at that time.     
7 Due to the introduction of the currency corridor. 
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My interviewee’s account of the appeal of Russian authorities to the banking community 
certainly helps to understand the logic behind it, which is “change your priorities or 
cease to exist as there are no any other business opportunities”. Yet this is not enough to 
understand the further market’s development without defining the banking group the 
officials appealed to.  
 
According to Buchs (1999: 708, emphasis added) there were ‘two main actors’ the 
Russian banking community was represented by, ‘the first is Sberbank, holding the 
majority of household deposits as well as 40 percent of outstanding State securities; the 
second is the group of the 22 larger Moscow banks belonging to the financial-industrial 
oligarchy’. Here it should be noted that Buchs does not claim that the second actor, the 
financial-industrial oligarchy banks, is also a major buyer of the government securities, 
considering that, in fact, the banking society was highly heterogeneous and Russian 
analysts distinguish at least four groups within the community back in 1995-96:   
 
The first [group] is big and major full-service commercial banks located, mainly, 
in Moscow. The second group is formed by mid-sized and small banks, which 
predominantly deal with non-banking [not retail] operations, acting in some 
particular market’s segment, mostly in GKO sector. These are not proper 
commercial banks, rather various financial companies. Some of them have GKO 
[…] investments amounting to 35, 40, 50 and even 80% of their total assets. The 
third group is ‘governmentalised’ banks, mainly serving settlements of the state 
[government] […]. The fourth [group] is banks established by industrial sectors 
and serving their needs [corporate banks]. (Mikhail Delyagin, at that time a chief 
analytic of the President’s Analytic Control Centre, cited by Loginov 1996). 
 
Starting with the major buyer of GKO, Sberbank (Savings Bank of the Russian 
Federation) is a government bank with the Central Bank of Russia as its chief 
shareholder that owns over 60% of its shares8. Lane and Lavrentieva (2002: 83) argue 
that being owned by the Central Bank, Sberbank ‘implements the market policy thought 
appropriate by the financial authorities’, thus it ends up being ‘a market-maker and itself 
a major operator in this [GKO] market’, owning 37% of total outstanding government 
                                                
8 http://www.sbrf.ru/en/about/, accessed September 19, 2008. 
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securities as of January 1996. This implies that buying GKOs was not a matter of 
survival for the bank; the bank was a mere tool of the Central Bank’s new budget 
financing policy.  
 
As for the other groups, to own government domestic debt was a very different matter in 
their case. The ‘financial-industrial oligarchy banks’, such as Menatep or Uneximbank, 
would belong to the first groups of Russian banks. They were, indeed, parts of financial-
industrial groups in the sense that their capital ‘was largely owned by non-financial 
companies’ and this was a result of a peculiar process of Russian banks’ emergence:    
 
The formation of the new Russian banks illustrates the tendency of industrial 
concerns to create banks rather than, as in the experience of developed Western 
capitalism, banks being initiators of industrial development. […] Non-financial 
companies owned the assets of commercial banks, rather that the other way 
around. Such developments are similar to the early stages of industrial capitalism 
in England, but the formation of ‘company banks’ on such a scale is a new 
phenomenon (Lane 2002: 18-19).  
 
These large commercial banks also functioned as retail and investment banks, but were 
not heavily involved in GKO securities trading9. In this respect the ‘financial-industrial 
oligarchy banks’ would finance the Russian government not through the GKO 
mechanism, but rather differently10.   
 
Therefore, the existing banks’ GKO portfolio boils down to the second group in the 
banking community, comprised of middle-sized and small banks. Seemingly, this 
portfolio has allowed obtaining so much needed liquidity in the course of the liquidity 
crisis in August 1995, but clearly was not enough to finance the Russian budget. Thus, 
some other solution had to be found.  
                                                
9 See, for example, an interview with Platon Lebedev, the Menatep’s assets manager (Birman 2002). 
10 It would be wrong to assume that these banks did not have financial involvement with the government. 
For instance, there is research exploring the so called ‘loans-for-shares’ auctions in November-December 
of 1995 in Russia (Lieberman and Veimetra 1995; Black et al. 2000; Allan 2002). These are the auctions 
that allegedly were the defining moment in forming the widely known Russian oligarchy: during the 
auctions the ‘financial-industrial banks’ would finance the government on collateral and the latter would 
be oil and metallurgic companies shares the government has never redeemed.        
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It was found in the beginning of 1996. F, who worked at the treasury department in a 
Moscow subsidiary of one of European banks at that time, explains: 
   
F. […] the Central Bank sets up the plan […] to attract foreign investments. 
Because the government debt accrues rapidly, the borrowing requirements are 
large, whereas [the budget] financing at the expense of domestic investors a kind 
of works, but only to the certain extent, [therefore] let’s allow non-residents in to 
GKO market (F interview).       
 
Konstantin Korishenko, back in 1996 a deputy head of the Central Bank securities 
department, clarifies the Central Bank’s plan: 
 
[…] February 1996 is the time when what later was called ‘EuroGKO’ began. 
Back then […] foreign investors got the right to obtain the government securities. 
And, consequently, [GKO] market has rocketed. This is a very important date. 
However different one can treat the 1996 elections, their repercussions, […] … 
But if not the feasibility to borrow money through the government securities 
market, then we [the state] would not be able to pay salaries, pensions, and so on, 
in other words [to answer] all that obligations discharged in the first half of the 
year 1996 (Korishenko 2008).                
 
The Central bank official refers to presidential elections of 1996 in Russia. Boris 
Yeltsin, the incumbent Russian president, and Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist party 
leader, contested the June-July 1996 elections. The contest was very close and Yeltsin 
had had a chance of winning provided that he could prove himself to be capable of 
improving the deteriorating economic situation, thus repackage his public image. Bella 
Zlatkis, one of the establishers of the GKO market, reasoning upon the events:              
  
In 1996, there were presidential elections and a winner was not apparent – 
Yeltsin or the communists [Zyuganov]. In actual fact, the [runaway] problem of 
GKO arose at that very time – that is why at once […] the budget expenditures 
were pushed: it was necessary to finance salary payments. If you remember, at 
that time, every evening, the finance minister Alexander Livshits would appear 
on TV and report on the regions where salaries were paid off. These salaries 
were paid off right before the elections, notably owing entirely to the government 
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debt market. In fact, without discussions how it will affect the [GKO] market. 
And then [GKO] interest rates surged unimaginably. The truth is that today 
nobody can answer the question of what would become of our country, its 
political set-up, [its] economy, if Yeltsin did not win back then? Not to mention 
the government debt market (Zlatkis 2008).           
 
These personal recollections of the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance officials both 
insist that, in a way, allowing non-residents’ to buy GKO securities helped to finance the 
budget, thus facilitated Boris Yeltsin’s victory. In other words, the budget deficit was 
not just a tight economic situation, it was dramatised by the existing political situation in 
the beginning of 1996. The interviewees claim that in the circumstances concerned it 
was crucial for the government to get financed as soon as possible. In so doing they 
engaged in the GKO controversy against those who think there must have been some 
other way to deal with the budget deficit, considering that the short-term government 
debt upsurge was at the heart of the 1998 Russian default.   
 
Thus, on February 2, 1996, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation issued the 
Temporary Provision No.236, allowing non-residents to participate in GKO market 
(CBRF 1996). The result of the Provision, and the development that followed, was the 
situation, where within two years ‘the most exposed with respect to State securities was 
Sberbank, which held more than 40 per cent of outstanding GKOs at the end of 1997, 
while another 30 per cent was held by foreign investors’ (Buchs 1999: 707, emphasis in 
original): 
 
Moreover, it is this Provision which triggered off the booming rouble forward market, 
even though it was not an initial intent of the Central Bank. As a matter of fact, the 
issued regulation had specified the one and only counterparty which non-residents could 
enter a forward contract with – the Central Bank itself (CBRF 1996). How did it result in 
the 1998 cross-default gridlock amid Russian banks, culminating in the collapse of the 
cross-border rouble forward market?   
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To be able to understand why foreign investors would transact forward contracts with 
the Central Bank, one should grapple with technicalities of the GKO trade. To begin 
with, Section 3 of the Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ‘On 
Foreign Investments in the RSFSR’ states that Russian currency, the roubles, must be 
used by non-residents when investing in the Russian Federation (RF 1991). F, who 
witnessed the mechanics of the GKO trade while working at the treasury department in a 
Moscow subsidiary of one of European banks, gives an explanation of the procedure: 
 
F. A non-resident comes [in the market]; he sells [foreign] currency on spot, 
[with settlements taking place] today. Simultaneously he buys some government 
securities with a certain rate of return in roubles; for example, about 100% per 
annum. You get in roubles.  
S.M. Yes, but then he needs to convert… 
F. Yes. The return in roubles, but he invested dollars. He needs to repurchase 
[the dollars] and he has got two ways [of doing this]. The first one. He may wait 
in the market. Well, that is he invested for half a year, or for three months, [he] 
waits till the tree months are over and buys [the dollars] on the spot market. But 
[…] from a risk management point of view nobody does this, because the 
position is opened, this is risky, and normally any investor would, so called, lock 
himself in some return, which is calculated as a difference between two exchange 
rates – the spot exchange rate, i.e. you sold [the dollars] today, and 
simultaneously bought on the forward [market, the forward exchange rate] (F 
interview).    
 
So, the Central Bank’s Temporary Provision issued in February 1996, then transformed 
into Provision No.02-64  in July 1996, affirms that foreign investors, or authorised 
banks-non-residents in terms of the Provision, ‘enters into a forward contract with the 
Bank of Russia to sell roubles to the latter’ (CBRF 1996). If it is apparent how exchange 
rates movements necessitate foreign investors’ forward deals, the reason why the Central 
Bank can be the only Russian counterparty in the contracts is still far from clear. The 
former deputy head of the Central Bank securities department Konstantin Korishenko 
explains the purpose of this measure:  
 
[…] The fact is that everybody would see the obvious disproportion in the rouble 
market return and foreign currency market [return], especially under restrictions 
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of the quasi-fixed rouble exchange rate such as the currency corridor. And 
nobody was offering speculative returns to non-residents. Initially they were 
offered two alternatives – either you freely purchase government securities for 
roubles and then it is your problem where and how you will convert your returns 
back in to [foreign] currency, or you will be offered a guaranteed exchange rate 
to exit [the market, to repatriate returns], but in this case it will be such as to limit 
profitability of your investments. They said ‘OK, we go for the hedging 
alternative’ (Korishenko 2008).         
 
Therefore, the Provision stated that ‘the Bank of Russia […] fixes a maximum rate of 
return for the forward transactions with foreign investors […]’ (CBRF 1996). With the 
developed procedure of GKO trading in place, where forward transactions were 
important tools in the mechanics of converting and repatriating returns, the GKO market 
surged. Here is the change in trading volume of the government securities market in 
1993-97 (in constant 2008 billion roubles): 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
GKO 0.20 10.59 65.76 203.58 272.61 
Source: Kommersant 2008.   
 
The statistics demonstrate triple growth in the market in 1995-1996; it illustrates that 
once being allowed to buy Russian government short term debt and secured the returns’ 
repatriation by forward deals with the Bank of Russia in 1996, foreign investors became 
a driving force for the market. Those who worked in the banks authorised for such 
trading recall: 
 
There was rapid stream of non-residents coming in [to GKO market]. I remember 
it clearly how in … [names the big European bank which actively traded GKO in 
1996] we were investing after the first ballot of the Presidential elections in 
Russia, when Zyuganov was fighting against Yeltsin, this was in June 1996, the 
14th, […] I can’t remember… There was a situation when the market…Well, the 
year started pretty badly, because Yeltsin has had low rating, and markets 
[participants] had no faith [in Yeltsin’s victory, therefore in the chance of 
repatriating their returns]. And that is why the [offered] returns grew, for 
example […] the return was 210% per annum on the secondary market. […] I 
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remember we [in the bank] reached … [the bank’s head office in Europe] and 
were permitted to invest about $6 million. Yet in half a year [later] it was already 
$12 million. Those were good returns. Lucrative yields.  That is why everybody 
was rushing in (F interview).   
 
However, on March 5, 1997, amid the rapid expansion of the GKO market, the Bank of 
Russia withdrew from the forward dealing with non-residents. According to the new 
edition of Provision No.02-64, the forward deals non-residents used to transact with the 
Central Bank from that day onwards were to be entered in with authorised Russian 
banks (CBRF 1996c, March 05, 1997 edition). The Central Bank official reasons: 
 
BG. Why, then, did [Russian] commercial banks begin transact the forwards 
instead of the Central Bank? 
K.K. In practice the system, where forward contracts were entered in to with the 
Central Bank, meant an introduction of some sort of a forward currency corridor, 
but for non-residents only. But it would have been incorrectly on the part of the 
Central Bank to maintain, generally speaking, two currency corridors in parallel. 
For this reason the CB left the forward market in 1997. But along with this [the 
Central Bank] bound non-residents entering GKO market to obtain hedging 
contracts from Russian banks. From the market development point of view it was 
rational behaviour, because it stands to reason that practically nobody invests in 
to risky assets denominated in a national currency without currency hedging. 
[…] (Korishenko 2008).  
 
Russian banks eagerly jumped into forward dealing aiming at the resumption of 
profitable business opportunities, which they have lost ever since the introduction of the 
currency corridor that eliminated large-scale currency speculations: 
 
F. […] the CB [Central Bank] stopped […] to quote forwards and said to the 
[Russian] banks ‘These are your risks, you are fully-grown, you are experienced, 
you know how to do this, there you go, do it’. In addition, so to say ‘non-
residents are welcome’, which means there can be any [trading] volumes, risk 
based capital adequacy was not monitored [by the Central Bank] (F interview).  
 
Konstantin Korishenko, at that time heading the Central Bank securities department, also 
admits:        
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[…] The CB did not regulate forward contracts between our [Russian] banks and 
foreign investors at all, apart from a general requirement to enter in to them. And 
there were no standards in this plan – each one did what was right in his sight 
(Korishenko 2008).  
 
My interviewee F, who witnessed the development in the capacity of a chief financial 
officer in a Moscow branch of a European bank, continues his account, accompanying 
explanations with illustrations: 
    
F. […] [the Central Bank] stopped lending its shoulder [to the forward market], 
nonetheless keeping the currency corridor […]. They stuck to promise to 
maintain the currency corridor within the range of 6 to I think 6.2 [roubles for 
one US dollar] for 1998. […] If we are to calculate the annual percentage rate 
(i.e. rouble depreciation, dollar appreciation), the result is about 7%. And 
[Russian] banks have had much faith in the Central Bank. Because it was the 
regulator, it was well-respected, it was growing in strength, and it had [its] status 
[re-established] and all that. [The banks believed] it [the currency corridor] will 
be [maintained as promised]. So they kept quoting forwards without the CB, 
[they] started shifting these [forward default] risks from one to another. How did 
it look like? There is a bank, for instance ABN Amro or Credit Suisse. There 
comes a Credit Suisse client […] and says ‘I would still like to buy GKO’. Good. 
[…] ‘What is the rouble rate of return?’ [It is] something like 35% for GKO, for 
example. ‘What forward contract will you give me?’, ‘We’ll give you [the 
forward with settlement] on September 15, 1998, [for the price of] 6.15 [roubles 
for one dollar]’. The 6.15 price is because this is the market quote. Credit Suisse 
quotes it to its client; but it must not to keep this position opened. […] It needs to 
close the position, i.e. buy [dollar forward] for 6.15. 6.14 will be even better.  
[Credit Suisse] comes in to the market, buys it from Imperial [Russian bank]. Or 
from Inkombank. What does Inkombank does? Inkombank buys [the forward] 
from […] Tori Bank [another Russian bank, but smaller size]. The latter buys 
[the forward] from Unikombank. Whereas Unikombank buys from Novator 
bank. So this chain [of forwards] […] has to end up somewhere. In principle the 
CB could see this problem even at that time. But… right, banks should be 
concerned with [their] risks. We [CB] do not have to take it up as a state. But at 
that point not entirely knowing that actually the banks’ risk management is weak 
(F interview). 
 
The USD/RUB forward contracts between foreign investors and Russian banks loomed 
large in a few months. By the autumn of 1998, the outstanding notional value of the 
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deals was variously estimated at from $6.5 to $365 billion (Ippolito 2002: 10; Ivanov 
2007: 39; Tompson 2002: 76; Zhang 2004: 198).  
 
The most terrible thing is that because this [forward] market was considered back 
then as very paying, there was, as I call it, ‘a bonus effect’. This means an 
individual, who enters in to a [forward] deal, above all thinks of a bonus he will 
get as a result of it at the end of a year. And the least [he thinks] of how he will 
lose his job since the contract will be failed. Sooner or later [he] will find another 
job where [he] will be getting new bonuses… I remember, in fact, a good case in 
point, absolutely phenomenal in my understanding. One of the small regional 
banks, total currency assets of which was about 300 million roubles, has 
accumulated $1,5 billion forward obligations. Breathtaking proportion. Hence it 
was clear that it is unlikely all our banks will settle up [the forwards] 
(Korishenko 2008).                  
 
The Central Bank executive shares his recollections of the events that took place 10 
years ago. He knows all about the notorious ending of the development, along with 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Nomura, and JP Morgan – the banks that left the 
Russian market bearing heavy losses (Chaikina and Dorofeeva 2008). These losses were 
caused by defaults on the forward obligations of Russian banks and, since the USD/RUB 
forward market had been developing along with GKO trading, the market’s decline was 
inevitable amid the downturn of the GKO market complete with the rouble devaluation.   
 
Traditionally, government securities are considered to be the least risky obligations out 
of all possible types of debt, ‘since [a] federal government has substantial taxing power’ 
to be able to pay its bills (Ritter et al. 2004: 86). Combined with high returns, foreign 
investors’ striving for GKOs was also based on the assumption that the borrower is the 
Russian government:  
 
L. That was … a sort of the underlying attitude to… as the GKO is went up, 
clearly it became much more of the case of will they get the IMF support. To 
keep going. Because […] I think pretty early on people knew that or… I can’t 
really say when this was, but there was an increasing feeling that without IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] support, clearly, the whole thing couldn’t keep 
going. So as the interest rates on GKOs went up, it were looking much more at 
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the IMF, and I think that the feeling was that because Russia was nuclear, then 
they wouldn’t allow them to default (from an interview with L, a former non-
resident investment banker, emphasis added).  
 
Lastly, as Costas Kaplanis, a head of global arbitrage in Salomon Brothers investment 
bank puts it, ‘I was expecting them [the Russian government] to just print money’ to pay 
its domestic debt (Kaplanis interview to Donald MacKenzie in MacKenzie 2006: 229).    
 
All these expectations have contributed to the GKO market’s acceleration. Nevertheless, 
the risklessness of the GKO ensured by the government’s taxing power which foreign 
investors likely believed in turned out to be merely general theoretical consideration. 
Bella Zlatkis, one of the establishers and advocates of the GKO market, fighting her 
battles over again: 
 
The default was caused by the fact, that this [GKO] market had simply become 
trapped by the country’s [deteriorating] macroeconomic situation. [Everybody] 
had stopped paying taxes completely. My friend […] was the Treasury Head in 
Minfin [Ministry of Finance]. Once we were on our way to lunch and she said to 
me with her eyes wide opened ‘Bella, could you imagine what budget revenues 
we got this month?’ And she quoted the proceeds. A shiver went down my spine 
– we hadn’t been getting tax revenues at all by the time of [1998] crisis. 10-11 
billion roubles a month, [it is] ridiculous. Worse luck - the oil prices had 
plummeted (Zlatkis 2008). 
 
The plummeting oil prices were, indeed, critical for the Russian economy. The East-
Asian financial crisis, combusted in July 1997 in Thailand, resulted in sagging of prices 
for the commodity that was detrimental to Russian balance of payments, since the 
country is a great exporter of oil and ‘an export price of Russian oil largely determines 
balance of payments on [the country’s] current account’ (Illarionov 1998: 21-22). Given 
that a country deficit current account is one of the main indicators of an increasing 
default risk (Afonso 2003), the rapidly increasing deficit balance in the first six month of 
199811 triggered the foreign capital outflow. 
                                                
11 The balance was in $1.7 billion deficit in the first quarter and in $4.3 billion in the second quarter of the 
year (Illarionov 1998: 17).  
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Alongside with that, the government debt accelerated due to the fact, that ‘[…] in 1997 
the East-Asian market’s crisis came on and investors began to leave from there. It should 
have been expected that we will face the foreign capital outflow, and it did, essentially, 
begin in 1998. To stop it we started paying huge interest (I think the highest [rate of 
interest] was 120%), but [foreign] investors kept fleeing from [GKO] market’ (From an 
interview with Viktor Gerashenko, who was forcibly resigned from his post as a Head of 
the Central Bank in 1994 and was reinstated in 1998 (Gerashenko 2008)).  
   
The unwillingness of non-residents to keep investing their capitals into the spiralling 
debt of the Russian government resulted in massive GKO sales and repatriation of 
obtained capital. This, in turn, contributed to a sevenfold increase in US dollars demand, 
which could be seen from the MICEX trading statistics of 199812:   
 
 
USD/RUB MICEX Trading Volume ($ million) 
 
January February March April May June 
308.1 709.1 824.3 1024.6 1121.2 2255.1 
Source: MICEX 1998: 21.   
 
The increase in demand of US dollars triggered an escalation of the dollar spot price, 
thus depreciating the rouble. Here is what one could read in analysis reports on the 
currency market at that time: 
 
In the second quarter [of 1998] RUB/USD exchange rate soared from 6.089 
[roubles for one US dollar] to 6.225. This is 2.2% [monthly] increase (8.96% 
yearly increase). Besides, for most of this time interval MICEX exchange rate 
                                                
12 I cite the MICEX statistics because reliable interbank USD/RUB trading data do not exist for the period 
in question.    
81 
has been notably higher than the [official] Central Bank of the RF [Russian 
Federation] exchange rate (Kononova et al. 1998).  
 
Having realised the unbalanced concentration of currency exposure risks caused by their 
short positions in dollars (i.e. obligations to sell soaring dollars for the price set up few 
months before), Russian banks was eagerly buying foreign exchange (Tompson 1998: 
8). This coupled with the surging non-residents’ demand for dollars, hence put even 
more pressure on the rouble. The banks also rushed to open long positions in USD 
futures on Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (i.e. to lock in the surging dollar 
price), thus to offset the currency exposure risk. This is how the MICEX share in the 
average daily trading volumes on the spot currency market (the data quoted in million 
US dollars) went up from 0.5% in 1997 to 5.8% in 199813:      
 
Year Total MICEX OTC MICEX Share, % 
1992 36.3 28.3 8 78.0 
1993 163.3 63.3 100 38.8 
1994 318.2 98.2 220 30.9 
1995 298.6 98.6 200 33.0 
1996 3800 22.8 3777 0.6 
1997 4130 22.4 4108 0.5 
1998 2000 112.4 1888 5.8 
Source: Potemkin 2005. 
 
The Central Bank found itself in a truly difficult situation.  As a chief banking regulator, 
it had to keep the Russian banking system from failure. As a monetary authority, the 
Central Bank was bound to keep the rouble pegged. On the face of things it would seem 
to be a very logical task, as one aim implies the other: by committing to the stable rouble 
the Central Bank prevents the banking system from crash, whereas the Russian banks’ 
failure would make the rouble weak. But taking a second look at the situation, ‘it was 
                                                
13 I used this table in the previous section to illustrate how Russian OTC currency market had upswept in 
1993-1997. Here I added a row at the bottom of the table with the 1998 data.   
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fraught with contradictions in practice: measures adopted to protect the rouble tended to 
aggravate the banks’ problem, while steps taken to shore up the banks would tend to 
undermine the rouble’ (Tompson 1998: 2).  
 
Yet, however narrow were the circumstances for the monetary authority, it did try to 
support Russian banks: 
 
During may-august of 1998 the money authorities obtained US $9.8 billion of 
foreign loans. Within the same period of time the Central Bank sold US $9.4 
billion of foreign exchange, and only US $2.5 billion went through the 
exchanges. Whereas the lion's share of the foreign exchange – about US $6.9 
billion – was sold directly to the banks, by-passing the exchange-based market 
[…] (Illarionov 1999: 39).    
 
And still, all the taken steps could not help the banks to overcome the expanding crisis 
‘as money kept flowing out of the country and foreign exchange reserves fell by US $1.4 
billion in one week [at the beginning of August 1998], making the Rouble increasingly 
vulnerable’ (Buchs 1999: 692). On August 17, 1998, the Russian government defaulted 
on its GKO obligations and devalued the rouble. Initially the Russian currency was 
allowed to fluctuate up to 9.5 roubles for the dollar, but the rate went up to 20.65 by the 
end of 1998 (CBRF 1998c).     
 
As the dollar rate skyrocketed, Russian banks went bankrupt in their ability to meet the 
existing forward obligations to non-residents. Aside from being exposed to the surging 
USD/RUB exchange rate, the banks were also exposed to the counterparty default risk, 
which one of my interviewees was describing earlier in the Section. This hedging of 
exchange rate exposure with undercapitalised banks had returned in the guise of 
subjection to double exposure. Lastly, the banks that hedged their forward positions on 
MICEX also failed to obtain funds, since for collateral the exchange had been accepting 
GKO securities the government defaulted on, which made settlements impossible14.      
                                                
14 According to Aleksandr Zakharov, the MICEX vice-resident in 1998, by August 17, 1998, GKO 
securities had accounted for about 70% of total currency derivatives collateral (Zakharov 2000)     
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F. […] How did the things turn out? […] The last settlement date was August 14, 
for forwards. Then banks settled [forward contracts for] 6.2 [roubles for one 
dollar]. Because they could even… Those who did not hedge [with another 
contract] the [forward] position [could] buy it [the contracted amount] on the 
spot market. But then the crisis happened, there was the August 17, the whole 
thing [forward contract] got frozen [by Russian authorities], and there were loads 
of outstanding forward contracts with September 15, October 15 settlement dates 
[…]. All these dates were left outstanding (F interview).   
 
Indeed, Russian authorities, namely the Bank of Russia, in its attempt to save the 
banking system from collapse, announced the 90-day moratorium on commercial foreign 
debt payments, including banks’ forward obligations (CBRF 1998; CBRF 1998a). This 
measure, which put all the settlements on hold, was attempting to reconcile the situation 
on the whole, taking GKO debt into account also. However, it triggered expressly 
negative reaction by foreign investors, and here is why it happened: 
 
B.G. You were representing the CB viewpoint in GKO settlement negotiations 
with foreign creditors after the 1998 default. What in particular do you 
remember?   
K.K. You know, […] it was not until fairly recently that I have grasped the 
essence of what was happening back then […]. The first attempt to settle the 
GKO debt after the default was made in the form of a combined suggestion that 
considered both – the GKO debt and the forward contracts. In other words, non-
residents were offered compensation, notably in foreign currency, if they quit the 
currency derivatives claims. But […] the whole plan was junked. At that time it 
looked very odd. And here is why. At that moment I was in charge of the open 
market operations department in the Bank of Russia and we questioned Russian 
banks about their involvement into […] forward contracts with non-residents. 
[…] We managed to get confirmed about 60% of such contracts from both sides 
[residents and non-residents]. And then we realised that settlement of the forward 
contracts will be a major issue for most of the banks and, as is, Western 
counterparties cannot expect these obligations will be met.  
B.G. What was their volume? About the same as the volume of the GKO 
market?  
K.K. Unfortunately not. It turned out that [the volume was] a lot more. […] 
B.G. How come foreign creditors went for separating the GKO and forward 
problems? 
K.K. At first I was surprised too. But later I have realised that their gain or losses 
from restructuring of GKO were incommensurably less than the gain and losses 
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on the forward market. And that is why all that perhaps sidewise was seeing as 
foreign investors’ GKO problems, in fact were their forwards problems 
(Korishenko 2008, emphasis added).     
 
This is precisely why, in his following the default events in October 1998, Tompson 
(1998:11) was absolutely right insisting that ‘foreign banks were […] likely to sue their 
Russian counterparties, whether in Russia or abroad […]’. The next Section of this 
Chapter will account for these legal proceedings which resulted in a recession in the 
interbank foreign exchange forward market.   
 
c. The End of Forward Trading: NDFs Are Betting 
Transactions 
 
The described rapid expansion of the USD/RUB interbank forward market, which 
resulted in vast outstanding amounts that exceeded the GKO market’s debt, was 
predominantly the expansion of cash-settled (non-deliverable) forward contracts. A 
cash-settled or non-deliverable foreign exchange forward contract is a forward 
transaction, thus it is an agreement between two parties about a certain exchange rate on 
a certain future date. On the due date the parties of the contract do not deliver (hence the 
name ‘non-deliverable’) the currencies, but settle the contract by paying the difference 
between the contracted and the current rates of exchange for these currencies. The 
contract is normally settled in a specifically required or most accessible currency1. The 
previous Section detailed the reasons which conditioned US dollar settlement of the non-
deliverable forwards that Russian banks defaulted on. In addition, these forwards were 
mainly contracts for a term of three months, and the MICEX USD/RUB exchange rate 
was a reference spot rate on the contracts’ due date.               
 
The sharp rise of the cash-settled forward market had been happening in ultimately a 
scarce regulatory environment. My interviewee AC, who in 1997-2004 was a lawyer 
with various investment companies in Russia, reasons: 
 
AC. […] and, in fact, [in Russia] relations […] of banks among themselves, the 
Central Bank with the rest of the [Russian market’s] world … [they] … have 
many areas that are erratic, not expressed in other norms and statutory acts [that 
regulate Russian financial market] […]. This [state of things] causes the 
following: if you, for example, type the word ‘swap’ in the Russian legal 
database, let’s say the Konsultant Plus2, you will easily find it in letters of the 
Central Bank, and nowhere else. That is the case.  
                                                
1 The settlement currency depends on certain factors. This and other specific traits of the contract will be 
discussed in more details in Section B of Chapter 5 of the thesis.    
2 The Konsultant Plus is the largest ‘distributor of legal information’ in Russia. The system includes a 
database of continuously updated legislation, background and reference information for market 
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S.M. Yes, I typed ‘[a] forward’ [in the database] and there are either articles 
[from law journals], or… 
AC. …Either articles, or Central Bank’s letters. This whole area [of the market] 
is within the scope of usual and customary business practices. Notably [the 
business practices] are not of our [Russian] origin, but mainly borrowed from 
foreign [business] practice and introduced in to [Russian] banking sector (AC 
interview).                 
 
Indeed, in 1996-1999 there was only one regulatory document for the referential use by 
the interbank market participants: Instruction No 41 issued by the Bank of Russia in 
May 1996. It defined a non-deliverable currency forward as ‘a conversion operation 
which is a combination of two transactions: a currency forward contract (a forward part 
of the cash-settled forward contract) and an obligation to make a counter transaction on 
the date the forward contract is due to at a current exchange rate (a spot part of the cash-
settled forward contract)’ (CBRF 1996a). The regulation did not explicitly state that the 
parties of the contract do settle a difference between a forward exchange rate and a spot 
exchange rate, and don’t exchange an underlying asset, i.e. currencies. However, in 
actual practice the contract was not considered as initially providing for delivery of 
currencies in question. In fact, the contract was nothing else but ‘an obligation of one 
party [of the contract] to pay a counterparty a difference between an article’s price at a 
moment of contract making and [a moment of] its execution’ (Ivanova 2005: 4).   
 
This obligation to pay a difference in prices for an article, without the article’s delivery, 
is an advantageous market tool: it is essential in a situation where market practitioners 
have a need for locking a price of a certain item that cannot be freely circulated in a 
market due to existing restrictions3. However, this distinguishing quality of a cash-
                                                                                                                                           
practitioners. ‘The President Administration, the Russian Government and Parliament, federal government 
agencies and departments’ among those who use the Konsultant Plus product range 
(http://www.consultant.ru/sys/english/, accessed October 13, 2008). 
3 A detailed analysis of the advantages of a non-deliverable forward contract as a hedging tool will be 
given in the next Chapter.  
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settled forward turned out to be also a trait that allowed Russian arbitration courts4 to 
declare the contract void, thus not liable to enforcement by a court decision.     
 
Interestingly, the cash-settled forward contract was put outwith the scope of existing law 
and therefore became unenforceable a few months before the Russian government 
defaulted on GKOs and devalued the rouble in August-September 1998. Six months 
earlier, on February 17, 1998, the Arbitration Court of Moscow City dismissed a claim 
of US $141,5435 debt of the Investment Bank of the Entrepreneurship Support (IBES) to 
the Interregional Commercial and Industrial Bank (ICIB) under the cash-settled forward 
contract the parties entered into on September, 22, 1997. The contract’s item was a price 
of shares (not a currency exchange rate) and according to the terms of the contract a 
settlement was expected to take place in three months time, on December 15, 1997. On 
the day the contract was due, the Investment Bank of the Entrepreneurship Support 
(IBES) did not settle the transaction and the other party of the contract, the Interregional 
Commercial and Industrial Bank (ICIB), took legal action against the debtor.  However, 
the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed on the ground of being unenforceable due to the fact 
that the ‘disputed contract is a wagering contract, since in actual fact the shares were not 
delivered by the parties, […], the parties did not participate in determination of the 
shares’ price on December 15, 1997; such transactions with securities are not provided 
for by the law, legal relationship arising from betting are not court protected, the 
reference to the analogy with currency [cash-settled forward] transactions [regulated by 
the Central Bank] is groundless’ (FAC 1998).   
 
Having its claim dismissed again in April 1998, in an attempt to collect the debt the 
Interregional Commercial and Industrial Bank (ICIB) made an appeal to the Federal 
                                                
4 Together with courts of general jurisdiction and a constitutional court, arbitration courts in Russia form 
an institutional infrastructure of the legal system. The arbitration courts ‘handle all economic disputes 
involving legal entities’ (Hendley 2007: 242).   
5 In actual practice, the claim was for 869,076 roubles. According to the 6.14 RUB/USD official exchange 
rate set by the Bank of Russia at that time (http://www.cbr.ru/archive/root_get_blob.asp?doc_id=250, 
accessed January 16, 2007), this amounted to US $141,543.    
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Arbitration Court of Moscow District6. The plaintiff insisted on the fact that during the 
two previous trials the ‘consensus of will of the parties to the agreement’ was left out of 
consideration; more importantly, it urged the Court to examine the terms of the contract 
more closely, in view of the fact that the contract ‘was based on the legal concept whose 
definition was given by the Bank of Russia in its Letters No 382 D/D 23.12.96 and No 
404 D/D 03.02.97’ with relation to currency forward transactions and extended to 
transactions with securities by its Decree No 02-97 D/D 21.03.97 (FAC 1998). 
Nevertheless, on May 29, 1998, the verdict to ‘dismiss the appeal’ and ‘affirm the 
[previous] court decisions’ was made. As for the Central Bank regulation of the contract, 
the court disregarded it considering the given definition was ‘a subject to application for 
the purpose of the Instruction No 41 D/D 22.05.96’, i.e. enforceable in connection with 
foreign exchange forwards only (FAC 1998)7.    
 
In the second half of the year 1998 the plummeting rouble resulted in a cascade of 
defaults on foreign exchange forward obligations. Given the Federal Arbitration Court’s 
decision to make securities forward transactions unenforceable in courts, with no 
challenges posed against  foreign exchange forward contracts, there would seem to be no 
reasons to expect court verdicts against the evidences confirming the lawfulness of 
interbank cash-settled currency forwards, such as the Central Bank’s statutes. However, 
                                                
6 Hendley (2007: 244, emphasis in original) accounts for 3 stages of trial: ‘Trial courts are knows [sic] as 
“the courts of first instance” […]. Those dissatisfied with outcomes at trial can turn to the “courts of the 
appellate instance” […] and, if they remain dissatisfied, they can appeal to the “courts of the cassation 
instance”[…] The 82 trial courts feed into 20 appellate courts, which feed into 10 cassation courts. The 
court of last resort within the arbitrazh system is the Higher Arbitrazh Court […].’       
7 Here it must be noted that, according to the article published in Financial Times in July 1998, this 
decision of the court was not left unnoticed by the Central Bank. The article claimed that ‘to help clarify 
the situation the central bank has stepped in to demystify capitalism for Russia’s lawyers. It has written to 
the supreme arbitration court explaining why forward contracts are a legitimate part of the banking 
system’; it also cited the Central Bank’s deputy chairman Denis Kisilyev, who accentuated the 
controversy: ‘We are demonstrating that we regard this market as a very important and integral part of the 
Russian financial system, […]. I think as soon as we have got a proper ruling from the court it will 
improve the quality of the market itself and restore the confidence of investors that they can hedge rouble 
assets’ (Thornhill 1998: 2).  However, I could not find the mentioned letter written by the Bank of Russia 
to the Supreme Arbitration Court – the search in the Court’s archives requested on my behalf has failed to 
turn up such letter. The Central Bank official, who at that time was involved in the negotiations, confirmed 
that such appeal of the Central Bank to the Supreme Arbitration Court indeed had happened, yet he 
doubted the documents in question could be found (A Central Bank official whose name cannot be 
revealed, electronic mail message to the author, October 27, 2008).    
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the apparent contradiction between the court rulings and the monetary authority’s 
regulation resulted in inconsistency in subsequent judicial settlements of the cases 
concerning cash-settled forwards. Ultimately, the statutes of the Central Bank had not 
been recognised as a sufficient ground to sustain the claims that eventually triggered ‘a 
number of lawsuits in various courts’ (Ivanova 2005: 17).        
 
 
A good case in point is the court examinations of the claim of Sberbank to 
Promstroibank. On April 28, 1999, the Arbitration Court of Moscow City satisfied the 
claim for a payment of US $370,4808 in connection with the agreement the parties 
entered into on November 19, 1996. Based on the agreement concluded by the banks, 
the foreign exchange forward contract was to be settled on September 15, 1998. As 
could be expected, due to the surging price of the US dollar, Promstroibank defaulted on 
its forward obligation (FAC 1999).  
 
No matter how far-reaching the consequences of such manoeuvre might have been, the 
defendant did not wish to bear losses and in its appeal referred to Article 1062 of the 
Civil Code of the Russian Federation, thus attributed the forward transaction to betting. 
In so doing, it argued that since Article 1062 announces betting as unenforceable, the 
court decision was invalid; thereby the bank substantiated the reasonableness of the 
application of the Civil Code article that regulated betting. The appeal court affirmed the 
initial court decision in July 1999, but on the second appeal in September 1999, the court 
of cassation reversed the judgement with the following statement: 
 
[…] In such [cash-settled forward] dealings the parties accepted the foreign 
exchange fluctuation risks. In the case files there are no evidences that these 
deals were supposed to answer to some specific economic purpose.  
                                                
8 Sberbank collected 9,150,875 roubles on judgement, and since the official exchange rate was 24.7 
RUB/USD at that time (http://www.cbr.ru/archive/root_get_blob.asp?doc_id=305, accessed January 16, 
2007), this is how the US $ amount was calculated.   
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According to Article 1062 of the RFCC [the Russian Federation Civil Code] the 
civil legislation does not regulate these deals and does not protect such deals in 
courts, considering that these deals are betting [deals]. 
 In these circumstances the Sberbank’s claim should have been dismissed [as a 
result of the first two court trials] (FAC 1999).        
 
Such decision of the court could have been conditioned by Decree No 5347/98 of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation issued on June 8, 
1999. The Decree ‘set a precedent in the Russian legal environment’, therefore it 
‘formalised in legislation the already existing court practice’ of voiding cash-settlement 
(Kuznetsova 2006). The issuance of the Decree was caused by one of the numerous 
lawsuits related to non-deliverable currency forwards. The litigation, this time between 
Moskomprivatbank and Russian Development Bank, resulted in rejection of the claim 
on the same ground –Article 1062 of the Civil Code which makes betting unenforceable. 
However, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court lodged a protest 
suggesting revoking the judgements and re-investigating the case. As a result, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court had to handle the protest and this yielded a 
reverse effect in the form of the Decree that once again emphasised the absence of an 
economic purpose of such deals and gave a decided answer to all current and future 
challenges to the legal position that understands cash-settled forwards as betting (PSAC 
RF 1999).  
 
The judicial concept of cash-settled forwards as betting, formalised by the Decree of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court in June 1999, also affected the exchange-
based futures trading. Currency futures are standardised forward contracts that are 
bought and sold on an exchange9. Despite the fact that this trade is legitimated by 
exchanges’ rules and regulations, the FORTS (Futures and Options on the Russian 
Trading System Stock Exchange) exchange-based currency derivatives market  kept 
increasing an initial margin that is a certain amount deposited by the markets’ 
participants to insure against the risk of default on a transaction. In 2003 there was an 
                                                
9 The difference between a forward contract and a futures contract will be identified in greater detail in the 
next Chapter of the thesis.  
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increase of the initial margin from 100,000 to 250,000 roubles on the FORTS10. 
Kuznetsova (2006) quotes the twofold increase from 250,000 to 500000 roubles11 in 
April 2004; whereas Oleg Safonov, President of the exchange at that time, claims 
fourfold increase of the margin over a period of 200412. 
 
With all the impact on the market, it was not until much later, in 2003-2006, that many 
lawyers insisted on the groundlessness of rating the contracts as betting in their analysis 
of the court decisions and the cornerstone Decree which made cash-settled forwards 
unenforceable (Petrosyan 2003; Ivanova 2005; Kuznetsova 2006). They reasoned: 
 
Chapter 58 of the CC RF [the Civil Code of the Russian Federation] is called 
‘Conducting Games and Betting’, and in Articles 1062 and 1063 of this Chapter 
there is no definition of the betting, and also no mentioning of contracts for 
difference matters. The specified Chapter of the CC RF is [only] concerned with 
the issues of how to organise a conduct of games and betting (Kuznetsova 2006).  
 
Z, a lawyer who has been  involved in the development of securities legislation for years 
and whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, protection and 
control of professional participants in the securities market, agrees that ‘the abstract 
definition of a betting deal let Russian judicial authorities to recognise cash-settled 
forwards as betting’ (Z interview).  Besides, the lawyers also appealed against the 
repeated grounding for making the cash-settlement of forwards unenforceable, namely 
‘the absence of an economic purpose’ (FAC 1999; PSAC RF 1999): 
 
First, the [Russian] legislation does not grant a relief under condition that there is 
an economic purpose [in a contract], and an absence of the economic purpose in 
the contract cannot put out of court parties in the cash-settled forward contract or 
any other contract. Further still, there is no doubt in the economic purpose [of the 
contracts]. The purpose of participation in the derivative [which include forward] 
                                                
10 That is from US $3,247 to US $8,117; the US dollar equivalent is calculated using the 30.8RUB/USD 
exchange rate in May 2003 (http://www.cbr.ru/archive/root_get_blob.asp?doc_id=4679, accessed January 
16, 2007). Source: http://www.riskland.ru/news/2003/05/22/227.shtml, accessed October 22, 2008. 
11 That is from US $8,772 to US $17,544 according to the 28.5RUB/USD exchange rate in April 2004 
(http://www.cbr.ru/archive/root_get_blob.asp?doc_id=5877, accessed January 16, 2007). 
12 http://c-society.ru/wind.php?ID=486684&soch=1, accessed October 22, 2008.  
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deals is systematic generation of profit and acceptance of exchange rate risks, i.e. 
normal course of business for speculators; for hedgers such purpose for entering 
such-like contracts is insurance against adverse movements in a price of an item. 
[…] As opposed to wagering contracts, in cash-settled derivatives there is no 
controversy as such, the parties agree merely on the fact that, in a case of a price 
change […] (and there is no dispute over the fact that the price may change), one 
party accepts a risk of such change and promise to compensate such 
disadvantageous price fluctuation to the other party [of the contract]        
(Petrosyan 2003).   
 
However, the market practitioners claim that the main reason for the judicial 
development that was unfavourable to cash-settled forwards was the economic 
expediency of it, rather than the legal ambiguity of the contracts: 
 
T. Why [did the courts announce cash-settled forward contracts unenforceable]? 
Well, actually it is quite obvious why. […] There was an understanding that if it 
was not for this Article [1062], a lot of banks simply would have gone bankrupt. 
Clearly. And […] this was that positive moment [in the legal development that 
overall is considered to be regrettable] the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration 
Court talked about … unofficially. And generally it was clear that if it was not 
for the [betting] provision, then there would be virtually nothing. By ‘virtually’ I 
mean economically; in Russia this [the banking system as it was, at the moment 
of the interview, considered to be strong] would have happened much later than 
[it did] (T interview)13. 
 
Nevertheless, the banks which sustained great damage caused by their parties’ defaults 
on the forward positions, did not wish to resign themselves to the court resolution, due to 
their conviction of its groundlessness. These banks went on litigating, and in so doing 
raising questions of validity of the application of Article 1062 to the outstanding 
contracts. Moreover, the Banque Société Générale Vostok took further action and 
initiated a case claiming unconstitutionality of Article 1062 of the Civil Code of Russian 
Federation. 
                                                
13 Several of my interviewees admitted the fact of lobbying such judicial decisions, although none was 
prepared to be quoted on the point; there was also a divergence of views on the lobbyists – the defaulted 
banks and state authorities are among those who were named. For instance, one of the Central Bank 
officials involved in the development, claims that ‘the [court] decision to declare[foreign exchange cash-
settled] forwards as betting was lobbied through by one Russian private commercial bank, which was not 
able to meet its forward obligations’ (A Central Bank official whose name cannot be revealed, electronic 
mail message to the author, October 27, 2008).  
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The Banque Société Générale Vostok had the grounds for such action. According to 
Ruling No.282-O of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, the bank had failed to 
collect the forward contract debt twice. First, the Arbitration Court of Moscow City had 
dismissed the bank’s claim to Avtobank; and second, the same court had defeated its 
case against Uneximbank. Trial of these two cases had resulted in citation of Article 
1062 by the court (CC RF 2002). To all appearances, the Banque Société Générale 
Vostok found this Article serving as a loophole in the law, thus questioned whether the 
Article complied with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.  
 
More specifically, the bank claimed a contradiction between Article 1062 of the Civil 
Code and certain articles of the Russian Constitution –Articles 34 and 55. The Banque 
Société Générale Vostok argued that in making cash-settled forwards unenforceable the 
court had applied Article 1062 which states that ‘the demands of citizens and juridical 
persons connected with the organisation of games and betting or participation therein 
shall not be subjected to judicial defence’ (RF 2002: 385); however, Part 1 of Article 34 
of the Constitution utters that ‘everyone shall have the right to a free use of his abilities 
and property for entrepreneurial and economic activities not prohibited by law’. 
Furthermore, Part 3 of Article 55 of the Constitution insists on the fact that ‘the rights 
and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to such an 
extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, for 
ensuring defence of the country and security of the State’ (RF 1993). Consequently, The 
Banque Société Générale Vostok ‘asks to adjudge the contested Article as not in comply 
with Articles 34 (Part 1) and 55 (Part 3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
inasmuch as it allows courts to announce cash-settled forward claims, which form a 
constituent part of banks’ entrepreneurial activity, unenforceable’ (CC RF 2002).  
 
The proper court for the trial of the action was the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation, since ‘this court reviews legislation and executive actions for compliance 
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with the constitution and hears complaints from citizens about violations of their 
constitutional rights’ (Hendley 2007: 242). On December 16, 2002, in the Ruling, the 
judges of the court confirmed that the existing ‘civil legislation [of the Russian 
Federation] does not hold criteria that allow unambiguous classification of an aleatory 
contract termed as a cash-settled forward’. However, even though there are no such 
regulatory foundations in the law, Article 1062 by no means obstructs justice in respect 
to cash-settled forward contracts, given that the course of justice is subject to the 
particular case.  Finally, the Ruling of the Constitutional Court did not define non-
deliverable forwards as betting; since legal definition of such contracts is not a 
legislative prerogative of the Constitutional Court, it recommitted all similar cases to 
arbitration courts (CC RF 2002).  
 
Apparently, the Ruling of the Constitutional Court closed the chapter on the legal cases 
of non-performance of cash-settled forward contracts.  A head of a legal department in a 
Moscow branch of a large European bank reflects on the development: 
 
X. […] statutory regulation is just a first stratum [of the financial markets’ 
regulation in Russia], the highest one. However, there are also judicial decisions. 
Indeed, we are not a country of common law14, but clearly the decisions of the 
Supreme Arbitration Court of [19]99 and the Constitutional Court of 2002 are 
very important to us (X interview).     
 
Given the importance of the judicial decisions, the following comment on the verdict of 
the Constitutional Court made by one of the court’s judges, would seem to be of a 
particular relevance to understanding the legal context of the events that took place in 
2003-2007 in Russia:     
   
                                                
14 Russia is a country of civil law. It is deemed that common law and civil law are two origins of 
commercial laws (La Porta et al. 1998). Common law is law that is assembled by particular cases, or 
precedents, and judicial decision resulted from the precedents. As for civil law, which comes from Roman 
law, it is codified law that consists of systemised statues. Further elaboration of the specific characteristics 
of Russian law will be presented in Chapter 6 of the thesis.        
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Are cash-settled forward contracts a form of business contracts undefined in the 
Civil Code of the Russian Federation or betting transaction? […] The issue in 
question is overwhelmingly important for the derivatives market’s development 
in Russia. The established adjudicatory practice of application of Article 1062 of 
the CC [Civil Code] of the Russian Federation to non-deliverable forward 
contracts is a fundamental reason that impediment to its maturation. [I] believe 
that terminal [forward] transaction made on exchanges and an over-the-counter 
market, are not the betting and gambling Article1062 of the Russian Federation 
CC refers to. […] The fact that the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation delivered a ruling, but not a decree, maintains the option of an 
arbitrary application of Article 1062 […], which, in circumstances where […] 
administrative regulation (although inadequate) does exist, is unconstitutional 
[…]. [However], courts cannot substitute other governmental authorities, which 
are responsible for developing a legal infrastructure for the financial derivatives 
market (Gadzhiev 2002).   
       
In summary, by the court decisions of 1999-2002, a currency delivery-free forward 
contract was unconditionally declared a betting transaction. The overall comprehension 
of the situation was as follows: 
 
J. It was a popular belief that we [Russian financial market practitioners] diced 
away all money. Stupid Russian bankers, with very little knowledge of it 
[currency forward risk management], as kids riding a tiger, went into the 
derivatives [debt], gambled 30 or 50 billion of dollars away in [cash-settled] 
forward contracts  (From an interview with J, a financial law expert with one of 
the Russian authorities, emphasis added).  
 
The interviewee uses the notion of gambling in a view of the fact that gambling is ‘the 
word [that] is (at least in serious use) essentially a term of reproach, it would not 
ordinarily be applied to the action of playing for stakes of trifling amount’ (OED 1989). 
Thus, the notion of gambling, that ‘haunt[ed] modern credit practices […] [because] the 
distinction between gambling and finance hinges on perception of […] excess rather 
than being inherent in nature or economics’ (de Goede 2005: 85, 84), once again stepped 
into and powered the judgement of contracts that do not require delivery of items.  
 
Having ‘gambled away’ such vast sums of money, those bankers who had suffered from 
their counterparties’ defaults on the forward obligations encountered a refusal of 
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enforcement of the contracts, based on a Civil Code article that regulates (or rather does 
not) betting. However, and this was confirmed by the Russian Constitutional Court, the 
application of Article1062 of the Civil Code was only possible in the legal context that 
did not provide grounds for legally stipulated forward transactions. Therefore, such 
contracts are of great necessity for a regulatory infrastructure in which cash-settled 
forwards cannot be named as voided contracts on the instant one of counterparties does 
not wish, or is not able to meet the obligation.  Though it is widely held that classifying 
non-deliverable forwards as betting, indeed, rescued the Russian banking system from 
collapse in 1998-1998, by 2003 it was generally agreed amongst market participants that 
if Russia was to have an efficiently regulated financial market, it was time to develop a 
robust legal context for cash-settled derivatives. Chapter 5 of the thesis will consider the 
economic usefulness of a non-delivered foreign exchange forward by focusing on the 
functions the contract performs and the ways its enforceability can benefit RUB/USD 
forward trading.  
 
Chapter 5.  The Way to Go - Forward 
 
The previous chapter discussed the beginning of the Russian derivatives market, its 
surging and plummeting as a consequence of the 1998 default. The subsequent 
declaration of cash-settled forwards as gambling transactions, and thus not court 
protected contracts, caused the recession in the interbank foreign exchange forward 
market. Moreover, the de jure recognition of a non-deliverable forward as a gambling 
transaction eventually led to a situation where the ‘Russian derivatives market has 
become literally non-existent’ (Golikov 2007: 45).    
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. In the first instance, it is to focus on a non-deliverable 
forward contract and its place in an interbank foreign exchange market, given the vast 
size and high importance of the latter. Secondly, through examining the current state of 
the rouble forward market affected by the conversion of non-deliverable forward 
contracts (NDFs) into gambling transactions, the chapter illustrates the negative 
financial consequences of the declaration of cash-settled forwards as unenforceable. The 
chapter argues that legalised non-deliverable forward contracts are of crucial importance 
to the very existence of the forward market. It also expands on another positive outcome 
of cash-settlement legality, such as a feasibility of netting, so vital to the rouble forward 
market.  
 
The articulated aims of the chapter determine its specific character. To attain the aims a 
number of the financial terms will be introduced and resorted to in the chapter. Since the 
key argument is about the essence and the mechanics of the foreign exchange forward 
market and the impact it has on the Russian economy, this will make the chapter’s 
discussion sound rather specialised and technical in some parts, therefore seemingly 
different from the previous and following chapters. In this respect, it will be somewhat 
dissonant to the works which belong to the approach generally regarded as social studies 
of finance.   
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The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section addresses the nature of the interbank 
foreign exchange forward market, its use and purposes. The second section is an account 
of the Russian over-the counter derivatives market and cash-settled rouble forwards as it 
is at the time of writing the thesis1. The final section of this chapter focuses on the 
specific characteristics of the rouble forward market that are consequential on legal 
unenforceability of cash-settlement and deals with the question of how an onshore 
legalisation of these cash-settled contracts would benefit the market.  
 
a. The Interbank FX Forward Market: How and Why? 
 
Prior to proceeding to the forward market inquiry it is essential to define what type of a 
forward market is dealt with. In this chapter and throughout the thesis the interbank 
foreign exchange forward market is referred to, unless otherwise stated. 
 
For understanding the market’s nature and essence, further brief explanations should be 
brought in. Foreign exchange (also called Forex) is a market which facilitates a trade in 
different currencies; it is a mechanism which makes possible to convert any amount of 
money denominated in one currency into the same amount in another currency. On this 
basis foreign exchange has a direct relationship to international trade and international 
investing.  
 
The foreign exchange market is a financial market, but a very special one – the trade is 
carried on ‘twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and is the closest analogue to 
the concept of a continuous time global marketplace’ (Bollerslev and Domowitz 1993: 
1421). Because it is a trade, there is always a buyer (who wants to buy, for instance, 
                                                
1 In view of the legal development described later in the Chapter 6 and the rapid growth of the market it 
can be said with certainty that in time the account will differ from the one given. 
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some particular amount of roubles), a seller (who sells the roubles and wants to receive a 
payment in US dollars), and a price (a RUB/USD exchange rate).  
 
Sarno and Taylor (2001, 2003) name three institutional features that make this market 
different from other financial markets – (1) the market is large in volume, (2) it is 
decentralised, and (3) the market’s substantial part relates to forward transactions. 
According to the size of the foreign exchange market monitored by the Bank for 
International Settlements in different years (BIS 1999, 2002, 2005), it is the largest 
market in the world – for example in 2007 its average turnover was $3.2 trillion a day 
and demonstrated ‘unprecedented’ increase of  71% since 2004 (BIS 2007:1). This 
amount is best appreciated by comparison with the U.S. annual budget – by estimate it 
was $2.8 trillion in 2007 (GPO Access 2008).  
 
Since such vast sums of money are traded in the foreign exchange market on a daily 
basis, and at the same time the difference between a price wanted and an offered price (a 
bid-asked spread) is slight, the market is exceptionally liquid, that is ‘the participants can 
rapidly execute large-volume transactions with a small impact on prices’ (BIS 1999a: 
13).  
 
The second essential trait of the foreign exchange market is its predominantly 
decentralised structure2: 
 
A decentralized market is a market in which participants … are generally 
physically separated from each other and in which transactions are made by 
telephone … or computer networks. … In a decentralized system, prices are 
quoted and transactions executed in private meetings, perhaps conducted through 
some form of electronic medium (Sarno and Taylor 2001: 3).   
 
                                                
2 Although there is an opinion that a structure of the foreign exchange market is a ‘combination of a fully 
decentralised interbank direct market with the quasi-centralised interbank brokered market’ (Flood 1991: 
57-58; Flood 1994: 132) 
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Due to the fact that the foreign exchange market is a decentralised trading, it is dispersed 
all over the world. However, in its survey the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 
2007: 7, Table B.2) reported on the main geographical locations of foreign exchange 
trading. In fact, the United Kingdom is the centre for the trade – 34,1% of the total 
trading takes place there. The United States follows the UK with 16,6% share in the 
global foreign exchange trading. As the numbers suggest, indeed ‘there is more dollars 
trading in London than there is in New York’ (from the interview with D, a City broker 
based in London), since the US dollar is ‘the most traded’ currency on the foreign 
exchange (BIS 2007: 9, see also Table B.5)3.   
 
At last, the third institutional feature of the Forex market is a dominance of forward 
transactions in the trading, and these transactions ‘generally occur in two different ways: 
outright and swap’ (Flood 1991: 56). On close examination of the global foreign 
exchange market turnover (BIS 2007: 4, Table B.1) it becomes apparent that foreign 
exchange derivatives instruments (outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps) 
definitely constitute the major portion of the foreign exchange market – these 
transactions account for about 66% ($2,1 trillion), whereas spot transactions for 31 % 
($1 trillion) of the total $3,2 trillion a day turnover4.   
 
The predominating Forex derivatives instruments are better understood through 
appreciation of the essential difference between a foreign exchange spot transaction and 
a derivatives contract. A spot market transaction is a transaction between a buyer and a 
seller of a currency. Delivery of this currency and payment in another currency takes 
place within the next two days, due to infrastructural complexity which affects transfer 
of funds. The price is the currency spot rate on the day of the transaction. Thus, there are 
                                                
3 To be ‘the most traded’ currency means that ‘for almost any other currency the bilateral dollar exchange 
markets will have the largest volume’ (Flood 1991: 56).   
4 The remaining 3% are ‘gaps in reporting’ (BIS 2007:4, Table B.1). In fact, in 2007 the global OTC 
derivatives market turnover is $4,2 trillion with interest rate contracts included. This amount  is $1trillion 
bigger the $3,2 trillion turnover of the traditional foreign exchange market comprising spot, forward and 
swap transactions only (BIS 2007: 13-14).    
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two key characteristics of a spot transaction – (1) a nearly immediate delivery and (2) a 
current (at the moment of the transaction) price/spot rate5.    
 
Similar to a spot transaction, an outright forward transaction6 is an agreement - a buyer 
and a seller enter in to a contract where they take up an obligation to exchange 
currencies they are interested in. However, delivery of the currencies takes place on a 
stated date in the future and an exchange rate (or the price) is agreed upon in advance, 
i.e. on a day the forward transaction took place7. 
 
Given that a forward market is the largest segment of foreign exchange market, and 
before proceeding to the question of usefulness of forward exchange, it is essential to 
depict the structure of the market or, put it differently, the elements amounting to, or 
constituting forward exchange. Generally speaking, currency forwards are traded on 
both organised exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) markets.  
 
The organised exchange, or centralised market, is a trade which is ‘carried out at 
publicly announced prices and all traders have access to the same trading opportunities’ 
(Wolinsky 1990: 1). This trade takes place either on organised exchange premises or 
may not be physically allocated. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group, Inc. 
                                                
5 Market practitioners also think of a spot market as opposed to a forward market: ‘…This term “spot” is 
associated with not only the second day [of delivery], but also it is contrasted with forward markets. There 
are derivatives markets, but also spot markets’ (F interview). Nevertheless ‘strictly speaking, a spot deal is 
really a forward deal for two days’ (Einzig 1937: 22).   
6 Unlike the spot transaction, there is a whole range of foreign exchange derivative transactions. It seems 
to be impossible to give a definition of a derivatives contract without specifying by kind, because such 
definition will be very general. For instance a derivative contract typically defined as ‘a financial 
instrument the price of which has a strong relationship with an underlying commodity, currency, economic 
variable or financial instrument’ (Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking 2005: 113). In fact, foreign 
exchange derivatives differ greatly from one another, not to mention a spot trade. An outright forward and 
a foreign exchange swap are associated with ‘traditional foreign exchange markets’, whereas currency 
swaps, options and interest rate contracts are accounted as ‘OTC derivatives’ (BIS 2007: 4, 14). To 
provide a description of all possible foreign exchange derivatives contracts is a task outside the purview of 
the inquiry. Yet for the purpose of defining a derivatives contract, and given that the theses are primarily 
concerned with the foreign exchange forward market, it would seem to be reasonable to define a forward 
contract as a pivotal transaction to the research. 
7 In actual practice there are deliverable and non-deliverable (cash-settled) forward contracts. The 
difference between these contracts will be specified in greater detail later in this Chapter.  
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is an example of a few remaining centralised foreign exchange forward markets 
physically allocated on the exchange premises. Eurex exchange and U.S. Futures 
Exchange exemplify an electronic exchange where currency forwards are traded.  
 
A forward contract, which is traded on an exchange, is called a futures contract, and all 
dissimilarities between a forward and a future are consequential to this.  The crucial 
difference between forward and futures contracts is that a price of a forward is the same 
over the contract duration, whereas a price of a future is marked-to-market, or evaluated 
daily on an exchange. For that reason ‘the futures market is unique in the guidance it 
provides for producers, distributors and users of commodities’ (Black 1976: 167, see 
also Polakoff and Grier 1991, Lioui 1998). As a result, regardless of the difference 
between forward and futures contracts, these instruments are interrelated in trading: 
 
In the interbank market, simultaneous trades often occur at different prices, so 
that the single price posted by the futures exchange becomes an important source 
of information to the traders who are typically active in both markets [and] 
empirical studies … confirm the close association between forward and future 
exchange rates (Harvey and Huang 1991: 546).8  
 
In addition to the daily recalculation of a futures contract’s value, this contract, unlike a 
forward, is standardised, i.e. all details of it are specified in advance and a buyer /seller 
do not adjust the terms of the futures contract to their needs, it is a ready to buy/sell 
instrument. Finally, but no less crucially, the futures contract is not affected by 
counterparties’ (a buyer and a seller) guarantee of performance, since it is the concern of 
a clearinghouse of an exchange where the futures are traded: 
 
The clearinghouse is an institution that interposes itself between the 
counterparties and operates as a ‘third party’ in the … resolution of obligations 
                                                
8 Nevertheless there is also a view that ‘although the expansion of trading in foreign currency futures… in 
recent years is a significant development in the continuing evolution of international financial markets, an 
understanding of these derivative contracts is not central to understanding the behaviour of exchange 
rates’ (Isard 1995: 20-21).     
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between counterparties… it thus works as a ‘central counterparty’ (Millo et al 
2005: 233).  
 
All contracts on an exchange are in fact executed with a clearinghouse, since the 
clearinghouse undertakes the obligations’ fulfilment by settling completed futures 
transactions in the capacity of an interdealer.  On the contrary, in forward markets 
‘dealers are… particular about the names they are prepared to take for forward business, 
and about the amount up to which they are prepared to take the various names’, given 
that there is no third party that would guarantee performance of a buyer and a seller of a 
forward contract (Einzig 1937: 86).  To sum this up, 
 
A futures contract has nearly the same attributes as currency, whereas a forward 
contract has the same attributes as a check (Telser 1981: 6). 
 
The currency futures market is barely a small component of the entire foreign exchange 
derivatives market - its average daily turnover in 2007 was $0,07 trillion, which is on 
average just 3 % of the total derivatives market turnover (BIS 2007: 14, Table C.1). That 
is, we may say, a forward market is mostly an over-the-counter (OTC) market.  
 
As an OTC market, forward foreign exchange is composed of banks, clients (or 
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Being its key constituents (or counterparties), commercial and investment banks are 
major traders on the market – in total turnover of foreign exchange in 2007 the interbank 
market share amounts to 43% (BIS 2007: 7). Banks are also market-makers; they 
‘make’, or maintain, or keep up a forward market resulting from their bid and ask prices. 
In so doing they are ‘professional risk-bearers’ (Stein 1962, cited by Kenen 1963: 371), 
given that ‘they usually quote rates even before they know rates at which they are likely 
to cover [risks]’ (Einzig 1937: 87). Lyons (1995: 347) calls it ‘a dealership market’, 
since ‘interdealer trades (direct or brokered) compose the … majority of activity in the 
market’ (Flood 1994: 134-135). 
 
If we are to picture this dealership (or interbank) foreign exchange forward market by 
listing the major counterparties, there would seem to be some ambiguity of information. 
The existing research acknowledges difficulties in obtaining such data, explaining these 
difficulties by the ‘non-transparent’ character of the over-the-counter market (Dodd and 
Griffith-Jones 2006: 1). It is indeed. A good case in point is the following dialogue 
between me and the broker (who wished to stay anonymous), which took place in a big 
brokerage company in the City (London) in June 2007:  
 
 S.M. How many dealers are in the rouble forward market, roughly? 
 The Broker. What, bankers? Or brokers? 
 S.M. You are working with. Both, actually. 
 The Broker. Oh, that is a question… Umm… In London… (Pause) 
 S.M. You cannot give up the names… 
 The Broker. No, no. Yeah. There must be… Purely in London, yeah? 
S.M. Yes, I am trying to figure out a picture of the market. Because it is really 
difficult to find any information at all. 
The Broker. I would say there are probably a very good high standard… 
Umm… 15 traders. And then you have probably got another 15 traders who are 
looking at various other currencies… So overall we are talking between … 30 
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and 40 active traders, whereas you’ve got a real niche 15 guys who look at it 
very carefully… (G interview, emphasis added).    
 
This is as far as I could get talking to the broker, given that brokers are reluctant to give 
up names of the dealers, due to the fact that banks are their clients and might not be keen 
on being named as big players on a particular market. Yet, there is a poll conducted by 
the Euromoney magazine in 2007, which lists ‘the top five banks [that] consolidate a 
clear lead over the rest of the [foreign exchange] market’: 
 
Deutsche Bank captured a 19.30% market share… UBS is still in second place 
but its market share has risen almost three percentage points to an impressive 
14.85%. Competition for the third place was tight. There is almost nothing to 
choose between Citi in third, RBS in fourth and Barclays Capital, which drops 
one place to fifth… (Euromoney 2007)9.     
 
To comment on the role of banks in a forward market there is one last thing that has yet 
to be said. Giving definitions to the market counterparties it reports on, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 2007: 38) reveals that banks are ‘reporting dealers’  
whose market activity varies between two types of transactions: 
 
[Reporting dealers] are mainly large commercial and investment banks … that 
(1) participate in the interdealer market and/or (2) have an active business with 
large customers, such as large corporate firms, governments and other non-
reporting financial institutions. In other words, reporting dealers are institutions 
that are actively buying and selling currency and OTC derivatives for their own 
account and/or in meeting customer demand (emphasis added).  
 
In summary, the large commercial and investment banks serve their own interests and, at 
the same time, are institutions that make forward transactions possible, as on the whole 
those involved in forward foreign exchange transactions cannot deal directly with each 
other; hence they are customers of dealing banks.  
                                                
9 The poll lists the top five banks which are most active in the foreign exchange market (i.e. in both spot 
and forward/swaps transactions). However, provided that the forward segment is the biggest part of the 
total foreign exchange market (as has already been stated, 66% of forward transactions against 31% of 
spot transactions), we may assume that this list is also valid for the foreign exchange forward market.  
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It is now time to consider who the banks’ customers are. These are mainly businesses 
that involve payments in foreign currencies10, namely ‘financial customers’ (Galati and 
Heath 2007: 65) and ‘non-financial’ ones (BIS 2007: 39). Again, 2007 Triennial Survey 
of foreign exchange, conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2007: 7), 
reports those transactions between large commercial and investment banks and their 
financial customers account for 40% of the total turnover, closely following the 
interbank market (43%). The remaining 17 % of the market covers dealings between the 
banks and their non-financial customers.  
 
The financial customers, who as a matter of fact are responsible for the record 71% 
growth of foreign exchange in the last three years (Galati and Heath 2007: 64), include 
‘smaller commercial banks, investment banks and security houses, and in addition 
mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds,… building societies, … insurance 
companies’(BIS 2007: 39). Non-financial clients that the banks deal with are ‘corporates 
and governments’ (BIS 2007: 39). 
 
Having defined the major participants of the interbank forward exchange, and bearing in 
mind that the market is decentralised, now the question becomes how the banks are 
connected, or what their way of dealing with each other in order to find the potential 
counterparty is.  Broadly speaking, banks deal either directly with each other or through 
brokers.  
 
Brokers are market participants who facilitate trading by connecting market-makers, (or 
buyers and sellers) ‘in return for a commission’, which typically are added in their 
                                                
10 Moreover, studies indicate that firms with seemingly no cash flows in foreign currency are still exposed 
to such risk: ‘U.S. corporations, including those with no foreign operations and no foreign currency … 
transactions, are generally exposed to foreign currency risk. Regional electrical utilities are a somewhat 
extreme case in point. With no foreign currency accounts on their books, they have no accounting 
exposure to exchange risk. From an economic perspective, however, the story is different. If their 
customer base is dominated by either importing or exporting firms whose activities and demand for 
electricity are affected by exchange rates changes, the electrical utilities’ operations and stock prices 
themselves will also … be exposed to exchange risk’ (Adler and Dumas 1984: 41).  
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quotes (IFSL 2007: 6). If the brokerage service is not free of charge, why would banks 
nonetheless resort to it? The answer is anonymity: 
 
Dealers often want to conceal their investments strategies and are concerned that 
the strategy will be revealed when they conduct large sales or purchases in the 
market. …By trading through a broker, a dealer can maintain their anonymity 
and benefit from a centralization of market information by posting their quotes 
and hitting other dealers’ quotes through the broker (Dodd and Griffith-Jones 
2006: 11).  
 
ICAP and GFI voice and electronic interdealer brokers may be named among the largest 
brokerage companies operating on forward exchange. Here is how one interviewee 
proudly talks about his company: 
   
ICAP is the world’s largest interdealer broker. So we have offices in many-many 
cities. We have operations with customers in about 80 different cities globally. It 
is a massive business… Recently the EBS Group, who were an independent 
electronic broker owned by a consortium of banks, were bought by ICAP about a 
year ago. And we are the absolute leaders in spot foreign exchange (B interview).       
 
Brokered or direct, interbank dealing is a versatile trade. Flood (1994: 135) reveals the 
complex of elements involved:  
 
Market-makers are assumed to try to call out each period11 ... Incoming calls take 
precedence, however, so that if a market-maker (or broker) receives a call, he is 
pre-empted and cannot call out in that period. …If he receives a call from a … 
market-maker, he makes a market by quoting bid and ask prices. If he receives a 
call from a broker, he decides on the price and quantity of a limit order. If he 
places a call to a broker or market-maker, he must decide whether and how much 
to by or sell. 
                                                
11 The expression ‘to call out each period’ is confusing and I asked Mark Flood if he could explain the 
meaning of it. Here are some of his further commentaries: ‘Forex trading in the 1980s was largely by 
telephone, both interdealer and brokered. Electronic brokerage did not yet exist. In my experience (…) 
Reuters and Telerate were used to transmit indicative quotes, but not live prices. The Teletype was still 
used on very rare occasions. Calling frequency varied a bit by trading style, but my experience was that 
traders canvassed the market pretty steadily – one phone call after another, essentially without a break – 
from the New York open (as the European markets were winding down for a day), until about 1:30 or so 
local time… The caller would have perhaps 5 seconds to respond to a dealer quote (buy/sell/pass), and 
then move on…’ (Mark Flood, electronic mail message to the author, 5 March 2008).  
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Clearly this description deals with voice (or telephone) trade only. However, the market 
is ‘no longer a phone-based’ trade, given the rapid expansion of electronic trading 
reflected in the fact that ‘less than one third of FX trading was executed electronically in 
2000 … [but] growing to 62% by the end of 2006, it will approach 80% by 2010’(TABB 
Group 2007, cited by Bobsguide 2007).    
 
Surging electronic trade affects both direct interbank dealing and brokerage12.  In 
illustration of a ‘direct electronic dealing system’ the Bank for Interntional Settlements 
names the Reuters Conversational Dealing system (BIS 2007: 43). This system is a 
pioneer in electronic trading in traditional foreign exchange markets (spot, outright 
forwards and swaps) and it works by ‘[analysing] each conversation electronically and 
generates a draft form or ticket for each trade that has been identified’ (Richards 2004: 
30).    
 
The Electronic Broking Services (EBS) Spot Dealing System may serve as another 
example of the electronic vehicles for foreign exchange trading. It consists of brokers’ 
electronic screens which display anonymous prices - bid and ask orders of the market 
participants (banks, or dealers, or market makers), thus providing an informational pool 
and brining market-makers together: 
 
EBS Spot means you have access to our market in your own name. So if you are 
Sberbank [one of the biggest Russian banks. – S.M.], you can have a spot 
workstation, and whenever you do a transaction with JP Morgan London he sees 
Sberbank, and you see JP Morgan London. And that works on bilateral credit. 
Both banks put credit in to our system, which is refreshed each day, and that will 
dictate the amount of business they can see each other for. There are tools within 
the mechanism to increase that daily limit, their intraday limit, if they need to. 
But basically you set your limits and the way you go (B interview).   
 
                                                
12 The systems named and described here are those between dealers only (although the Reuters 
Conversational Dealing system is used between a dealer and a customer). In actual fact ‘there are two 
basic types of electronic systems. Those that connect dealers among themselves in the Interbank market 
and those that connect dealers with customers’ (IFSL 2007:7).   
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As one can see from the screen below, the bids and offers are anonymous, but ‘you see a 
price because you have pre-screened credit, however you do not see the name of the 
counterpart (on the bid or offer) until you consummate a deal. At this point you get the 
name immediately’ (B, electronic mail message to the author, January 30, 2008). The 
screenshot is kindly provided by one of the interviewees, because this screen, like any 
other interbank brokers’ screens, is not accessible for non-dealers: 
 
 
The screen is a clear, straightforward and user-friendly source of information for those 
who deal with or, in fact, relies on it every second of a day, i.e. for market participants. 
To non-users, or outsiders, this screen might look as a set of numbers with no meaning 
whatsoever. Perhaps some commentaries should be made here, and since the research 




The upper left section of the screen reflects the key information pertinent to the forward 
contracts, thus will be explained here. It shows three segments containing information 
about (1) the British pound sterling (GBP)/ Japanese yen (JPY) spot exchange rate 
(price), (2) the non-deliverable, or cash-settled, Russian rouble one-month forward 
contract (NDF RUB 1M) price, and (3) the US dollar (USD)/ Russian rouble (RUB) spot 
exchange rate (price) on November 6 2007 at 20:35 (London time). Leaving out the first 
segment with GBP/JPY spot rate information, here is the short explanation of the other 
two segments. 
 
The lower segment of this section deals with the USD/RUB currency pair (the base 
currency is USD and the quote currency is RUB, which means for 1 USD a quoted 
amount of RUB will be paid). The currency pair has two prices – it is a ‘bid’ price and 
‘offer’ price. The USD/RUB price is quoted to four decimal places, i.e. 1 USD/24.9580 
RUB (bid) and 1 USD/ 24.9630 RUB (offer) with the 50 units difference (spread) 
between the bid and offer prices.           
 
The middle segment gives the information about the bid and offer prices for a Russian 
rouble one-month cash-settled forward contract (NDF RUB 1M) with just the 1 unit 
spread (24.5678 bid price and 24.5679 offer price). The transaction is going to take place 
in one-month time, on 6 December at 20:35 (London time, in Moscow it is going to be 7 
December, therefore the date on the screen is 06/07-Dec). It is not accidental that the 
USD/RUB spot and NDF RUB 1M segments are put next to each other –since the screen 
is user-friendly, it is convenient to see a current price of the currency that the dealer is 
going to buy/sell in a month time.   
 
To resume on this concise picture of a structure of forward foreign exchange, it would 
seem reasonable to say that it is compound and the structure alone indicates the 
complexity of the market’s mechanics. Yet what remains to be seen is what is the 




To begin with, what is a forward contract? The definition which was given earlier in this 
Section maintains that it is an obligation to exchange certain currencies with their 
delivery on a specified future date at a guaranteed exchange rate (price). The purpose of 
such exchange is to secure oneself against exchange rate movements: 
 
The object of a ‘forward’ deal … is to fix at once a price for a contract to be 
carried through on the future date agreed upon, and it is intended to free both 
buyer and seller from any risk of loss which might accrue through fluctuations in 
the price of the commodity by the time both parties are ready actually to 
complete transactions (Evitt 1955: 140).    
 
Applying the above-cited to foreign exchange means a trade, as an exchange of 
currencies (e.g. some certain quantity of US dollars and Russian roubles), is going to 
take place at some stated date in the future (e.g. one month later), but the exchange rate 
is fixed on the day this contract was tied up. It gives the counterparties of the contract 
certainty in the amount of currency they are going to get in one month time, regardless 
of whether the US$/RUB exchange rate (a spot rate) will surge or plummet on that day 
one month later. Therefore the forward foreign exchange contract is a financial 
instrument which fixes an exchange rate on a precise day, thus eliminating risk of 
exposure to exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
It is apparent that a vested interest in such contracts would have those who are exposed 
to the risk of exchange rate movements, that is to say all participants in the forward 
market. Yet, having said that, the forward contracts’ demand, all the described above 
counterparties (i.e. banks, their financial and non-financial clients) are subjected to, 
derives from diverse requirements. Admittedly, there are three types of dealings that 
result in the forward demand, namely hedging, interest arbitrage and speculation13.  
 
                                                
13 Such categorisation is rather theoretical. In practice a forward exchange market is inextricable 
intertwining of these operations being constituent to each other. Moreover, Kenen (1966: 144-145) insists 
on fundamental sameness of these dealings based on the assumption that all of them have the same 
common function – ‘to align’ the existing currency situation with the predicted exchange rate.   
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A hedging transaction is an equivalent of insurance against exchange rates fluctuations. 
Businesses which export or import goods (i.e. non-financial clients) and get paid/have to 
pay in foreign currency want to make sure they will get/pay expected amount of the 
domestic currency when converted from/in to the foreign one. For this purpose they 
would sell/buy a forward contract fixing the received payments/the cost for/of the goods 
in terms of their domestic currency.  
 
The most clear but simplified example of the forward contract use would be a UK based 
company that needs to buy 100 barrels of oil from a Russian oil company at a price of 
2,500 roubles for each barrel. Hence the total price the UK company has to pay in one 
year for this oil is 250,000 roubles (RUB) or 5,000 British pound sterling (GBP), since 
the current GBP/RUB exchange rate is 50, i.e. 1 GBP/50 RUB. At the same time as the 
UK company makes a deal with the Russian company, it phones up a UK based bank 
and enters in to a forward contract with the bank. The contract states that the UK 
company will purchase RUB 250,000 for GBP 5,000 in one year from the bank14. The 
GBP/RUB exchange rate decreases over the next year - it is 1 GBP/45 RUB, the pound 
sterling oil price increases as a result of it – RUB 250,000 costs about GBP 5,556. But 
under the forward contract the UK company gets RUB 250,000 for just GBP 5,000 and 
pays the roubles for the oil15.   
 
To insure currency risk similar hedging transactions are also demanded by financial 
customers of banks, such as long-term investors (pension funds, mutual funds, etc.)16. 
Notably, these institutional investors were defined as a ‘driving force’ of forward 
market, since ‘the portfolios these institutions manage have become increasingly 
                                                
14 In this example the spot and the forward price of rouble is the same (1 GBP/50 RUB), which is not 
generally the case. But I introduce the same price in order not to complicate the illustration.  
15 In fact, the Russian oil exporters get paid in US dollars (so called petrodollars) at the moment. However 
the apparent rouble strengthening, ‘about 1.5 percent since the beginning of the [2008] year’ (Butrin 
2008), promises to result in rouble payments for Russian export of oil (Interfax 2007).  
16 Short-terms investors also hedge their currency risk, but such hedge would seem to be ultimately 
converged in interest arbitrage – the details are discussed later in this Section.   
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diversified internationally (…), encouraged by developments in financial markets … and 
regulatory changes’ (Galati and Heath 2007:68).  
 
Seemingly, for those financial and non-financial customers who merely hedge their 
currency risk, there is no interest in profiting from exchange rate movements, and 
exchange rate exposure is just an unavoidable side effect of international trade and 
investments17. This risk is manageable, although there would seem to be the ideal recipe 
for removing the risk once and for all and it ‘is to adopt a common currency’ (Heffernan 
2005:109):        
  
One of the central motivations for the creation of the euro was to eliminate 
exchange rate risk to enable European firms to operate free from the 
uncertainties of changes in relative prices resulting from exchange rate 
movements. At the macro level there is evidence that the creation of such 
currency unions results in dramatic increase in bilateral trade (…) (Dominguez 
and Tesar 2006: 188-189). 
 
If hedging dealing derives from risk elimination requirements, arbitrage dealings are 
about profits from difference in prices for the same product in various markets. The 
essential feature of all arbitrage transactions, which in a way makes it similar to hedging, 
is its risk avoidance: arbitrageurs buy and sell simultaneously18, in order to reduce their 
risk exposure to a minimum. Currencies are traded on a number of forward markets and 
prices for the same forward contract might not be congruent thus providing an 
opportunity to profit from such discrepancy by arbitrageurs. This might seem to be a 
                                                
17 As always it is all far more complex in the real world – since late 1980s investors practice so called 
currency overlay strategy in order to not just eliminate currency risk involved in international investments, 
but exploit this risk and make profits out of it by ‘managing the currency exposures separately from the 
underlying assets’ (Harris 2006).   
18 Or, at least, as close to simultaneous as possible. The material sociology of arbitrage argues that due to 
the fact that various ‘material entities’ are of a crucial importance to trading activities, ‘a price [as an 
object arbitrageurs cash in on] is a thing’ that is materialised in different forms, such as ‘the sound waves 
that constitutes speech’, or ‘the electrical impulses that represent binary digits in a computerised system’. 
Therefore the real simultaneity is not possible, given that the physicality of a price has an effect on ‘the 
extent and speed of [price’s] transmission’ (Beunza et al. 2006: 724, 729). For more research on arbitrage 
within the social studies of finance approach see, for example, Beunza and Stark 2004; Hardie 2004; 
MacKenzie 2003, 2004a, 2005a. 
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basic and straightforward case for arbitrage. But as they are, the arbitrage operations 
involving forward contracts are more complex, given that forward contracts play a 
crucial role in interest arbitrage. 
 
Interest arbitrage is a set of transactions that also facilitates profiting, but, as the name 
suggests, from discrepancy in interest rates in different countries. The set of transactions 
consists, as an example, of (1) purchasing of a foreign currency - RUB 50,000 - on spot 
for  £1,000; (2) simultaneous forward selling of RUB 50,000 for the same price £1,000 
with delivery of the currency in one month time, therefore hedging the currency risk 
during this month, and (3) profiting from the higher interest rates on Russian securities 
until the expiration date of the forward contracts with no exposure to the GBP/RUB 
exchange rates fluctuations. 
 
Clearly this is an example of arbitrage involving investment of funds, but there is also 
arbitrage aiming at profiting by borrowing funds abroad at interest rates that cheaper 
than domestic interest rates. However, the analytics of the 2007 BIS Triennial Central 
Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange claims that short-term investors (e.g. hedge funds), 
not borrowers, are ‘primary players in foreign exchange market activity in recent years’ 
(Galati and Heath 2007: 65).    
      
The final type of dealings that result in the forward demand is speculation. Similar to 
arbitrageurs speculators (banks and their financial and non-financial customers) also act 
‘with the objective of improving profitability’ (Heffernan 2005: 139), but unlike 
arbitrageurs they are prepared to take risk. Another distinctive feature of speculative 
operations is that by entering into a forward contract, speculators cover neither existing 
commercial, nor financial positions (Sohmen 1966; Einzig 1967; Bartram et al. 2005).  
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An example of speculation on a forward market would be the following set of 
transactions. A speculator expects RUB will appreciate19, hence its future exchange rate 
(in one-month time) will be £1/RUB 48 instead of current spot rate being £1/RUB 50. 
Having such expectations she buys 48,000 RUB forward with an obligation to pay 
£1,000, i.e. at £1/RUB 48 exchange rate. In one month time the rouble indeed 
appreciates even more (£1/46 RUB) and by executing the forward contract she pays 
£1,000 to get RUB 48,000, which she can sell on spot for £1,043, thus making £43 
profit.  
 
However, there is also a ‘pure’ speculator (Sohmen 1966: 12), or a speculator that uses a 
forward market only. She is not interested in possessing the currency she speculates on, 
since there is no commercial or other need for such possession. All she wants is a pound 
sterling equivalent of the profit with no need to sell the currency on the spot. For such 
purpose on the day she buys the RUB forward she also enters in to an offsetting contract 
for selling RUB 48,000 to those who would need to get this amount for physical delivery 
in order to meet their obligations (commercial traders or arbitrageurs). Therefore the 
speculator pays £1,000 out of £1,043, which she gets from the simultaneous sale of RUB 
48,000 meeting the obligations of the offsetting contract thus pocketing the £43 
difference between the spot and forward rates.   
 
When such speculative transactions proportionally override all other operations on the 
market they are blamed for magnifying exchange rate fluctuations; hence have a 
reputation of a destabilising activity on the market leading to financial crises 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005).  Nonetheless, when the speculative deals are just a 
segment not outweighing the rest of transactions, they are of crucial importance to the 
forward market in a way that speculators provide liquidity to the market by ‘narrowing 
the range of fluctuations of the current price relatively to the expected price’ (Kaldor 
1939: 8, emphasis in original). 
                                                
19 What to expect of the currency evidently depends on the current currency forward rate, hence the 
decision whether to buy or sell forward (Grubel 1966).   
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For this extensive analysis of the value and mechanics of the interbank forward foreign 
exchange market to be complete, it is important to emphasise the following arguments. 
Forward transactions dominate the world’s largest and most liquid market known as 
foreign exchange. Given the decentralised structure of the market, interbank dealings are 
leading forward operations on foreign exchange. Such a dominant position of the 
interbank forward transactions can be explained by the main objectives a forward market 
is employed to accomplish or, otherwise, the two essential economic necessities this 
market is called to facilitate, namely (1) protection from uncertainty that enables gain, 
and (2) financial profit per se.  This is precisely why it is difficult to underestimate the 
value of forward transactions to commercial trade and investment.  
 
b. Settling in Cash: The Non-Deliverable  
USD/RUB Forward Market  
 
Having analysed the key characteristics and discerned the high importance of a forward 
market to financial development and economic growth, this Section’s discussion is 
going to be centred around one specific interbank forward contract, namely a non-
deliverable (or cash-settled) USD/RUB forward, and the market it is traded on. Such 
focusing is based on the fact that the contract was outlawed by Russian courts in 1998-
1999, and consequently this caused the collapse of the onshore forward market. 
Therefore, the consideration of the cash-settled forward’s mechanics, its characteristics 
that are constituent to the NDF USD/RUB forward market, would help in unveiling the 
importance of the Russian Civil Code amendment that announced these contracts as 
court-protected financial transactions in January 2007. 
 
While inquiring into the 1998 default events, Section B ‘Non-Deliverable Forwards and 
the Default of 1998’ of Chapter 4 ‘Russian Derivatives Market’ briefly described how a 
cash-settled forward works. Nevertheless, a closer look at the essence and mechanics of 
cash-settled forwards is required before I proceed with a detailed examination of their 
role in a financial system. If there is no doubt in the value of the interbank forward 
market which provides insurance against and gain from exchange rate fluctuations, it is 
not all that explicit with non-deliverable forwards. The fact that non-deliverable 
forwards were given a legal definition of gambling contracts speaks for itself.  
 
A non-deliverable or cash-settled forward contract (NDF) is an outright forward 
transaction, which is an obligation to buy or sell a particular currency (Russian roubles) 
on some future date at an agreed upon price (in US dollars, hence it is USD/RUB NDF). 
There is only one thing that differentiates a cash-settled contract from a typical outright 
forward – it is the fact that there is no physical delivery of the principal amount of the 
contracted currency. For instance, instead of getting a certain amount of roubles and 
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paying a fixed sum in dollars, the counterparties of the non-deliverable forward settle the 
obligation in the following way. On the day the contract is due (settlement date) the 
counterparties refer to the spot USD/RUB exchange rate (or spot price of the rouble in 
US dollars). If the exchange rate is less than it was contracted for, or the rouble 
appreciates (e.g. the current spot rate is 1USD/20 RUB, but the forward price was 
1USD/25 RUB1), then the seller of the roubles has to pay the roubles’ buyer the dollar 
equivalent of the difference between the existing spot and contracted forward rates. 
Hence if the contract was for the principal amount of RUB 1000, the roubles’ seller pays 
USD 10 to the buyer (USD 50 spot price for RUB 1000 minus USD 40 forward price for 
RUB 1000).  
 
To apprehend a cash-settled forward in a wider context, it is helpful to define a non-
deliverable forward contract as a derivative, whose price depends on an exchange rate. 
For short ‘the rouble market’ is often used to refer to the USD/RUB exchange rate 
market. However, the same market may become ‘the dollar market’ onshore (between 
two Russian residents), where settlement takes place in Russian currency: 
 
[…] in an onshore NDF market, circumventing exchange controls usually 
requires settling contracts in the local currency. That is, restrictions are imposed 
on the foreign exchange dealings of the local market participants, which can be 
avoided by dealing in the local currency. In contrast, in an offshore NDF market, 
restrictions on currency convertibility prevent settlement taking place in the local 
currency. Therefore settlement must take place in another currency, such as the 
US dollar (Debelle et al. 2006: 56, emphasis in original).   
 
Thus it is important to understand that an exchange rate, i.e. a price of one currency in 
terms of another currency (a price of roubles in terms of US dollars, or vice versa), but 
not a currency, underlies a non-deliverable contract, or forms the basis of it.  
 
                                                
1 In reality such dramatic appreciation of RUB within a relatively short period of time is not typical and 
these rates are used to simplify the example’s calculations.   
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Also an emphasis should be made on the fact that a non-deliverable forward does not 
involve a payment of a principal amount of the contract: 
 
From a management point of view it is good, because settlement risk is less, the 
money is not kicked about. And if you don’t aim at buying money physically, but 
at hedging market risk [possible loss due to price fluctuations], then you simply 
need to get an equivalent of this very market risk… (F interview).     
 
This essential feature of a cash-settled forward determines the other characteristics of the 
contract that are better understood through depiction of the existing USD/RUB non-
deliverable forward market. The choice of this particular currency pair was 
predetermined by the three circumstances. First, USD/RUB non-deliverable forwards 
were the contracts at the heart of 1998 crisis. Second, this currency pair still dominates 
the rouble forward market accounting for 83.8% of the total foreign exchange trading in 
2006, followed by EUR/USD (9.9%) and EUR/RUB (4.9%) (Piskulov 2007: 11). Third, 
the US dollar is a currency, which non-deliverable forwards are ‘typically settled in’ 
(Lipscomb 2005). 
 
Before proceeding to the market account it should be emphasised that the market’s data 
is very sparse and this can be explained by the very nature of the market. D, a broker 
trading rouble NDF in London, explains: 
 
Forward foreign exchange information is over-the-counter. So it’s… There is no 
a sort of one repository for the information. And NDF market in particular, and 
rouble even more in particular… it’s not gathered by anyone (D interview).    
 
Such insufficiency of data required thorough and intensive market research, which was 
mainly based on in-depth field interviews and market participants’ presentations for 
industry conferences that produce some of the market’s figures. Subsequent to the 
research findings I am able to claim the following market’s configuration.     
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The structure of the market can be broadly outlined by three segments, one of my 
interviewees, a head of International Business Development in a brokerage firm in 
London, summarises2: 
 
I think there is three kinds of markets. There is an international market, which is, 
of sure, offshore. There is cross-border. Which is, of sure, offshore. And then 
there is domestic, onshore. A lot of the growth it’s coming from offshore, 
increasingly cross-border, and within time – onshore… You know, we don’t 
really have one centre for rouble… (D interview).  
 
To facilitate the understanding of the non-deliverable USD/RUB forward market 
structure, here is a schematic representation of its geography: 















                                                
2 The structure described in the Section is an over-the-counter market’s structure. The exchange-based 
USD/RUB futures contracts are not the contracts the thesis is concerned with, since although they, as a 
part of an onshore market, were in some way affected by the Russian court’s decision of 1999, 
nevertheless were not the contracts that constituted the crucial part of the defaulted obligations on the 
interbank market in 1998. Furthermore, ‘among all Russian [Forex] derivatives market’s participants it is 
credit organisations (banks) which are absolute leaders either in volume of trade or in assortment of 
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An international (offshore) segment of the market is a sector to start with, since it is the 
largest part of the rouble market and so far dwarfs the other two: 
 
Following the well-known decision of the Supreme Court [of the Russian 
Federation in 1999, described in the previous Chapter], OTC derivatives (cash-
settled) ended up being outlawed. Therefore the OTC derivatives market, that 
provides service to Russian economy, thus far has been growing predominantly 
in London… Primarily when it comes to cash-settled contracts. … Despite all the 
advantages of cash-settled derivatives, they are not widely spread in Russia 
(Golikov 2007: 45)3. 
 
Beyond all doubt revealing the market volume data would be the best way to picture the 
international (offshore) rouble NDF market.  Yet there are no consistently collected and 
published statistics. The Emerging Markets Trading Association (EMTA) published 
scarce data that was gathered in 2003. According to the ‘industry-wide’ survey that 
involved 25 companies such as ‘dealers, investment firms and other market participants’, 
the annual volume of the rouble NDF market in 2003 was $11.5 billion, which is 
approximately $45 million a day turnover4 (EMTA 2004). The most recent figures to 
compare the 2003 data with were merely guessed by the market brokers: 
 
There are number of banks in London, big top 20 banks, … [that] have huge 
rouble NDF positions, and would go home with positions of one or two hundred 
million dollars long or short, you know, quite comfortably. And they feel the 
market will accommodate them when they want to turn that position around (B 
interview). 
 
A broker from another London–based brokerage firm that is active in rouble NDF 
trading is more precise, but at the same time explains why it is not easy to get the data 
from brokerage houses: 
 
                                                
3 For the moment I will leave out the domestic (onshore) forward market, as it will be considered in detail 
later in this Section.  
4 Assuming there are 252 working days a year. 
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The volume? Um… Yeah, I mean it obviously varies in our day-to-day basis; it 
is not something that we want published to other broking houses. That is the 
problem. So it is difficult question to answer. Um… Yeah… I mean, you know, 
it is very difficult because […] if you decide to pass on my information on that 
kind of size to other people, it does not do us any favours at all. I think if you are 
talking in a market standard, in general market it has probably risen to … I 
would say in NDF trading-wise anywhere between 500 millions to a yard5 of 
dollars, it is 500 millions to a thousand million dollars a day. On NDFs (G 
interview).    
 
Rough estimation demonstrates 15 times growth in the offshore market’s volume in the 
last 4 years. So what is the market that trades the currency outside of its residency in 
such surging quantities?    
 
The international (offshore) rouble NDF market is constituted by rouble deals between 
banks that are not Russian residents (or non-residents, for short). The key characteristic 
of a cash-settled contract is the absence of a physical delivery of a principal amount of 
the contract. There are at least two reasons for that. First, the contract’s parties simply do 
not need the currency they are exposed to (e.g. RUB), and all they want is to hedge the 
risk of this currency’s movements using the currency they operate in (e.g. USD). The 
second reason is a somehow problematic remittance of the currency in question. In fact, 
the rise of NDF in emerging markets’ currencies was caused by the restrictions imposed 
by governments of certain countries on convertibility of their currencies6: 
 
The authorities of these countries have been concerned that large offshore 
markets in their currencies [unrestricted non-residents’ trading] could induce 
greater volatility in capital flows and exchange rates and make it harder for the 
authorities to control the money supply. They have sought to limit speculation 
against their currencies by restricting nonresidents’ access to domestic currency 
funds (Ishii et al. 2001: 3).    
                                                
5 “Yard” is slang widely used by currency traders and, according to Bloomberg’s Financial Glossary, is 
used  ‘for one billion currency units. […] e.g., for Japanese yen since one billion yen equals approximately 
US$10 million. It is clearer to say, "I'm a buyer of a yard of yen," than to say, "I'm a buyer of a billion 
yen," which could be misheard as "I'm a buyer of a million yen." (Bloomberg 2008).  
6 Although market participants avoid applying the term ‘emerging markets’ to some countries: 
‘Developing markets, we don’t call them emerging any more, because they’ve emerged… Where you 
have interest rate swaps and cross currency swaps is not an emerging market’ (D interview).  
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Such restrictions resulted in non-liquidity of certain developing markets’ currencies, thus 
non-deliverable forwards became ‘an instrument of a Forex operations and hedging in 
relatively non-liquid currencies. […] Philosophically speaking, it is one of the 
mechanisms of engaging each and all in globalisation’ (N, a Head of a Treasury 
Research in one of the top Russian banks, electronic mail message to the author, 
November 14, 2007). 
 
Starting from the 1st of January 2007 Russia can be regarded as a country with no 
currency exchange restrictions7.  The significance of such development can be 
appreciated by the fact that currency exchange has been under control for 15 years, since 
the first Russian Currency Control Law was enacted in 19928. The latter has prohibited 
all currency transactions, except those precisely stated in the law and the instructions of 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The list of permitted operations had been 
changed a few times during the past 15 years and the following is an attempt to 
adumbrate, in brief, the changing nature of yet staying in place restrictions.      
 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section B), according to Russian law on foreign 
investments all the investments in the Russian Federation were to be made in roubles 
only (RF 1991). Implemented in 1993, Instruction No.16 of the Central Bank states that 
in order to operate in roubles non-residents could open just two types of rouble accounts: 
T and I, current and investment accounts respectively, and could not use these accounts 
to invest in short-term and long-term government rouble-denominated bonds, namely 
GKO and OFZ (CBRF 1993).   
                                                
7 While announcing Russia as a country with no currency restrictions, Russian authorities, however, keep 
some reporting requirements in place: rouble transactions, where one or both of the parties is a non-
resident, entail ‘a special currency control code that describes the purpose of the transaction in relation to 
the details of payment provided’ (Melnikova 2007, CBRF 2004b).      
8 To give the precise account of the currency exchange restrictions in Russia it should also be 
acknowledged that strict currency control have lasted for much longer than 15 years: in the USSR ‘in 
order to maintain stability of the rouble in the closed economy’ (Kudrin 2003: 10) Soviet government was 
the only lawful owner of foreign currency, hence had held a complete monopoly on all currency and 
banking operations. However it can be disregarded in the context of this research, since under the closed 
economy restrictions the forward market does not exist by definition.         
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However, in 1996 the CBRF relaxed its control over foreign investments ‘in order to 
facilitate non-residents’ access to the domestic government securities market’9 (CBRF 
1996; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c). F, who was a chief financial officer in one of the foreign 
banks subsidiaries in Moscow at that time, explains:   
  
F. …Non-residents are allowed in to the GKO market. They [the Central Bank of 
the Russian federation] organise the mechanism, which is spelled out. It goes 
like this. A bank-non-resident, or a non-resident in general, has to come to a 
Russian bank, which is authorised to manage non-residents’ accounts; those were 
the special accounts called S-accounts. ‘Securities’ or something… 
S.M. ‘Special’?    
F. Or ‘Special’. They were allowed opened not by anybody, i.e. the Central Bank 
regulated this matter, to the large banks only … well, including the foreign 
banks’ subsidiaries10 (F interview).    
 
Thus the introduced S-accounts were the tools that partly lifted the existing currency 
restrictions. The main restrictions were still in place; for instance, according to 
subsection 3.4. of the Instruction, repatriation of GKO rouble profits was to be made in 
convertible currency. To further this, Provision No.02-262 required execution of the 
‘conversion operations’, spot and forward transactions, hence stimulated the rapid 
development of the cross-border forward market, which was discussed in detail in the 
previous Chapter (CBRF 1996c). 
 
The 1998 default events triggered the reverse regulatory actions enabling the shift in 
Russian policy on foreign exchange. As described in Chapter 4, such shift was due to the 
attempt to restore stability of the Russian currency and extend the foreign exchange 
reserves. In November 1998 the Central Bank issued the Directive that banned the 
conversion operations between non-residents and the authorised (qualified) Russian 
                                                
9 The previous Chapter describes in details the way non-residents got access to GKO market and clarifies 
that they were allowed to participate in GKO auctions in February 1996.    
10 Davidovski and Chernoff (1996) prefer to call these banks ‘qualified’ for that purpose and estimate that 
about 21 Russian banks were licensed for such activity by the Central Bank. In fact, the Deputy Head of 
the Central Bank Sergey Aleksashenko personally signed such permissions (CBRF 1996). 
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banks and deposit of rouble funds obtained in these operations on to S-accounts of non-
residents (CBRF 1998).  
 
Interestingly, up until 2004, when the newly introduced Currency Control Law cancelled 
the conversion restrictions, non-residents could not transact spot conversion of roubles 
into foreign currency for repatriation, but the authorised Russian banks were still 
allowed to enter into forward transactions with non-residents (CBRF 1999). 
Nevertheless it did not seem to help the cross-border USD/RUB forward market to keep 
its volume, or at least not to move entirely offshore. 
 
Despite the wide-spread expectations of currency deregulation, the new Currency 
Control Law of 2004 ‘introduced certain new mechanisms of currency control that 
appear to be capable, if applied in full, of producing an even more restrictive system of 
currency regulation than the one that existed before’ (Korolev 2005: 1). Indeed the law 
drifted from total ban with few exceptions to overall permission of the currency 
transactions with a few remaining restrictions (SRBC 2004; Komolov and Pettibone 
2004). However, the remaining in force S-accounts were supplemented by the 
reservation requirements or, in other words, the regulation to deposit rouble funds in to 
interest-free accounts of the Central Bank with regard to transactions involving S-
accounts11 (CBRF 2004, 2004a; RF 2004): 
 
Reserve requirements, which [Russian] banks have to send to the Central Bank 
[of the Russian Federation], is in fact a frozen deposit. The FRS [The Federal 
Reserve System] can trade, add the interest, not the Central Bank, which simply 
gets hold of it and freezes it. They [the Central Bank] increases [reserves 
requirement] for currency [transactions] very substantively and it becomes 
gainlessly to obtain currency funds and have it somewhere as non-earning assets 
(F interview). 
 
                                                
11 The reserving requirement for the transactions connected with sale or purchase of short-term 
government bonds, for example, called for one year ‘reserving’ period and 7.5% reserving amount (Baker 
& MacKenzie 2006).  
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Having all the described above convertibility restrictions in place, it was impossible to 
hedge investors’ rouble exposure by deliverable forward contracts. And that is how non-
deliverable rouble forwards have become popular instruments, since ‘the NDF user is 
economically protected from exchange rate fluctuations by the compensating US dollar 
payment paid or received based upon the NDF fixed rate even though there is no 
exchange of foreign currency’ (Rhee 2005: 2). I asked one of my interviewees, who is a 
head of International Business Development in one of the brokerage houses in London, 
if the offshore rouble NDF market has developed due to the absence of access to Russian 
currency: 
 
That’s true, that’s true. It’s a proxy. It’s the proxy thing… So like South Korea, 
Korean won NDFs, it’s a proxy for the NDF market (D interview).  
 
However, in 2007 Russian authorities lifted all convertibility restrictions it had been 
gradually relaxing during 2005-200612. The restrictions were ‘to stabilize the domestic 
foreign exchange markets by either eliminating or segregating the offshore domestic 
currency market from its onshore counterpart’ (Ishii et al 2001: 34). Consequently, if the 
rouble were a convertible currency, there would seem to be no such segmentation, since 
the rouble, like any other fully convertible currencies, can be hedged against onshore. 
 
The second segment of the USD/RUB NDF market is a domestic or onshore market. 
Broadly speaking, the transactions that constitute this market are cash-settled USD/RUB 
forward contracts between banks of Russian residency (bank that reside in Russia and 
operate under Russian law). Again, as it was in the case with the offshore rouble market 
statistics, it is almost impossible to get the precise picture of the cash-settled forward 
market, which is known to be a small fraction of the onshore USD/RUB forward market. 
Here is what an official from the Central Bank of Russia says: 
 
                                                
12 For detailed explanations of rationale for keeping and then lifting convertibility restrictions and capital 
control by Russian authorities see Golikov (2005).   
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Y. You know, in Russia there is mainly deliverable trading on the [forward] 
market. As for the non-deliverable market… We do not know the statistics 
because we do not have such reporting… Or, we roughly know the range of 
figures on the deliverable market… 
S.M. From your point of view, why the majority of the [forward] transactions are 
deliverable transactions? Is it the result of 1998 [default]? Or are there some 
other factors?  
Y. To be honest, I don’t know why it is so. Perhaps due to the tradition. 
S.M. What tradition? 
Y. Traditionally after 1998 there were deliverable transactions only. Well… or, 
there is probably something else behind this. But Russian [forward] market, the 
one you call ‘onshore’, is deliverable (Y interview). 
 
In 2007, in order to get a picture of the over-the-counter foreign exchange derivatives 
market, the National Foreign Exchange Association (Russia) conducted a survey in 
which 26 of the biggest banks that are responsible for over 90% of the total OTC 
derivatives transactions took part. So far this is the only data that generates a thorough 
account of the interbank derivatives market13 and it confirms that non-deliverable 
forwards account for just 32% ($5.49 billion a month, or $261 million a day14) of the 
total currency forward trading in Russia (Piskulov 2007).  
 
The survey also elicited the banks that most actively trade derivatives onshore – it 
revealed that subsidiaries of international banks constitute 54.4% ‘of total Russian 
derivatives turnover’15. In 2006, in circumstances where cash-settled contracts were still 
outlawed, the fact that subsidiaries of foreign banks were responsible for large volumes 
of trade is explicable – having their head offices in London, or generally abroad, these 
banks were (and still are) able to book their transactions under law that considers them 
as legitimate market practices, thus eliminating legal risk in their market activity:  
 
                                                
13 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation also publishes forward market statistics monthly 
(http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/); however, the survey of the National Foreign Exchange 
Association has produced the data that portrays the market in detail.       
14 Assuming there are 21 working days a month. 
15 The ‘breakdown between local Russian banks and subsidiaries of international banks’ is given for the 
‘total Russian derivatives turnover’. However, this picture is representative for the domestic cash-settled 
forward market since Forex forwards, both deliverable and cash-settled, make up half (50.5%) of the 
domestic Forex derivatives market (Piskulov 2007). 
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F. [In the survey] we used a little of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
methodology which, for instance, when it does countries’ survey, it says that it 
relates the transaction to the country according to the location of the sales desk or 
trading desk. And for Russian banks it is a very relevant matter… Many tell me 
‘You know we transact that much, but actually we book it in London, these are 
legal operations in London’… I say ‘Excuse me, wait, guys, are you the ones 
who sell, set terms and conditions, make deals?’ – ‘Yes, we are. But yet we send 
everything there [to London] for execution’. I say, ‘Anyway it means it is a 
Russian transaction’ … it is booked in a name of Russian banks. 
 S.M. And what about the market-makers? 
F. Do you want to know the names? Fair enough. The major names in Russia are 
BNP Paribas, Sberbank… 
S.M. Are these in NDFs? 
F. Oh, just NDFs? No, mainly foreign banks are [dealing with] NDFs. Because 
traditionally, up until recently, Russian banks had been doing DFs [deliverable 
forwards], NDFs had being under an embargo. For instance Sberbank hadn’t 
been doing NDFs at all.  
S.M. This embargo… was it official? 
F. The embargo by lawyers. It varied – somewhere officially, somewhere 
unofficially. But they say they don’t do [NDFs] because… well I heard, but I 
didn’t investigate to the tick, but I’ve been told by many that they are vetoed 
to… 
S.M. By whom?  
F. Well, by some internal services, by a Treasury, executives […], credit 
committees, some authority in a bank, a Head of a Treasury, a President of a 
bank… 
S.M. By internal authorities… 
F. Precisely, yes. 
S.M. So there is no an official directive of the Central Bank, isn’t there? 
F. No, there is no an official one (F interview).  
 
To summarise, the domestic USD/RUB NDF market is by far inferior to the offshore 
market in terms of its size. Russian subsidiaries of foreign banks are responsible for the 
major part of the onshore cash-settled operation due to their advantage of being able to 
operate under the law that does not challenge legality of such transactions. The fact that 
so far Russian subsidiaries of foreign banks have been the most active players on this 
market confirms that legal uncertainty of cash-settled contracts under Russian law 
definitely is an onshore forward trading deterrent.    
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At last, the third segment in the rouble cash-settled forward trading is a cross-border 
market. Cross-border transactions are transactions between a non-resident bank and a 
bank that resides in Russia.  
 
For instance, when we asked banks [Russian banks in the poll conducted in 
2007] to answer the question… we did not ask “Specify all your deals with also 
Russian residents”, we said, we asked Russian banks “Specify all your deals in 
Russia”. For example, they can make deals with London. And then these will be 
cross-border. Cross-border transactions (F interview). 
 
It is to be recalled that one of my interviewees, the Head of International Business 
Development in a London-based brokerage firm, in his discussion of the market 
structure speaks of cross-border transactions as of offshore deals. The risk avoiding logic 
is in evidence here. Since cash-settled forwards are under the risk of being classified as 
gambling transactions following the decision of the Russian court, what always happens 
in practice is such transactions are booked under non-Russian law, i.e. offshore, thus 
iterating the risk management strategy used by Russian subsidiaries of foreign banks. H, 
a lawyer in a Russian branch of a big European bank, reasons: 
 
When you enter into […] a contract […] between a Russian counterparty and a 
Western company, a few problems arise. In particular so called a choice of law, a 
choice of law risk. Because despite the New York convention of 1958 about 
enforceability of arbitral decisions [The Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards enacted by the world diplomatic 
community in New York in 1958 and ratified by Russia in 1960], in Russia, 
unfortunately, there is a practice that perhaps relates to the political risk, let’s call 
it this way, when some or other foreign judgement was … unenforceable (H 
interview). 
 
To avoid this, non-deliverable forward transactions are filed under, for instance, English 
law, but the main idea here is that these transactions do not comply with Russian law, 
hence avoid loopholes similar to the one that Russian banks used to default on their 
cash-settled forward obligations in 1998-99 (described in Chapter 4).  
W, a financial lawyer in Russia, explains the logic of an offshore party: 
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If I’ve moved to offshore and have been using clear, painfully familiar 
agreements, then for me there are no reasons to retreat from that, unless with new 
risks I will get… some super returns that motivate me. Otherwise everything will 
stay there [offshore] (W interview). 
 
As this Section demonstrated earlier, the very purpose of the offshore markets’ existence 
is to cope with various difficulties related to onshore currency dealings, and elimination 
of legal risks is amongst the highest priorities as practice shows. On this account the 
cross-border USD/RUB NDF market inevitably becomes offshore trading. 
 
It might be argued that as long as cash-settled forwards are legally enforceable, i.e. are 
booked under a law that recognises them as court-protected transactions, there would 
seem to be no difference whether the cross-border market is offshore or onshore. 
However, the fact that before 2007 the Russian law would not have given legal 
protection to these contracts has resulted in substantively fewer cross-border transactions 
than between non-residents only. X, a financial lawyer in a Russian subsidiary of a 
European bank, explains: 
 
There is another question. Not about validity of the [cash-settled] contract as in 
case with a local deal, but about enforceability. Because if… Imagine you have 
entered such contract. You have agreed that English court is a place for 
adjudication of a dispute in case there is a dispute. You understand full well that 
Russia signed about 12 or 13 I think… bilateral legal support agreements. But 
these are practically the CIS countries [the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, is formed by former Soviet Republics] and Finland, I think. But not 
England, not the [United] States, not France, not Germany […], i.e. not the main 
jurisdictions of the [non-deliverable] contracts’ counterparties. […] So a place 
for adjudication of a dispute is some English court. So what? We get finding for 
a foreign counterparty [in the English court]. He [a lawyer of this foreign 
counterparty] comes here [to Russia] with this decision. What is happening in 
Russian court? Nothing. Because there is no obligation of enforcement for this 
Russian court. […] As you know Russia is a party to the New York Convention 
of 1958 that covers, pay attention, decisions of arbitration courts. Not state 
courts. Now, if a place for adjudication of a dispute is, say, some non-state court, 
then this is a binding decision for Russia. But it [non-performance] happened [in 
Russia] in 1998. Why? Because you know that decisions of arbitration courts 
[such as, for instance, the London Court of International Arbitration, which is 
based in London, but not part of English judicial system] are not binding 
131 
decisions [in practice]. Because if a counterparty defaulted on an arbitration 
court’s decision, where would you go? You would go to a state court [which 
does not comply with the New York Convention of 1958] within jurisdiction to 
get an order of enforcement. You see? And that is what was happening after the 
1998 crisis (X interview).        
 
The set of legal discrepancies spelled out by the interviewee explains the reluctance of 
non-resident banks to deal with banks that operate strictly under Russian law. This 
results in the reduction of Russian banks’ participation in the USD/RUB NDF cross-
border market and further deepening the offshore-onshore segmentation. 
 
Thus the presented picture of the USD/RUB non-deliverable forward trade clearly holds 
certain market’s traits that must be accentuated for the subsequent analysis of the 
significance of legal amendment the thesis is focused on. The disproportionate 
domination of the offshore market (by comparison with onshore and cross-border trade), 
which is recognised by market participants, manifests the pivotal characteristic of the 
market - its clear-cut, explicit segmentation. Initially this spatial segmentation was a 
result of non-convertibility of the rouble; therefore the segregation of the offshore 
market could have been brought to an end once the rouble became a fully convertible 
currency. Yet the segmentation was deepened by the inbuilt legal uncertainty of cash-
settled forward contracts under Russian law. The unlawfulness of cash settlement 
triggered the fact that onshore non-deliverable trading was regarded as risk-generating 
dealing. The outlined peculiarities caused the far-reaching repercussions that are to be 
discussed in the next Section of this Chapter.  
 
c. Unenforceability of Cash-Settlement: The    
Implications 
 
The previous Section’s discussion was focused on the nature and mechanics of a cash-
settled forward. It also dealt with USD/RUB non-deliverable forward trading and, 
employing and analysing the data from field research, it assembled the findings into the 
account of the USD/RUB non-deliverable forward market. This description revealed 
certain peculiarities of the market stemming from the unenforceability of cash-
settlement under Russian Civil Code: the trade is explicitly segmented with its onshore 
counterpart being significantly lagging behind the offshore one in both the size and 
composition. This Section is going to discuss the detrimental economic implications of 
the given attributes and also the potential benefits of the legality of cash-settlement. 
 
In attempting to give an account of the essential characteristics of the USD/RUB cash-
settled forward trading, the burden of the previous Section was to demonstrate the 
development of the trade resulting in the existing clear-cut market’s segments.   
However useful for a conceptual grasp of the contract such segmented structure may be, 
it does not help the integrated functioning of the USD/RUB forward market. Without 
doubt this segmentation has been caused by various developments in currency control 
policies amplified by the 1998 crisis and the consequent consideration of cash-settlement 
as gambling. It has also resulted in the situation where the domestic forward market, due 
to its underdevelopment, did not facilitate essential economic necessities such as 
hedging, eventually posing difficulties for economic development of Russia. Here is 
how V, a broker who trades USD/RUB NDFs in London, summarises the current 
situation on the market: 
 
V. There is a very weak correlation between these two markets [international and 
domestic]. It is due to the deliverable market is mostly used by local banks, 
Russian banks.  And since there is big problem of limits, not many foreign names 
can trade with any Russian banks, despite the rouble is convertible. [It is 
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convertible] Theoretically. All these banks can trade with each other but, 
unfortunately, it is not like that. So the local market is a little bit … well, still 
isolated from the international part. If, say, big clients, like hedge funds, … they 
use service here in London and they trade NDFs ... the NDF market is more in 
one way, …these flows don’t go to the local [domestic or onshore] market… (V 
interview).     
 
The broker’s overview indicates that there are at least two problematic issues on the 
market: (1) the isolation of the onshore part of the rouble trade, and (2) the ‘theoretical’, 
i.e. not the factual convertibility of the Russian currency.  
 
Why is the lack of integrity on the market considered to be a troublesome matter? Or, 
put it differently, what are the benefits of market integration? There are two possible 
ways to answer this question. A broad, general answer might be the following: 
 
In financially integrated markets, domestic investors are able to invest in foreign 
assets and foreign investors in domestic assets; hence, assets of identical risk 
command the same expected return, regardless of trading location. Moving from 
a segmented regime to an integrated regime affects expected returns, volatilities, 
and correlations with world factors, all of which are important for both risk 
analysis and portfolio construction (Bekaert et al. 2002: 204, emphasis added).     
 
Yet, a more specific explanation would be the one that demonstrates a certain economic 
quality that is in evidence in an integrated market, and why it is of crucial importance to 
have this quality in place. In search of such quality, I asked one of my interviewees, a 
deputy managing director of one of the leading investment banks in Russia, why it is 
good to have an integrated USD/RUB forward market. In answering my question he was 
referring to some particular quality, liquidity specifically, without naming it, simply 
reasoning from a customer’s point of view:   
 
E. It’s like a shop, right? For instance, how are DIY goods bought these days? 
You go on Internet… Some, you know, packaged mix for flooring. For house 
renovation, right? I go on Internet, there are lots of those, and it will be delivered 
to me from the other end of Moscow, the one I need, the right one. I would have 
never found it on my own. I would have spent a year and haven’t found it still. In 
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other words, how’s it been in the past? You know where your DIY store is. You 
go there, you are told: ‘We’ve got this, and this, and this’. Yet, there exists 
something else, out there, but you don’t even know. You don’t even realise it 
exists. Therefore you take what you are offered. For a price you are offered. […] 
The same happens these days [on the onshore interbank market]. A customer 
comes to a bank: ‘I would like to hedge a risk’. – ‘We will hedge your risk, you 
have to pay a 3% fee’… 
S.M. And how would he know [it is the right hedge for the best price]… 
E. And how would he know?.. The same with calculating some exotic options. 
They will tell him [sarcastically]! That it is such a wonderful option – it covers 
you here, and it covers you there […]. Although it costs a fortune, but it covers 
you all round. They’ve off-loaded this option onto him. It is a different story 
when he goes on Internet. […] Here is Bloomberg, right? And [he] types ‘Such 
and such option’. And there are at least 10 banks in the world that quote it. 
Clearly, they also agreed on the price and quote at a high price… But price 
competition still remains (E interview).              
 
A couple of points need to be clarified. First, E exemplifies a customer’s point of view 
by talking about a client of a bank; however, in a sense the bank itself is a customer 
trying to find the right deal on an interbank market. The more liquid the interbank 
market is, the more chances the bank has to strike the best deal. By ‘quoting a price’ my 
interviewee means a bid-ask quote, which consists of a bid, that is a price a dealer is 
ready to pay for an item, and an ask, i.e. a price another dealer insists on for the same 
item. The difference between a bid (which is always less) and an ask is a spread. The 
bid-ask spread is also a measure for ‘direct trading costs’ that are considered to be an 
‘empirical definition’ of liquidity (Lesmond 2005: 412): the lower the spread, the more 
liquid a market is (Ritter et al. 2004: 101).  
 
My interviewee’s appeal to common sense is also supported by financial economics, 
which equals a consolidated financial market to a liquid one. Applied to an equity 
market it resumes: ‘As foreigners are allowed [considered not legally risky] to access the 
local market, liquidity can increase along with trading volume. […] We find that 
integration brings about or is accompanied by […] [a] market that is significantly larger 
and more liquid than before’ (Bekaert et al. 2002: 206, 243). The research in a bond 
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market suggests the same: segmentation of the market ‘works against liquidity’ 
(McCauley 2006: 83).  
 
Aside from these benefits, liquidity is associated with other financial markets’ 
advantages: 
 
A central aspect of market development is reaching a high level of market 
liquidity, which is a prerequisite for efficient markets, as transactions convey 
private information and increase the information content of […] prices. […] 
higher market liquidity is positively related to economic growth, progress in 
productivity, and expansion of capital accumulation. Hence, market reforms 
should enhance market liquidity to facilitate investment and guarantee long run 
economic growth (Gao and Kling 2006: 163).    
 
Applied to the USD/RUB NDF market, a reform that has a potential to increase its 
liquidity is a legal action that grants protection of a court to cash-settlement under 
Russian law. As seen from the previous Section, the unenforceability of cash-settled 
contracts discourages cross-border deals, in other words it deters foreign banks to deal 
with banks operating under Russian law, because these banks may potentially use the 
legal loophole of the Russian Civil Code, the one that served as a legal basis for 
announcing non-deliverable deals unenforceable back in 1999-2002. In its turn, the 
contracts’ court-protection would encourage cross-border trade. This rise of cross-border 
transactions’ volume would reflect the rise of market’s liquidity. The latter would be 
indicative of the changed nature of the market: from being segmented on to an 
international (offshore) and domestic (onshore), with ‘very weak correlation between 
these two’ (V interview), to becoming the integrated NDF RUB/USD forward market, 
characterised by increased trade flows with no emphasis placed on counterparties’ 
location, as is, for example, in the case with USD/EUR NDF trade.     
 
Having discussed all the positive repercussions of market consolidation, there is one 
more issue that has to be addressed or, more constructively, one more question to be 
answered. If the initial source of market segmentation was the rouble convertibility 
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restrictions, would the 2007 market liberalisation alone consolidate the market? In other 
words, will the announced rouble convertibility be the decisive factor, which puts an end 
to the market segmentation and its disadvantages? According to the Federal Reserve’s 
research, 
 
Over the years market growth has been greatest in NDFs for currencies of 
countries where investors (with portfolio and/or foreign direct investment) have 
become increasingly active… Conversely, [offshore] NDF markets in currencies 
of countries that have allowed increased capital convertibility, to the point where 
currency hedging is fully available onshore, have dissipated and/or disappeared 
(Lipscomb 2005).  
 
Market participants certainly share this view: ‘A truly "fully convertible RUB" would 
eliminate the need for the NDF [the offshore market that evolved due to currency 
restrictions] and then all market participants [both non-residents and residents] would be 
able to trade RUB forwards freely’ (B, electronic mail message to the author, April 21, 
2008, emphasis added). Yet, why is there a reservation? Because market liberalisation 
does not necessarily cause market consolidation: 
 
[There is] the important distinction between market liberalization and market 
integration. […] market integration is a gradual process. […] Allowing foreign 
investment does not appear to be sufficient to bring about market integration; 
foreigners still have to be willing to invest (Bekaert et al. 2002: 203, 242, 243). 
 
The rouble market liberalisation substantiates this statement. The announced rouble 
convertibility does not make the Russian currency convertible just yet, since ‘the rouble 
will not become a fully convertible currency until businesses themselves want to use it 
in international settlements’ (Fetisov 2007: 75).  
 
In fact traders did become optimistic and encouraged by the restrictions’ withdrawal, 
and this is how D, who is responsible for international business development in a 
brokerage firm in London, accounts for it:  
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D. We are developing our rouble products on a back of President’s Putin 
announcement last April [2006] that the rouble will be convertible, or freely 
tradable, from July rather than January… July 06, rather than January 07. We 
decided to start broking again … we would a little bit, but not a lot. Now we’ve 
got a fully men desk (D interview).    
 
However, this is where traders faced a problem. For the rouble to be used in 
international settlements its settlement infrastructure must be robust, i.e. provide smooth 
and seamless payments between transaction’s parties. Indeed ‘everyone jumped into the 
deliverable market when the rouble became convertible… It was supposedly going to 
make the market more efficient, but people have pulled back…’ (Daniel Aitchison, 
managing director, local markets trading, Citi bank, quoted by Euromoney 2007a: 34). 
The failure of the rouble settlement system dismayed traders, specifically the absence of 
the Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS). The RTGS is a variety of systems (e.g. 
Fedwire in the US, the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) in the 
UK) with the following advantages: 
 
RTGS systems process and settle payment instructions individually, 
immediately, and with finality throughout the day across accounts held at the 
central bank. Given the intraday finality of RTGS payments, if a participant fails 
during the day, other participants who have received such payments during the 
day from the failing member will be unaffected. Hence, systemic risk in the 
RTGS system is eliminated through the central bank guarantee of finality 
(Furfine and Stehm 1998: 832-833).   
 
Furthermore, the RTGS system enables the payment versus payment settlement which is 
crucial for foreign exchange trading (Furfine and Stehm 1998); the settlement guarantees 
payment of a certain amount in one currency only if there is a transfer of a certain sum 
in the other currency. Here is what B, an emerging market manager of a brokerage firm 
in London, says about the absence of RTGS for Russian currency: 
 
B. The problem with the rouble settlement is it is a very archaic system. It 
worked very well after the banking collapse in Russia, in the 90s. When MICEX 
[Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange] came about and created a … sort of 
central liquidity pool… In a line with that was this system, which really lends 
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itself more to your 80 or so regional governments who used this central payment 
system. But the key element of that payment system and it is also for 
international clearing as well, is the fact that you have 5 windows through the 
course of the trading day to make payments. But the payments in those windows 
are categorised. So for instance payments in window one might be for child 
support… number two might be pensions. Foreign exchange trades, just a regular 
spot trades, don’t happen until at least at the earliest window three. If they take 
place in windows four or five, you won’t see the impact of those settlements on 
your account, because there is no real time settlement in Russia. What is 
commonly called ... a real Time Gross Settlement System… When Putin brought 
forward the fully convertible rouble … it wasn’t really fully convertible, it all 
sounded very good, very proper… but it looked more like a positioning to get 
into G8. But it didn’t really happen, because people still got this flipping thing 
with trying to settle through these windows (B interview). 
 
Overall, the situation with the convertible but not deliverable rouble might be 
summarised by G, a broker in London who deals with emerging markets’ non-
deliverable forwards: 
 
G. I guess everyone feels that the strength of the Russian economy now is able 
to… enough substantiate dealing in a world financial market. […] Enough, you 
know, for the currency to be tradable across the world. Unfortunately, I think 
some of the networks, as in the banking industry, as in the settlement… you 
know, needed documentation in the back-office. […] So therefore one or few 
trades, or quite a few trades have taken place deliverable. Money’s have turned 
up late, or confirmations haven’t been sent, which is quite a… I guess 
disappointing from the London banks’ point of view. From a broker’s point of 
view we prefer NDF market. It’s a lot quicker, a lot cleaner and, you know, it’s 
better for us…so we’re not pushing deliverable, and as the banks… as they 
traded they’ve understood that it’s not quite ready yet. So, you know, most of the 
reverting banks are doing NDF [as opposed to deliverable forwards] (G 
interview).       
 
The rouble, as a measure of the Russian economy or, more precisely, its financial 
solvency, must practically demonstrate/represent this solvency, i.e. an ability to pay; 
hence it must be tuned to the extent that everybody can easily, unquestionably use it. If 
‘the [rouble] settlement system is an absolute nightmare [and] settlement issues take up 
traders’ time and [the bank’s managers] have to allocate extra back-office resources to 
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it’ (Euromoney 2007a: 34), it is not yet a tradable (in the true sense of the word that 
implies the actual exchange of goods) item.        
 
The announced yet not performed rouble convertibility serves as a case in point of the 
‘material sociology’ perspective that advocates the materiality of financial markets, 
which are ‘assemblages not of abstract economic agents but of embodied human beings, 
artefacts, and technological systems’ (Beunza et al. 2006) or, in other words, markets are 
constituted by ‘socio-technical agencements’ as agencies-arrangements that ‘are made 
up of human bodies but also of […] tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.’ 
(Callon 2005:4). What is more, by paying attention to ‘aspects of agencements that are 
not obvious and on ways in which the composition and configuration of agencements 
affect economic action’ (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007b: 74) it argues ‘markets’ 
infrastructures matter’ (MacKenzie 2006: 13):   
 
At the most basic level, the notion of ‘agencements’ helpfully directs us to the 
conditions of possibility of economic actors: the often-ignored infrastructure that 
enables them to be the actors they are (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007b: 74). 
 
Yet, whereas Hardie and MacKenzie (2007b: 74) ‘had deliberately to seek out the 
infrastructure of [the hedge fund they studied, its] economic action’, since ‘a smoothly-
functioning infrastructure is normally invisible’, the absence of it for the rouble forward 
trade also substantially validates the argument. With no expedient payment 
infrastructure in place there is no truly convertible rouble, thus there is just scarce 
deliverable forward trading: 
 
B. Once the RTGS is fully adopted, or seen to be fully adopted for clearing and 
settlement, then the CLS [Continuous Linked Settlement, the cross-currency 
settlement procedure enabled by a large group of the big prominent banks and 
enjoys a reputation of the leading settlement network with the highest payment 
processing standards] may want to add the rouble as one of the CLS clearing 
payers. Which would also help the rouble and the volumes tremendously. […] I 
think the rouble volume will probably triple in a very very short space of time 
when they can actually settle properly (from an interview with B, an emerging 
market manager of a brokerage firm in London).   
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The absence of the RTGS system, resulting in the de facto non-convertible rouble, also 
confirms that non-deliverable forwards are to be in high demand in the nearest future: 
 
S.M. How is convertibility of the rouble going to affect the [USD/RUB] cash-
settled forward market? The Federal Reserve’s research states that as soon as a 
currency becomes fully convertible an offshore NDF market [for this currency] 
disappears, since this very market evolves due to the currency [convertibility] 
restrictions.  
N. Yes. As a matter of fact, the reason NDFs exist is to get round inconvertibility 
of a currency.  
S.M. Therefore, logically, if convertibility is announced… 
N. …why have NDFs [the offshore USD/RUB NDF market] not disappeared, 
right? I believe due to the infrastructural reasons. In a greater degree. And, shall 
we say, due to the low liquidity of the onshore money market. I mean, you can 
announce the rouble convertible by all manner of means. But for this… for it to 
become truly convertible, at a minimum it should be in demand, […] there 
should be a trading infrastructure for this currency […]. 
S.M. Yes, I talked to the brokers in London and they criticised the 
infrastructure… 
N. Of course, of course. So [the USD/RUB] NDF market is going to be in 
existence for quite a while (from an interview with N, a Head of a Treasury 
Research in one of the top Russian banks).          
 
As evidence of these difficulties, the proof that confirms the offshore rouble NDF 
market is not going to disappear in the nearest future, on 3 of March 2008 the biggest 
interdealer broker in the word, ICAP, launched electronic trading of rouble non-
deliverable forwards on EBS platform, ‘responding to client demand for the certainty of 
trade, liquidity and transparency’ (ICAP 2008).  
 
Finally, there is also another reason for cash-settled forwards to play an important role in 
the rouble market for quite some time in the future. In its acknowledgment and study of 
offshore NDF markets, the financial economic research suggests that if properly 
developed, such markets can potentially ‘facilitate a smooth transition to a fully 
convertible currency’, therefore to a consolidated forward market, as they can ‘provide a 
“training ground” for both domestic and foreign market participants that allows them to 
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improve both analytical and trading skills’ (Debelle et al. 2006: 63). Arguably, this study 
equates liberalisation with consolidation of the market. However, and this is where I 
would agree with the researchers, ‘[it is] important […] whether policymakers allow 
local institutions to participate in the NDF market’ (Debelle et al. 2006: 63).  I would 
add that for Russian policymakers it means to recognise cash-settlement as a court-
protected practice under Russian law.     
 
To summarise, it is clear that the announced convertibility of the rouble (or the rouble 
market’s liberalisation) does not immediately lead to consolidation of the USD/RUB 
NDF market. Consequentially, the segmented market lacks liquidity in the USD/RUB 
forward trade, thus causing inefficiency of the market. An effective solution to such 
problem would be an adjudication of legality of cash-settled forwards which, in turn, 
would stimulate the cross-border USD/RUB forward trade thus rendering liquidity to the 
market. 
 
Thus far this Chapter has discussed just one of the implications of cash-settlement’s 
unenforceability, namely the market’s segmentation eventuated in illiquidity of the 
market. However, there was also a significant legal ramification of the cash-settlement’s 
gambling status, which led to almost complete fade-out of the derivatives market in 
Russia.  
 
While discussing the nature and mechanics of the foreign exchange market and a 
forward contract as one of the mostly used derivative instruments on the market, this 
Chapter specified two types of forward contracts – a deliverable and cash-settled 
forward. In fact, it is true for all derivatives contracts. Every derivative has an underlier 
which is ‘the asset, measure, or obligation on which a derivative […] is based’ (Oxford 
Dictionary of Finance and Banking 2005: 417). It is apparent that such underlier as a 
measure (a financial index, an interest rate) cannot easily be physically delivered. And 
here is where cash-settlement comes to the aid. The mechanics of cash-settlement has 
already been detailed with specific reference to a non-deliverable forward. It works in 
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the same way in all cash-settled derivatives – on a day the contract is due a buyer, or a 
seller, pay the difference between a contracted price of an item and its current price.  
  
In actual practice, banks, which are counterparties in deals made on the over-the-counter 
interbank market, enter in not just one contract, but conclude a number of contracts: 
  
Generally, firms either buy from or sell to other firms, but rarely do both 
simultaneously. […] However, financial markets often generate large numbers of 
bi-directional transactions between counterparties (Bliss and Kaufman 2006: 58).   
 
In so doing banks either hedge risks that arise from, for instance, interest rate or 
exchange rate fluctuations, or take advantage of the rates’ movements. Since the range 
of the contracts banks enter into is very wide, it typically includes both deliverable and 
cash-settled derivative instruments. Here some further explanations should be brought 
in, since legal implementation and documentation of interbank derivative contracts is 
crucial to effective market functioning. 
 
As a rule, all interbank derivative contracts are covered by a so called Master 
Agreement. It is a standardised contract which assembles various types of derivatives 
that comprise numerous transactions between two counterparties (banks) into one 
agreement. The agreement is structured in a particular way: it links all the transactions 
by a set of covenants, such as the Confirmation, the Master Agreement, the Schedule, 
and the Credit Support Annex.       
 
The interaction of these various agreements is quite simple if a simple sporting 
metaphor is used. The master agreement stands for the rules of a particular game, 
as amended by the parties in their schedule to that master agreement, and each 
confirmation constitutes a record of any individual game having been played. 
[…] Between two market counterparties there would, ideally, be only one master 
agreement but many hundreds of confirmations where the latter documents 
merely record the details of the individual transactions entered into between the 
parties (Hudson 2002: 95). 
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As for the Credit Support Annex, this is simply an addition to the Schedule that details 
credit guarantees.    
 
Given a specific structure of a Master Agreement, why would banks need such single 
assemblage of all the contracts they enter in?  In a case of default of one of the 
counterparties the agreement allows ‘to net the mark-to market values of all existing 
transactions’ (ISDA 2004: 3). In other words, it enables the parties to settle amalgamated 
value of obligations between them in such way, that if, for example, Dresdner Bank 
ZAO (Moscow) is under an obligation to pay $500 000 to BNP Paribas ZAO (Moscow) 
and the latter owes $400 000 to Dresdner Bank ZAO, then Dresdner Bank ZAO has to 
disburse $100 000 only: 
 
The aim of netting is to reduce a number of obligations to a single sum which is 
owed by one party to the other (Hudson 2002: 464). 
 
The form of a Master Agreement developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) is the one that is almost universally known and used by international 
banks. ISDA is  ‘a trade group that coordinates industry documentation practices, drafts 
model contracts, and lobbies for legislative changes to support the enforceability of 
those contracts’ (Bliss and Kaufman 2006: 58), and enjoys a reputation of ‘the most 
prominent voice of the industry’ (Riles 2000: 21). The association was established in 
1985 and it joins forces of ‘over 830 member institutions from 56 countries on six 
continents’ (ISDA 2008)1. Here is how a financial law expert with one of the Russian 
authorities explains the advantages of the ISDA Master Agreement as a risk 
management tool: 
 
J. The idea of ISDA trading is that between two counterparties… Why is it 
possible to make so many deals? Because at the moment they [deals] are linked 
to different underlying assets, they vary differently, and due to the fact that we 
net them, the total or net fluctuation of all deals is imperceptible (J interview). 
 
                                                
1 For a detailed account of the ISDA’s emergence and evolution up to 2001 please see Flanagan (2001).   
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Clearly the netting procedure, enabled by a Master Agreement, reduces market risk and 
counterparty risk2, but it also ‘permit[s] expansion of dealer activities, enhancing the 
depth and liquidity of the derivatives markets’ (Bliss and Kaufman 2006: 57). 
 
However, in circumstances where non-deliverable contracts are unenforceable, the 
netting provisions of a Master Agreement cannot work. If cash-settled contracts covered 
by a Master Agreement are illegal contracts, the Agreement will not be able to reduce 
the net exposure of one bank to another in a case of the latter’s default, since the 
aggrieved party will not be able to claim damages for costs incurred in connection with a 
void contract. Consequently, to enable a Master Agreement, thus to facilitate netting, 
which admittedly increases liquidity of the interbank derivatives market, the law needs 
to be changed: 
 
[The legality of cash-settlement] equals the legal treatment of deliverable and 
cash-settled derivatives, thus allows covering them by a single (master) 
agreement (Ivanov 2005a). 
 
Cash-settled derivative contracts form a substantial part of the interbank derivatives 
market in Russia. H, a lawyer in a Russian subsidiary of a European bank, claims: 
  
H. On the whole, on the [Russian] market, I can say, for example, [about] those 
banks I worked in… I can name them… Deutsche Bank [Moscow branch], 
Raiffeisen Bank [Raiffeisen Investment AG, Moscow subsidiary], ING [ING 
Russia, International Netherlands Group, branch in Moscow], the major 
participants of the investment and derivatives markets… [They] are more keen to 
use non-deliverable contracts. […] Because the market inherently… the 
[interbank] derivatives market, after all, is based on non-deliverable contracts (H 
interview).  
   
While specifying banks which incline to cash-settled derivatives, the lawyer names 
Russian branches of the large European banks. It will be recalled that the National 
Foreign Exchange Association’s survey of Russian interbank derivatives market also 
                                                
2 Market risk is ‘cased by a movement in the prices of […] market instruments’. Counterparty risk ‘is the 
risk that one of the parties will renege on the terms of a contract’ (Heffernan 2005: 107, 104).  
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confirms that ‘mainly foreign banks are [dealing with] NDFs’ since they are able to 
implement cash-settlement legally, through their head offices located in London, thus 
using the ISDA Master Agreement (F interview, see Section B of this Chapter). 
     
Yet, the same survey of the National Foreign Exchange Association reveals that Russian 
banks are also active in the interbank derivatives trading with Gazprombank, Sberbank, 
and VTB (Vneshtorgbank) being leaders on the market (Piskulov 2007). Presumably, 
these banks cannot avoid non-deliverable contracts. This brings up the question of how 
they circumvent the gambling status of the cash-settled forwards that in a case of default 
on obligations will allow a counterparty to simply walk out of a contract. I posed such a 
question to a sales manager in a derivatives department of a big Russian bank that is 
seemingly also not afraid to settle derivatives contracts in cash: 
 
S.M. As for today, as far as I know, there is no an official directive of the Central 
Bank [of Russia] that bans cash-settled forwards. And yet, there are no cash-
settled deals made between Russian banks… 
P. Oh no, no... No, [the Russian banks] do make [cash-settled] deals. 
S.M. Do they? 
P. Yes. 
S.M. Because the National Foreign Exchange Association’s survey states if there 
are such deals, these are deals booked in London. 
P. No, well understandably, yes. […] If there [are deals made] under ISDA or, 
say, ISMA [International Securities Market Association] – then [they] do, of 
course. But as far as I am aware [cash-settled deals] are traded by Russian credit 
companies.  
S.M. Then why do they take such risks? Do they use some sort of… like the 
ISDA… 
P. Well, GMA. General Agreements. But normally there is no standard. 
However in [names his bank] lawyers… about 5 years ago… roughly speaking, 
translated [the] ISDA [Master Agreement] in to Russian, and…Well, of course 
they made some corrections, right? Taking into account Russian law… […] And 
basically [the lawyers] operate… A kind of… signing is bilateral, meaning that, 
roughly speaking, one bank sends its version to another bank, and lawyers 
examine it in there, make their amendments, send it back. Again these [the first 
bank’s] lawyers settle … kind of matters of principle, and sign it (P interview). 
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Y, an official from the Central Bank of Russia, summarises this in the following account 
of the current market situation: 
 
Y. The existing routine, business routine, it is based on a certain local form of 
agreement. It is already, in an actual fact, conventional. It has been used for 
years; it is used by major [Russian] banks, such as Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, 
well, any big bank. These are agreements signed by them on the local market. 
[…] There is no Russian translation of ISDA [Agreement]. ISDA is based on… 
in fact, its main advantage is that it allows to regulate risks… to minimise. 
However, for this purpose, in order to minimise risks on its basis, it is, indeed, 
necessary to change the [Russian] law […] (Y interview).      
 
The Central Bank official’s confidence in the ‘local form of agreement’ raises a question 
of whether the ISDA Master Agreement’s implementation is all that necessary to the 
interbank derivatives market. I addressed this question to a market practitioner, a sales 
manager in a derivatives department of a large Russian bank: 
 
S.M. From your point of view, how essential is an implementation of the ISDA 
form of a Master Agreement, i.e. a standard form agreement which is not kicked 
about by lawyers (as you described), but exists as a standard and serves as a tool 
for all banks in the [Russian derivatives interbank] market? Is this ISDA 
Agreement all that necessary? Or may be you are happy to keep trading… 
P. Well, I think… Of course, I think […] [the ISDA Agreement] would make the 
life easier to many of us. If you take A [names his bank], it is a big bank. But if 
you take… But at large, for the market development… for middle-size 
organisations, I think it would help them a lot. […] Because we employ a large 
number of lawyers, right? There are [in his bank] resources to avoid these 
problems. It [his bank] will be trading anyway. […] But the middle-size 
organisations, they… well, for them there is an obstacle. Right? Consequently, 
they have to accept A’s terms. 
S.M. Right…  
P. …Or some other big bank’s terms. Roughly speaking, it would seem that 
ISDA is a mirror-like [does not discriminate against a smaller bank], right? But 
these General Agreements [GMA]… well, they, after all, look toward a bigger 
bank. […] They [GMA] vary, unlike ISDA [Agreement], right? ISDA is ISDA. 
And that is it, and everybody signs it. And then some confirmations can be 
changed. Now, here [in a case of a General Master Agreement] the agreement 
itself is changed (P interview).  
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In actual fact, the impelling need for a tool that facilitates netting on equal terms for all 
banks is recognised by the Russian banking community. Here is a press release 
published on the Association of Russian Banks’ website in August 2007: 
 
The Association of Russian Banks (ARB) in conjunction with the National 
Foreign Exchange Association (NFEA) and the NAUFOR [the Russian National 
Association of Securities Market Participants] have opened a tender for 
international law firms to design a standard Master Agreement for derivatives 
trading in Russian financial market. […] According to the Associations, the new 
Agreement must be based on international experience, primarily on the ISDA 
Master Agreement (2002) (ARB 2007). 
 
On January 16, 2008, the Association of Russian Banks announced the winner of the 
tender and clarified the structure of the Master Agreement, stating that it is analogous to 
the ISDA Master Agreement framework (ARB 2008).  
 
This adoption of a Master Agreement was indeed possible due to the amendment made 
to the Russian Federation Civil Code a year earlier, in January 2007. The amendment 
has granted court protection to cash-settlement under Russian law and the next Chapter 
is going to be concerned with the circumstances of its development. Meanwhile, I should 
emphasize the crucial importance of this amendment for putting a netting technique into 
practice, thus facilitating and illustrating the process of ‘the legal constitution of 
globalization’ (Riles 2000: 23). 
 
To conclude the discussion on the implications of unenforceability of cash-settlement, 
and in this way to draw attention to the substance and significance of the relevant change 
in Russian law, I shall once again accentuate two main aspects of non-deliverable 
contracts’ gambling status. First, I argue, it results in insular offshore and onshore 
markets and, consequentially, in less liquid rouble trading. Second, the unenforceability 
enhances market risk in such a way that it makes netting procedure impossible for the 
market participants, therefore interferes with the development of cash-settled trading, 
including forward dealing.   
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I should also once again accentuate ‘the material production’ of seemingly virtual 
derivatives markets (MacKenzie 2007b). The absence of an adequate settlement 
infrastructure for the rouble trading poses difficulties for the fully developed rouble 
forward market with all the facilities for deliverable trading in place.  
 
Given the importance of the USD/RUB NDF market to the Russian financial market and 
the whole economy, the cost of the delay in its implementation is very high. What 
remains to be seen is the context of the battles which resulted in legal changes that took 
place in Russia in January 2007. The following Chapter will examine it in detail.  
 
Chapter 6.  Making the Law: Putting Forward Regulation 
 
Chapter 4 of the thesis aimed at describing the events that constituted the RUB/USD 
cash-settled forward market, its emergence, evolution and collapse. The Chapter 
completed its narrative by resuming the legal development that resulted in 
unenforceability of non-deliverable foreign exchange forwards. Chapter 5 was organised 
rather differently. It focused on a cash-settled foreign exchange forward contract in order 
to demonstrate the ways the gambling status of these contracts affected RUB/USD 
currency trading. In so doing it dealt with scrutinising the cash-settled forward by first, 
treating it as a part of the interbank Forex market, and second, giving an account of the 
RUB/USD forward market as segmented, thus illiquid trade. Having emphasised the 
economic disadvantages of unenforceability of cash-settlement, and in a view of the fact 
that court-protection was eventually granted to non-deliverable contracts in January 
2007, there is one more development that needs to be examined, namely a process of 
making the statutory law.  
 
This Chapter intends to answer the question of what caused, according to the widespread 
agreement among the derivatives market’s participants, the delay in the process of 
putting derivatives regulation in place; it is set to analyse the ‘meta-bargaining’ 
(Carruthers and Halliday 1998), that is the negotiations among regulators and market 
participants aiming to develop a legal framework for derivatives in Russia. Such 
discussions resulted in the amendment of Article 1062 of the Russian Civil Code, the 
article Russian arbitration courts referred to in a number of trials which produced 
verdicts against enforceability of cash-settlement.       
 
Section A opens the discussion describing authorities that someway or other are 
involved in regulation of the derivatives market in Russia. The Section argues the 
market is under the jurisdiction of more than one regulator, therefore subject to 
overlapping supervisory policies. Section B outlines the two ways that were developed 
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to make cash-settled derivatives enforceable under Russian law; it then follows attempts 
made to pursue one of the paths - to produce the law on derivatives. Section C concludes 
the Chapter by analysing the circumstances that facilitated the turn to the alternative way 
of making cash-settlement of derivatives enforceable and the outcomes of such 
development.   
  
a. The Apple of Discord: Russian Derivatives 
Market and the Overlapping Authorities (the Bank 
of Russia and the Federal Financial Markets 
Service) 
 
The arbitration court trials of the forward cash-settlement cases culminated in the Ruling 
of the Constitutional Court announced in December 16, 2002. The Ruling drew attention 
to the absence of legal provisions for the procedure of non-deliverable forward 
settlement in Russia (CCRF 2002). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court judge, Gadis 
Gadzhiev, emphasised that unenforceability of cash-settlement under Russian law is a 
major impediment to the growth of the Russian derivatives market. Given the 
importance of the latter, he said, the governmental authorities must develop an adequate 
legal infrastructure for delivery-free derivative transactions (Gadzhiev 2002). Thereby 
the task seemed set; it only remained to identify a responsible party, namely the 
government authority that regulates a derivatives market in Russia, that is able to initiate 
law on cash-settled derivatives1.  
 
To be able to distinguish an authority responsible for the establishment of a legal 
infrastructure, one has to grapple with the way the Russian derivatives market is 
regulated. First of all, it should be noted here that in order to identify the government 
                                                
1 The focus of this discussion is on regulation of the market, considering there are ‘regulation (the 
establishment of specific rules of behaviour), monitoring (observing whether the rules are obeyed), and 
supervision (the more general observation of the behaviour of financial firms)’ (Llewellyn 1999: 6, 
emphasis in original).    
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authority in question, the Section will be dealing with ‘externally imposed regulation’ 
(Goodhart et al. 1998) as opposite to self-regulation. Secondly, a discussion of this 
Section will be focused on the regulatory matters of the derivatives market taken as a 
whole, given it is cash-settlement of a Forex forward (as a type of a derivative) that 
made the contract unenforceable; thus the regulatory authority should aim to provide a 
legal infrastructure for all cash-settled derivatives in Russia.     
 
If one is to understand the essence of financial regulation, the following two questions 
should be asked: first, why does a financial market (and a derivatives market as its 
segment) need to be regulated; second, what are the key financial institutions on the 
market, the institutions that are to be regulated? It is notable that both answers are 
indispensable to apprehension of financial regulation, given that ‘[financial] regulation is 
both functional and institutional’: 
 
This follows from the fact that particular functions are carried on within 
specialised financial entities: regulation of the function is tantamount to 
regulation of the associated entities and vice versa (Dale and Wolfe 1998: 329, 
emphasis in original).     
 
Thus, to form a clear view of regulation of a derivatives market in Russia is to define the 
key regulatory objectives and to attribute them to the particular regulator in the market2.  
 
There would seem to be a widespread belief among those involved in regulatory policy 
making that there are at least three objectives that should guide any policy making in 
financial markets: regulation is necessary to provide consumer protection, to guarantee 
integrity of a market, and to manage systemic risk (Dale and Wolfe 1998; Goodhart et 
                                                
2 Llewellyn (1999: 8, emphasis in original) argues that it is necessary to discern ‘the objectives of 
regulation (what outcome it is trying to secure), the rationale for regulation (why regulation is necessary if 
the objectives are to be achieved), and the reasons for regulation (why in practice regulation takes place)’. 
The focus of the current discussion is on the regulatory objectives, since these are the most crucial targets 
that are to be achieved by regulators of financial markets.    
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al. 1998; Llewellyn 1999)3. To protect a consumer means to make sure that different and 
sudden market failure will not crucially affect a user of financial services. There are two 
ways to do so: by prudential regulation and by ensuring proper conduct of business. 
Prudential regulation is based on the assumption that due to imperfectness of accessible 
information a consumer is not able to make a sound judgement on the quality of 
financial institution she deals with, thus external regulation of financial institutions is 
imperative. To ensure proper conduct of business is to focus on fairness and soundness 
of the way financial firms treat their customers.  
 
Financial regulators also aim at supporting market integrity, that is at an array of ‘such 
diverse matters as money-laundering, market manipulation, price discovery, fairness (for 
instance, in terms of access to information) and, above all, transparency’ on the market 
in its entirety (Dale and Wolfe 1998: 327). The last but not least objective is systemic 
failure financial regulators are set to prevent. Systemic risk is a danger ‘that the 
economic system will break down as a result of problems in the banking sector’ 
(Heffernan 2005: 32), thus systemic regulation is a prerogative of a chief banking 
regulator.  
     
In an attempt to define the institutional structure of the Russian financial market, one has 
to bear in mind that ‘there are many possible distinctions that can be made between 
different types of financial institutions’, and the distinction ‘between banks on the one 
hand, and all other institutions on the other’ (Goodhart et al.1998: 155-156), which was 
adopted in the Russian financial market, is one of the many. However, this very 
distinction is helpful in discussing financial regulators in Russia, where there are three of 
them: the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Supervision Service for Insurance that 
regulates insurance undertaking, the Federal Financial Markets Service that is 
responsible for non-credit financial organisations, and the Bank of Russia which is in 
charge of credit financial organisations, namely banks.   
                                                
3 Although this is not necessarily always the case. See, for example, Partnoy (2001) and Esau (2001), who 
discuss how regulatory competition, or ‘turf wars’ affected the single-stock futures market.   
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Since insurance companies are not known as key participants in the Russian derivatives 
market, there are two principal regulators for the latter: the Federal Financial Markets 
Service (FFMS) and the Bank of Russia or the Central Bank. The subsequent discussion 
in this Chapter aims at demonstrating the fact that the so called ‘turf battles’ (Partnoy 
2001), or the discord between these two regulatory bodies over regulation authority in 
the derivatives market, affected the way the market developed.   
 
My interviewee K, a leader of a self-regulatory association in the Russian financial 
market confirms the above described bilateral regulatory division for the derivatives 
market: 
 
K. There is, in fact, an actual split in regulation of the [Russian] derivatives 
market [based on] two main groups of the participants. These are banks regulated 
by the Central Bank […]. [And] investment and asset management companies 
with FFMS [the Federal Financial Markets Service] as their regulator (K 
interview).  
 
Seemingly, such division of labour among Russian financial regulators is perfectly 
reasonable: 
 
The rationale for regulation, and the form that the regulation should take, differs 
significantly between banking and non-banking financial services, especially (as 
with pensions, insurance and life assurance) when long-term contracts are 
involved. In particular, systemic issues are central in the regulation of banks 
[given that banks are exceptionally susceptible to sequential failures], but they 
are much less significant for non-bank financial services, whereas consumer 
protection issues are comparatively more important in the latter (Goodhart et al. 
1998: 10, emphasis in original).  
 
The high danger of systemic risks based on particular banks’ susceptibility to ‘contagion 
effects’ (Heffernan 2005: 32, emphasis in original) is confirmed by numerous financial 
crises, with the current global financial crisis as the latest example. The probability of 
154 
systemic collapse determines the unique status of a chief banking regulator - a central 
bank.  
 
The Central Bank of Russian Federation, or the Bank of Russia, was granted its unique 
status by the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993. Article 75 of the 
Constitution states that ‘the protection and ensuring the stability of the rouble shall be 
the major task of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which it shall fulfil 
independently of the other bodies of state authority’ (RF 1993). Article 3 of the Federal 
Law ‘On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)’ also declares the 
aims of the Central Bank’s activity, which are ‘developing and strengthening the 
banking system of the Russian Federation and guaranteeing the efficient and 
uninterrupted functioning of the payment system’, thus assigns banks’ regulation to the 
Bank of Russia (CBRF 2008a).4 In parallel with systemic regulation, the Central Bank 
exercises prudential regulation of Russian banks (RF 2002b: 33-46).    
 
As for its power of law-making, the regulator of Russian banks issues normative acts 
‘concerned with issues that fall within its competence under the Federal Law On the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) and other federal laws’ (CBRF 
2008a). The instructions, directives and provisions, which were referenced in the 
previous Chapters, serve as examples of such normative acts. However, the Bank of 
Russia ‘has no right to initiate legislation, but its participation in the law-making process 
is guaranteed by the procedure requiring The Bank's of Russia opinion on draft federal 
laws and federal government resolutions relating to the implementation by the Bank of 
Russia of its functions’ (CBRF 2008a). M, an official from the Ministry of Finance of 
the Russian Federation, explains: 
 
M. The Central Bank [of the Russian Federation] does not have a right of 
legislative initiative. That is why the Minfin [the Ministry of Finance] elaborates 
all banking laws (M interview). 
                                                
4 For a detailed research on policy, personnel, financial, behavioural and other aspects of the Central Bank 
independence up until 1998 see Tompson (1998a).   
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Take, for example, the Federal Law ‘On Currency Regulation and Currency Control’ 
(RF 2004). The law sets a regulatory framework for financial activity which falls under 
the Central Bank’s jurisdiction; yet ‘all changes to the Currency Law [are made by] the 
Ministry of Finance’ (M interview).  
 
For eleven years, since March 1993 to March 2004, alongside with the Central Bank, the 
Federal Securities Market Commission (FSMC) had been a regulatory agency in 
someway or other responsible for the Russian financial market. More specifically, in 
addition to being accountable for the security market, FSMC was a regulator of all 
Russian stock-exchanges (RF 1993a, 1996, 1996a). According to J, a financial law 
expert with one of the Russian authorities, the Commission originated in the early 1990s, 
as a part of the Russian economic transformations: 
 
J. There was a huge project on Russian securitisation5 [undertaken by Russian 
government]. In the beginning of 1990s M [one of the leading experts in Russian 
securitisation] started [working in the project] in the American team of experts 
who under the patronage of [Anatolii] Chubais were introducing vouchers, 
initiating securities trading, converting Soviet enterprises into joint-stock 
companies […]. [They were placed in to] the huge building… The FSMC 
secretariat grew out of this team (J interview).         
 
In 2004, a Presidential Decree restructured the Commission into the Federal Financial 
Markets Services. The Decree was the culmination of the ongoing at that time 
administrative reform that aimed at ‘enhancement of the efficiency of […] the federal 
government executive bodies and business facilitation’ (RF 2003). In particular, one of 
the reform’s priorities was ‘the organisational division of regulation of economic activity 
[and] monitoring and supervision’ (RF 2003). Andrei Sharov, at that time the Head of 
                                                
5 What is meant here is the process of voucher privatisation in Russia in early 1990s. In order to transfer 
ownership of enterprises from the state to its citizens, the government issued and distributed privatisation 
vouchers which were securities that denote shareholdings in an enterprise. The citizens could potentially 
sell the vouchers or keep them and retain their shareholdings.          
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the Government Service Department, the Ministry for Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation, clarifies: 
 
The fact is that by the new arrangements [as the result of the administrative 
reform] the Ministries’ functions have fundamentally been changed. Today, [a 
minister] is responsible for nothing else but policy. He is debarred with […] law-
enforcement […]. On the contrary, a head of a federal service […] monitors and 
supervises, but cannot set up rules for the service. It is a prerogative of a minister 
(Sharov 2004).  
 
However, an exception was made for the Federal Financial Markets Service. The same 
Statue that elaborated upon the Service’s scope of authority also stated that it’s in FFMS 
power to ‘introduce federal legislation to the Government of the Russian Federation […] 
[and to] make statues […]’ (RF 2004b). 
 
As for its responsibilities, Paragraph 13 of the Decree devolved monitoring and 
supervising power of a number of other agencies on the Service, for example FFMS 
became responsible for monitoring and supervision of pension savings’ organising and 
investing, whereas before 2004 the Ministry of Finance had been in control of it (RF 
2004a).  As noted above, all functions of the Federal Securities Market Commission 
were assigned to the new agency; hence FFMS became a successor of the Commission 
in its role of the securities market’s and stock-exchanges chief regulator. Having 
concentrated a significant regulating, monitoring and supervising power, FFMS took a 
position as the chief regulator of financial markets in Russia, albeit insurance, banking 
and auditing stayed outside its jurisdiction (RF 2004b).  
 
Such state of affairs seemed to be confusing in terms of prospects for the market’s 
development. M, an official from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 
explains: 
 
M. […] it was not entirely clear which authority is responsible for the derivatives 
market. Because on the one hand this is a financial market, hence FFMS [is its 
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regulator], well, FSMC back then [before 2004]. On the other hand [the 
regulator] is the Central Bank, because they were foreign exchange forwards [the 
Constitutional Court] referred to, that is [they were] banking instrument[s] (M 
interview).      
  
Indeed, as a whole, the Russian derivatives market was, and still is, situated on an 
intersection of regulatory spheres of the two authorities. It is to be recalled that the 
market’s over-the-counter segment is a trade in dealer markets. With Russian banks 
being major dealers on the market6, this interbank derivatives trade stays entirely under 
regulation of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. As for the derivatives market’s 
exchange-based segment, most of the trade takes place on two Russian exchanges: the 
Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange and the Russian Trading System (RTS), more 
precisely on the FORTS (Futures and Options on RTS). However, banks are major 
participants in the exchange-based derivatives trade. Take, for example, MICEX: there 
are 139 banks out of 190 participants in its derivatives market (MICEX 2008). Yet, the 
chief regulator for the exchanges, i.e. the authority that initiates legal changes, monitors 
and supervises the exchange based trade, the trade where the banks account for 73 per 
cent of all participants, is the Federal Financial Markets Service. There is more to it: 
 
S. Have a look [at the situation with] a bank trading on the stock-market: 
technically, it is under FSMC jurisdiction, yet the majority of requirements to it 
is issued by the Central bank. As to a [financial] institution. And [these 
requirements] affect all the rest of its activity (from an interview with S, an 
official from a Russian legislative authority).         
 
Such regulatory ambiguity, or ‘the absence of an authority that could be a propulsive 
force in [derivatives] law-making’ (MC interview), was not conducive to what 
participants viewed as a successful response to an array of the market’s problems, with 
the enforceability of cash-settled derivatives being the first priority on the list. 
Moreover, the regulatory uncertainty was circumstantiated by the discord, ‘[the] tag-of-
war and continual disagreement among the authorities resulted in the situation where it 
was practically impossible to get any change approved’ (R interview). The most intense 
                                                
6 See Chapter 5 of the theses. 
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competition was the one between the Bank of Russia and the Federal Securities Market 
Commission, subsequently the Federal Financial Markets Service: 
 
[The regulation] which takes place in the derivatives market one cannot call the 
regulation, despite the effective federal law of 199[3] ‘On the Stock-Exchange 
and Exchange-Based Trading’ and the FSMC Statues […]. Moreover, the 
individual regulatory standards, specifically on the procedure of cash payments, 
accounting, risk management in banks, has been issued and keep issuing the 
Bank of Russia. The specified statues contradict each other, even in their 
definitions and terms related to this most complex financial market. […] To this 
day the derivatives market is ‘an apple of discord’ among some authorities and 
the Bank of Russia (Pleskachevsky 2003).   
 
The existing inconsistency in regulation of the derivatives market with a reference to the 
clash of interests of the Bank of Russia and FSMC-FFMS was confirmed by market 
participants, who claim that the point of the regulators’ debates is ‘significant 
differences in circulation of [derivatives] underlying assets, such as, for instance, 
currencies, securities, commodities’ (Smirnova 2004: 25): 
 
X. The [derivatives] market consists of three components. The commodity, 
money and securities [markets]. Right? [According to] underlying assets. Well, 
that is it. Consequently, we end up with three regulators. […] These are the 
Central Bank, the FFMS and […] the FAS [the Federal Antimonopoly Service7] 
(from interview with X, a head of a legal department in a Moscow branch of a 
large European bank).  
 
Z, a lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, 
protection, and control of securities market participants, and who was a direct participant 
in the debates of the regulators, reflects: 
                                                
7 The FAS ‘considered itself as a regulator of the derivatives market’ (M interview), or at least the 
commodity derivatives’ regulator (X interview), due to the fact that it is a successor of State Committee of 
the Russian Federation for Anti-Monopoly Policies and the Support of New Economic Structures. 
Established in 1990, among other responsibilities it aimed at enforcement of the 1991 Federal Law ‘On 
Competition, and Restrictions of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets’ 
(http://fas.gov.ru/english/structure/452.shtml, accessed August 20, 2008). However, ‘it was in a state of 
disaster and had been so for a long time. […] It was incapable [of regulation] and in fact did not have any 
regulatory power, neither monitoring nor law-making; [it also] did not have a wish to deal with this 
[regulation]’ (Z interview).    
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S.M. It would seem to be the case that in order to set up a robust regulatory 
framework for the derivatives market, law-makers should give a clear outline of 
spheres of responsibilities for each regulator, yet it has been a difficult task so 
far…   
Z. That is exactly what was happening. [Normally it would] end up [with the 
question]: ‘And who will be dealing with weather futures?’ [ironically]. And this 
discussion embrangles everyone, because the idea of the Meteorological Office 
being a regulator makes everyone laugh. Of course… From the one hand the 
foreign exchange derivatives market is linked tightly to the spot market, but from 
the other hand participants in the derivatives market usually form an autonomous 
group. […] On top of everything else there was indeed a strife between the 
Central Bank, the FSMC […], and, over the long term, the Ministry of Economy 
[the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation], which 
hoped to get regulation of all exchange-based activity, as a whole, under its 
jurisdiction (Z interview).       
 
Eventually, as a result of the administrative reform of 2004 and formation of the Federal 
Financial Market Service with law-making power, the Ministry for Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation could not claim to be a chief regulator for 
exchanges, since the reform set up the division of labour between the Ministries 
responsible for policies’ development, and the Services which are in charge of 
monitoring and supervising. However, as a policy developer and a law maker, in 2007 
the Ministry for Economic Development produced the Law ‘On Exchanges and 
Exchange-Based Trade’, where ‘as the single regulator of exchanges the law suggest[ed] 
the FFMS’ (Granik and Asker-Zade 2007). Furthermore, the Ministry also wanted to 
amend the Law ‘On Currency Regulation and Currency Control’ in such a way that the 
FFMS was to get ‘a control over the exchange-based and trading systems-based foreign 
exchange trade’; however, the Government considered such move as ‘unreasonable’ 
(Granik 2007). Here is U, an official from the Ministry for Economic Development who 
anticipated such an outcome: 
 
U. There is an ongoing regulatory war […]. [According to the produced law 
draft,] derivatives, all of them, with any underlying asset [are supposed to be 
under] FFMS regulation. […] But unfortunately, I think, that the question about 
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foreign exchange derivatives… Well, […] the Central Bank does not welcome 
our innovations (U interview).    
 
Those who were involved in the debates sided with either the Central Bank, or the 
Federal Financial Markets Service. J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian 
authorities, reasons: 
 
J. [Vyugin, the Head of FFMS in 2004-2007] he finds himself in a very, I think, 
unpleasant situation in the sense that… […] Well, banks constitute 90 per cent of 
Russian financial market. These are companies controlled by [the] CB [Central 
Bank]. All that given to Vyugin is securities law-making. He does not even have 
experts [in banking]. […] These are banks [to deal with], this is a completely 
different type of expertise. […] All the [legal] documents written by FFMS, in 
my expert opinion, are skewed. […] ‘We don’t care about banks; our concern is 
asset management companies, investment funds, and […] brokers and 
exchanges.’ [They never ask] what sort of challenges banks face, what our vision 
of the interbank market’s development is. [FFMS] wrote [the document on] the 
financial sector’s development strategy where [they] said not a word on banks. 
As if, ‘There is the banking sector’s development strategy - let [the] Bank [of 
Russia] deal with it. As for us, we deal with everything else.’ (J interview). 
 
However, the position of the Federal Financial Markets Service was based on the 
assumption stated by T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators:  
 
T. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to regulate this [derivatives] market outside 
the exchange-based market. It is the truth. Hence the question who is going to 
regulate the exchange-based derivatives market.  And this is a question about the 
trade organisers. [The question is] Who ratifies rules? This is it, really (T 
interview).     
 
Z, a lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, 
protection, and control of securities market participants, elaborates: 
 
Z. […] in which sense FFMS… FSMC, to be precise, had been in comfortable 
position? Its regulation [responsibilities] was most perfect [elaborated] at that 
moment [when the discussion was at its highest point, in 2003-2004]. Because by 
the [1996 Federal] Law ‘On the Securities Market’ the ‘derivative’ term was 
defined and classified as… if its underlying assets were securities or indices, as 
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stock-exchange [instrument]. [Thus] it was clear whose jurisdiction it is. […] 
[And there was] the Central Bank, which deliberately had been creating a 
situation with the currency regulation in such a way that to make the regulation 
of the currency exchanges as unclear as possible, with the intent to keep this 
regulation under the Central Bank’s jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the Central 
Bank had been offered… a way… to set up a clear regulation of an activity on 
currency exchanges in the Law ‘On Currency Regulation and Currency Control’. 
The Central bank took a different road for the purpose of securing [its] monopoly 
in MICEX [Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange] (Z interview, emphasis 
added).  
 
Seemingly, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange appeared to be an object of 
particular discord between the Bank of Russia and the Federal Financial Markets 
Services. Take, for example, the most recent incident. In April 2007 the Head of FFMS 
Vladimir Milovidov was to present a report on the securities market’s development as a 
part of the project on establishment of a legal and infrastructural framework aiming at 
the fully fledged financial market in Russia. Notably, one of the initiatives put forward 
by FFMS was ‘consolidation […] of the financial infrastructure’ or, to put it simply, 
merger of MICEX and the Russian Trading System (RTS) exchanges (Gubeydullina et 
al. 2008). The report was to be presented to the Government session.  However, it was 
removed from the agenda of the session due to ‘various disagreements’: 
 
‘The task to create a competitive financial centre cannot be tackled by means of 
development of nothing else but the securities market’, writes the Deputy Head 
of the CB [Central Bank] Alexei Ulyukaev. He also sees as disputable the idea of 
merging MICEX […] and RTS as suggested by FFMS, thus CB cannot ratify the 
project […] (Gubeydullina et al. 2008a).  
 
The reason the Bank of Russia resisted the merge is its 29.8 per cent shareholding in 
MICEX8. The Central Bank also owns 39.3 per cent of the non-profit partnership 
‘National Depositary Centre’ that is a settlement and depository centre for Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (Baraulina 2008)9. Consequently, the Central Bank’s 
                                                
8 http://www.micex.ru/group/profile/structure, accessed August 22, 2008.  
9 However, it would seem that the Central Bank’s shareholding in the National Depositary Centre comes 
to its end. In 2006 The Prosecutor-General's Office of the Russian Federation considered such ownership 
as violation of the 1990 Law ‘On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)’, which 
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determination to ‘secure [its] monopoly in MICEX’ (Z interview) was and still is in 
contradiction with the Federal Financial Markets Service’s ambition for a single 
regulator of the exchange-based derivatives trade.      
      
To conclude, the Russian derivatives market, and its exchange-based segment in 
particular, is a zone of regulatory ambiguity. It is a sphere of regulation of two 
authorities: the Central Bank of Russia which is eager to keep the major currency 
exchange under control, and the Federal Financial Markets Service which is intent to 
become the one and only regulator for exchange-based financial activity.  Given that 
these regulators are the authorities both committed to smooth functioning of the 
derivatives market, such conflict of interests would seem to be a ‘turf battle’ that 
affected the fulfilment of their responsibilities, namely initiation and construction of  a 
robust regulatory framework for the derivatives market. The next two Sections of this 
Chapter will discuss the attempts of the regulators to establish such framework 
nevertheless and the outcome of this endeavour.  
                                                                                                                                           
prohibit the Central bank’s shareholding in commercial and non-profit organisations if such participation 
does not aim at facilitating the Bank’s main duty as a monetary authority (Gubeidullina and Kudinov 
2007). As a result, it is assumed the Central Bank will withdraw from the partnership in 2009 (Baraulina 
2008).       
 
b. The Law on Derivatives: The Double Challenge 
of Defining the Regulators and a Derivative  
 
The year of 2002 was marked by two notable developments: the verdict of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on cash-settled forwards, and the 
approval of Sergei Ignatiev as the new Chairman of the Central Bank by the State Duma 
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Both events were consequential to 
the Russian derivatives market.  The Constitutional Court conclusively clarified the 
judicial authorities’ position on the contracts at the same time stating the necessity for 
the development of regulatory infrastructure for the derivatives market; whereas the 
change of power in the Bank of Russia resulted in a different attitude toward derivatives: 
 
The atmosphere has changed. Since the new management took over at the 
Central bank, we hear them talking about using derivatives themselves for 
currency regulation. This was unimaginable a couple of years ago (Victor 
Pleskachevsky, chairman of the parliamentary committee on property, quoted by 
Pirani 2003).  
 
This change in the atmosphere triggered stormy discussions on the way the regulatory 
framework should be constructed. The debates could be narrowed down to two concepts 
suggesting how to repair the lack of legal clarity for the derivatives market.  
 
The first was an approach that favoured the so called ‘smart regulation’, that is putting 
together ‘a series of normative prescriptions that purport to specify the conditions in 
which particular regulatory tools are likely to achieve behavioural change most 
effectively and efficiently’ (Morgan and Yeung 2007: 124). In the context of 
establishing derivatives regulation in Russia, this meant a necessity to amend the law 
that had been applied to cash-settled forward contracts, namely 1062 Article of the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation.  Advocates of such approach also suggested reconciling 
the amendment with other laws that in some way or another could be pertinent to 
regulation of various aspects of derivatives trade, for instance the Federal Laws ‘On the 
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Securities Market’ and ‘On Banks and Banking’ were proposed  to be adjusted 
(Tarachev 2003a). To enforce the suggested amendments Vladimir Tarachev, a member 
of the parliamentary committee on credit organisations and financial markets, presented 
a legislative draft to the Russian parliament - the State Duma of the Russian Federation. 
He did it more than once, in 2002 and 2003 (Tarachev et al. 2002; Tarachev 2003, 
2003a), but all these attempts were rejected by the Ministry of Finance and the Legal 
Department of the Duma. J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian authorities, 
explains why:  
 
J. […] In 2003, when the previous legislature of [the State] Duma was finishing 
its term [the term of 2000-2003], […] Minfin [the Ministry of Finance] took a 
political decision to reject all legislative drafts presented at that time by […] 
Tarachev, [those] concerning 1062 Article’s [of the Civil Code] amendments. 
[…] By taking such decision it [the Ministry of Finance] wiped the slate clean 
for new Duma [to start working again on derivatives legislation]. […] [The 
reason for not supporting the Civil Code amendment is that] there had been a sort 
of soreness of the mouth [since 1998 and the reference to 1062 Article of the 
Civil Code]. […] The shortest and most effective way1 appeared to be associated 
with some sort of serious moral damage, because it had such strange overtone of 
[the events of 19]98. […] It is this [soreness] that had been nudging to … that 
next, logically, was a full-scale law on derivatives, [so that] to forget the 
‘gambling’ (J interview).  
 
‘The full-scale law on derivatives’, or the ‘legislative regulation’ concept (Selivanovsky 
2005a), was indeed the second approach to derivatives regulation the market participants 
hoped for.  Those who advocated this approach believed that a law on derivatives, as a 
code of practice that defines a derivative and ‘specifically describes [various] types of 
[derivatives] instruments’ (Pleskachevsky 2008) is indispensable to the market: 
 
T. Basically, the law on derivatives […] had always been in the air. It was 
widely understood that [the derivatives market] needs to be regulated in some 
way or other; the problem [the lack of regulation] needs to be solved (From an 
interview with T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators).        
                                                
1 I is an advocate of the ‘smart regulation’ approach, therefore it is his strong belief that an amendment to 
Article 1062 of Russian Civil Code is the ‘shortest and most effective way’ to give the green light to cash-
settled derivatives in Russia (J interview).  
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With the objective of making such law, in 2003 ‘two parliamentary committees, 
covering property and credit organisations and financial markets, […] formed a working 
group with Russian banks including Alfa, Zenit and Trust & Investment, to consult on 
the law. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was retained as consultant and helped produce 
a draft’ (Pirani 2003). Those who did not support this way of making cash-settled 
derivatives legally enforceable commented ironically:   
       
J. […] they were at the start [of drafting the law] and raised […] money […] to 
draft the law on derivatives based on a very clear and simple logic: ‘Guys, […] 
do you want to start up a derivatives market? That means it needs to be 
regulated. Do we have a law on derivatives? No, we don’t have the law. Let’s 
make the law, let’s make the high-quality law, [which means] to copy everything 
from the American [derivatives] market. […] And indeed there were … very 
powerful banks [participating in the working group] and Pricewaterhouse 
[Coopers] contracted to do this’ (J interview). 
 
The law on derivatives aimed at meeting a great challenge of defining. It had to define 
two things: what a derivative is, and what the regulatory domains and their regulators 
are. The first purpose, to define a derivative, was seen as of primary importance: 
 
W. After all, the main issue that should have been settled by the law is a 
construct of a derivative. This is […] the first question to be resolved. What is 
actually a derivative (An interview with W, a financial lawyer with one of the 
Russian financial regulators)? 
 
Proceeding from this primary task, the specific job was to introduce, legally, a complex 
terminology of derivatives trade: 
 
AC. Right from the start this project took a ‘let’s describe everything’ tack. 
‘Let’s describe all the [derivative] instruments, name all of them, to the 
maximum, and tell how they circulate’. [However] not a single legislation in the 
world took such tack. (From an interview with AC, a lawyer with various 
investment companies in Russia). 
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The ‘driving force’ of the project (Z interview), those who ‘had been grinding out this 
concept for ten years, really’ and ‘wanted to dip into the future and to build up 
something robust, [a legal basis for derivatives] that would last for decades, at least’ (S 
interview), agree on the fact that the task ‘to describe everything’ by listing and 
specifying all derivatives was unachievable:  
 
S.  We tried to make [derivatives regulated by the law through] specification of 
all possible derivatives. But in this case the problem is … we are aware that the 
[derivative] contracts multiply. A month never passes without a new […] 
contract’s appearing. The market does not keep pace with it, much less law-
makers, given that every new derivative has to be put in to the law. As a 
consequence, this way did not answer the purpose. [Eventually our] idea was that 
essentially any contract, I emphasise, any contract that is based on probabilities 
we considered as a derivative, provided that […] it had been legitimised by those 
dealing with derivatives on exchanges […]. And over-the-counter [derivatives] 
had been accepted by the Association [of Russian Banks]. […] M [names another 
expert] and I, we used to wrangle [about it]. He used to say, ‘Suppose we could 
make a [derivative] contract on how my datcha’s [summer cottage] weathercock 
moves?’ ‘Yes’, we would answer, ‘but on one condition: if this contract had been 
accepted by an exchange, if it is interesting to trade’ (From an interview with S, 
an official from a Russian legislative authority).       
 
If ‘any contract that is based on probabilities’ is a derivative, how does this approach 
make the derivative, the cash-settled derivative in particular, legally enforceable? S 
reasons: 
 
S. In our construct we did not use the word ‘betting’ whatsoever. […] We 
situated these contracts in such way that this part [deliverable contracts] clearly 
fell within the scope of  a ‘standard contract’ term, thus under court protection. 
[…] [Another] part of these contracts, over-the-counter and tailor-made, which 
was to be legitimised, let us say, by Russian [version of] ISDA [International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association], an association of participants, also fell 
within the scope of the respective regulation. Under the responsibility of the 
association itself, at least. You know how self-regulation works, right? […] 
Every member has to follow the established rules of an association. If he did not 
follow, all of you [other members of the association] would hold responsible [for 
this]. You know, a guaranteed performance of obligations approach. […] This 
increases responsibility of the participants drastically. Hence [it] creates the 
guaranteed performance which […] is the court-protection in the sense that it 
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will be compensated. It may not be 100 per cent of your losses [that are 
compensated] […] but, at any rate, mopping up the market [the unscrupulous 
dealers] starts here and now. The main thing here is not the compensation as 
such, […] but the fact that a mechanism of […] punishment and responsibility 
starts working (S interview).  
 
The goal for the law was set very broadly and market participants involved in its drafting 
stated it was rather ‘unmanageable’ (AC interview), therefore ‘in terms of legal 
technicalities the result was bad’ (X interview): 
 
T. That proposed law was expressly impassable [through other legislative 
authority and executive bodies]. […] It was simply impassable. Neither as a legal 
text… […] He [S, the interviewee quoted above, who is widely viewed as 
driving force of the law draft] had been doing this for two years. And here was 
the [unsatisfactory] result. […] S is very creative; he is a wise head, but… 
unfortunately… Writing of legal texts is a very specific thing. And they [laws] 
are written in a quiet room, not […] by twenty people. Which is to say [there 
should be] a maximum of two or three people [writing a law], even so there 
should be just one person sitting in front of a computer [typing the text], who 
controls the entire text. […] [Therefore] There was a big problem with the text, 
from a legal point of view.  
S.M. Was this law written in economic terms? 
T. Yes. But I am afraid it is not possible to write it in legal terms… […] Try to 
find a law where it’s all written [defined]. [All the existing laws] are written in 
abstract terms. Or by recapitulation. In many jurisdictions. ‘This, this, this and 
also any aggregate of this, this and this’. Nobody writes [the law] otherwise. As 
for us [law-makers in Russian legal system], if we are to write the law, it needs 
to be written: ‘a swap is this and this’… 
S.M. That is it needs to be defined at first…  
T. …Moreover, it is required to be defined in [already existing] civil law terms 
(From an interview with T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial 
regulators, who is known as an author of the wording of several statutes).      
 
Here it should be noted that the necessity of defining financial constructs in civil law 
terms, pointed out by T, is caused by the fact that the Russian legal system belongs to 
the civil law tradition. As opposite to the common law tradition that is viewed as ‘case-
oriented approach to legal thinking’, the civil law tradition based on the idea of 
coherency of law: it is ‘important that the law be presented in statutory form as a 
coherent whole’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 2). Such coherence cannot be maintained without 
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consistency and uniformity of legal terms used throughout a body of law - in already 
existing and new statutes.   
 
The second objective the law aimed at, or the challenge it faced, was how to regulate the 
market: 
 
W. The major challenge is separation of the authorities’ power, [i.e.] who will be 
regulating what (An interview with W, a financial lawyer with one of the 
Russian financial regulators). 
 
Those designing the law advocated a functional approach to regulation of the market, 
wherein ‘specialist regulators focus on the type of business undertaken irrespective of 
which institutions are involved in that business […] [so that these] individual institutions 
might then be subject to several regulatory agencies’ (Dale and Wolf 1998: 336). Such 
regulation with no regard to a certain administrative body, they claimed, will help to 
reconcile the authorities: 
 
S. […] at that time we were having heated discussions with the Central Bank and 
FSMC [Federal Securities Market Commission] with respect to whether to 
regulate depending on … an underlying asset or regardless [of it]. […] [What] 
we maintained [was to regulate] categorically regardless [of an underlying asset]. 
[According to] a universalistic approach. What matter [what the underlying asset 
is]? I trade a new contract and I do not care what it derived from. […] Since it is 
a derivative, it is a derivative. It has no connection with [its] underlying. Whether 
it is a security, oil or grain. […] Therefore [we argued for] the law on derivatives 
that would have described all the over-the-counter market participants’ 
association. And their [trading] recommendations. […] And alongside this [law] 
the law on exchanges and exchange-based trade that would have set out rules of 
an exchange where it did not matter what to trade, [however] it was crucial to 
specify what a broker is, what exchange rules are […]. Besides, [by the law on 
exchanges and exchange-based trade we wanted] to establishes the following: if 
some sort of an underlying asset was under special regulation, such as currency 
and precious metals, then details [of regulation] were set out through a special 
code of practice. […] You know, this problem [of discord among the regulators] 
exists indeed. But. In the model we suggested there would not have been much 
of [derivatives trade] in need of regulation left. Because the name of the game 
was self-regulation. […] Our model was as follows. An exchange, its general 
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rules were under control of the FFMS [FSMC]. Securities exchanges [were under 
control of] FFMS too; whereas currency exchanges […] got additional 
requirements from the Central Bank, due to specific regulation for currency trade 
set out by the Central Bank. [It would have been] so called a classic functional 
[approach to] regulation. Not institutional but functional (S interview).  
 
However, the discord between the financial regulators, namely the Bank of Russia and 
the Federal Securities Market Commission, could not be settled in such a way. Market 
participants argued that the functional approach, which was claimed to be adopted in the 
legislative draft, did not help to resolve the ‘turf wars’ between regulators. Instead, the 
proposed law turned out to be ‘a law with no regulation’ (Z interview) given that it did 
not specifically prescribe the regulatory domains (over-the-counter and exchange-based 
derivatives trade) to jurisdictions of the certain authorities (the Central Bank and 
FSMC): 
 
Z. To all intents and purposes it was a law of definitions. […] Because there was 
no information on what needed to be regulated as such. […] We [at FSMC] 
argued that it was exchange-traded [financial] instruments that needed to be 
regulated […]; over-the-counter instruments required no regulation but 
accounting, [and] risk control. They all were subject to self-regulation for that 
matter.  In no circumstances [a regulator] should have intervened in these 
processes. Thus [there was] just one domain in need of regulation by the state – 
[which is the] exchanges. That is why the proposed law was doomed to be just 
definitive in regard to over-the-counter instruments. When it came to it [setting 
out regulation for over-the-counter trade they] failed to write anything. Because 
what would you write about forwards after all? […] There is nothing to write. 
This is a great legal problem (from an interview with Z, a lawyer whose current 
professional activity is concerned with coordination, protection, and control of 
securities market participants, emphasis added).   
 
By insisting to leave over-the-counter derivatives out of external regulation, the Federal 
Securities Market Commission laid claim to being the only regulator on the market, 
given that the authority had been officially in charge of all Russian stock-exchanges 
since 1993. No matter how strongly FSMC felt about imposing regulation on nothing 
else but exchange-based derivatives trade, the Bank of Russia nevertheless viewed the 
law as an opportunity to broaden its regulatory power in the market:      
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J. In terms of state authorities the Central Bank was perhaps one of the main 
patrons of the […] law; in such way [having the law in place] it would have been 
easier for them to place all their [Central Bank’s] regulations in to [the law] and 
regulate banks with the all-embracing law (J interview). 
 
S, a law-maker committed to producing the legislative draft, confirms: 
 
S. […] The Central Bank had been financing this process [of drafting the law]. 
[Thus] there was a good team of market participants in partnership with the 
Central Bank (S interview).     
 
Being a direct participant in drafting a law on derivatives, the Central Bank pursued its 
own purposes. Since over-the-counter derivatives trade could not be regulated directly 
by the Bank, it did not wish to leave exchange-based trade under a regulatory monopoly 
of the Federal Securities Market Commission, therefore the Central Bank attempted to 
promote banks’ ability to trade actively all types of derivatives on exchanges, with no 
licence but under the Central Bank’s regulation. The Federal Securities Market 
Commission did not welcome such initiative: 
 
T.  The conflict, actually, was based on the fact that, roughly speaking, the 
Central Bank wanted to have it its own way […]. They just wanted to split… 
There was that law ‘On Exchanges and Exchange-Based Trade’, more precisely 
‘On Exchanges’… They [the laws ‘On Derivatives’ and ‘On Exchanges’] were in 
conjunction [with each other]. They were in a single package. […][And there 
were] the Central Bank’s claims to regulate derivatives and to [allow] banks 
trading all derivatives, not just currency [derivatives]. Notably, without a licence 
(From an interview with T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial 
regulators).   
 
Market participants who at that time were directly involved in or followed the debates, 
sums up:      
   
Z. These legislative drafts were also used to redistribute the regulators’ scopes of 
authority in order to get relevant [to regulators] markets under their jurisdictions. 
Hence if [we were] to give details [of how the derivatives legal framework had 
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been developing], then naturally it had been a fight between the authorities (Z, a 
lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, 
protection, and control of securities market participants).  
 
W. It is hard to claim who exactly torpedoed the law draft, but it is definitely the 
case that the failure in identifying regulator[s], or the difficulty in this matter, 
was the main problem [that caused the draft’s deficiency] (From an interview 
with W, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators).         
 
To summarise, market participants were at one in thinking that  although the working 
group tried hard, it did not succeed; the attempt to propose the all-embracing law on 
derivatives had failed: ‘it solved perhaps ten problems yet created another hundred’ (X 
interview), ‘it resulted in the law draft which lawyers could not understand’ (Q 
interview): 
 
Z. Essentially, the draft failed.  Frankly speaking, it seemed it could never turn 
out well; I have to say that as a legal practitioner. It had not being coming off 
well because the definitions of derivatives were disputable, individually and in 
combination (From an interview with Z, a securities market legal expert).     
 
Even those who were involved in the writing, in their commenting on the law draft 
produced by the group, were critical in their assessment, stating that it failed to answer 
the challenge of setting up terminology for derivatives trading: 
 
AC. As it stood, the draft could not become the law. That is why, frankly, having 
been [S’s] assistant for many years, [and] an expert on this market, I can honestly 
say that having read ten pages I was all in a tangle about what had been written. I 
had lost the narrative thread, stopped comprehending it in general. How to say 
this? It [the text] was mind-bending and complex, and had nothing to do with our 
[Russian] economic reality. […] It turned out that in our attempt to produce the 
law on derivative we had to cover this vast…this immense field [of derivatives 
terms], to gather lots and lots of terminology. Why did the law appear to be so 
kind of nonsensical? This attempt to assemble [all derivatives terms], it produced 
such a peculiar result. It came out as a sort of a patchwork (AC, a lawyer with 
various investment companies in Russia who participated in drafting of the law).   
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Also evident was the fact that those who worked together on the draft perhaps agreed on 
certain aspects, but were at odds over another. Here is A, a financial lawyer with various 
legal and audit firms in Russia who participated in producing the draft, and who contests 
the idea of adopting a functional approach to regulation: 
 
A. I think [for the law to be effective] it is essential to work [on it] very 
thoughtfully and articulate [what a derivative is] not by listing all types of 
derivatives […], because you and I understand that [a derivative] is an obligation 
that depends on an underlying, or [more likely] on performance of an underlying. 
Since in actual fact we may as well have a situation where we have performance 
[of an underlying], but not the underlying itself, [for instance] a weather 
derivative. […] But apart from everything else it is essential to regulate those 
who undertake such obligation. Because, again, we do not want to regulate 
something just for fun, we have to pursue an objective. Just out of common 
sense. If we say that these transactions are very risky, then there is a party which 
may default. […] [Hence we have to regulate] participants, or parties of these 
contracts and in so doing we can specify jurisdictions for those already existing 
authorities (A interview).           
 
When I asked my interviewee AC, a lawyer with various investment companies in 
Russia who participated actively in drafting the law, why by 2004 the working group 
seemed to stop working on the draft, thus abandoning all attempts to accomplish the task 
of producing derivatives legislation, the answer was: 
 
AC. [You asking about] further elaboration of this law … Well, there was no a 
political will to do this, [there] was no money to do this, right?  
S.M. [Money] to hire more experts? 
AC. Well, actually not even to hire [more] experts, but as simple as to pay those 
who were ready to do this [to keep working on the law draft]. [Because] those 
who were able to write [the text] at a high level of excellence were not prepared 
to work for $5000 a year. Small wonder [ironically]. [To accomplish the task] 
there should have been a pool of money, a pool of participants, a pool of those 
who wanted to produce this law, and therefore a group of experts which would 
have sat down and ‘tune’ it up. It did not happen. In other words the market gave 
it no encouragement. For the reason that … it was not prepared to make such 
decisions. Consequently, the law hung in air, no other [law draft] appeared (AC 
interview).                     
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Being equally unsuccessful in defining a derivative and its existing varieties in legal 
terms and specifying clearly the regulatory jurisdictions, the law draft brought all 
attempts at progress in derivatives legislation to a standstill. But not for long. The failed 
attempts to produce a conceptual law on derivatives inclined some to think that 
‘unfortunately, it is very difficult [to create such law because] the [derivatives] market is 
so versatile, and it is so variform, and at the moment so innovative, that it is rather hard 
to spell out everything in a law’ (From an interview with X, a head of a legal department 
in a Moscow branch of a large European bank). Hence the time had come when the 
question arose of whether to get back to the ‘smart regulation’ approach. The final 
Section of the Chapter is going to deal with further developments that resulted in the 
amendment of Article 1062 of Russian Civil Code.  
 
c. ‘It Gets Through By Bits and Pieces’: Changing 
the Statutory Law 
 
On August 10, 2005, the Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow District once again 
dismissed a claim over unsettled non-deliverable forward contracts, this time a contract 
entered into by Alfa Bank and Sodbiznesbank. However, unlike all previous court 
verdicts which declared cash-settled forwards unenforceable under Russian law, this 
dismissal was accompanied by a ‘surprising ruling’: 
 
The court held that the unenforceability of betting transaction results not just in 
dismissal of a claim over such [cash-settled forward] transactions, but in 
dismissal of legal action [i.e. such claims cannot be even taken to courts]. This 
ruling sharpened the problem of [un]enforceability of derivative transactions the 
legislators have been unsuccessfully trying to solve for over two years now 
(Pleshanova 2005).      
 
Such an aggravation of the situation happened amid administrative reforms started in 
2004. Section A of this Chapter discussed the way the Federal Securities Market 
Commission (FSMC) was transformed into the Federal Financial Markets Service 
(FFMS). The reorganisation resulted in new regulatory priorities and change of 
leadership: Oleg Vyugin was dislodged from the position as First Deputy Chairman of 
the Bank of Russia and put in charge of the FFMS; furthermore, the government just 
approved a new strategy called the Programme for the Social and Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation in the mid-term of 2005-2008 and Vyugin  was 
instructed to carry out activities associated with the Programme in respect to the 
financial markets: 
 
J. And now [given that the Central Bank was a direct participant in drafting a 
derivatives law and Oleg Vyugin used to be a Central bank official] this idea of a 
conceptual law on derivatives moved to FFMS. […] He [Vyugin] came [in to 
FFMS], he was just appointed [as a head of FFMS, alongside with the fact that] 
the Government set the Programme [for the Social and Economic Development 
of the Russian Federation for 2005-2008] […]. So he came in […], he was not a 
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lawyer, and what is more he was […] an English speaking person, it was easier 
for him to operate in these categories [of a market based  on common law 
tradition] (From an interview with J, a financial law expert with one of the 
Russian authorities). 
 
X, a head of a legal department in a Moscow branch of a large European bank and a 
participant in the legal debates on the ways the derivatives market should develop, 
continues:     
 
X. […] Vyugin set his experts [at FFMS] a task […] to develop a draft of a law 
on derivatives. To incorporate what had been done by Pl. […] Clearly, it required 
removing all husk from there [and] improving legal technicalities […]. It ended 
in talk, because it was [a] complicated task to write a law on derivatives (X 
interview).     
 
Those who were given such a task reflect on the complexity of it:    
 
T. […] To write [a law on derivatives]… Just to sit down and write [a law is 
going to result in situation that] nobody will accept it as it is. Because it is [an] 
impossible [task]. It [derivatives regulation] gets through by bits and pieces: a bit 
in here, a piece in there. Then, slowly, the jigsaw puzzle takes its shape. Right? 
Whereas [to produce] a one whole law is not feasible, unfortunately (From an 
interview with T, a financial lawyer with a Russian financial regulator who is 
known as an author of several financial statutes and who actively participated in 
development of the regulatory framework for derivatives, emphasis added). 
 
Such acknowledgement triggered a change in the focus of attention and, consequently, 
led to experts’ efforts shifting from the all-embracing conceptual law on derivatives 
back to the so called ‘smart regulation’. It should be recalled that this approach to 
regulation of derivatives calls for various changes in already existing laws (including 
Russian Civil Code) and numerous attempts to produce it had been made by a member 
of the Parliament (the State Duma of the Russian Federation) Vladimir Tarachev1. 
Advocates of such regulation comment on the further development at the Federal 
Financial Markets Service back in 2005: 
                                                
1 See the previous Section of this Chapter.  
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X. […] They [the experts at FFMS] realised that [it is] more rational… After all, 
the market is rational, you see? So the legislation should be rational too. [It was] 
more rational not to develop this all-embracing law which will require ten more 
years of work, virtually… (X interview).       
 
M, an official from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, continues: 
 
M. Vyugin fell under the influence of the experts who suggested ‘smart 
regulation’. Afterwards there were just experts’ ambitions. They are lawyers 
after all. You know, two lawyers produce four opinions; three lawyers produce a 
constitutional convention (laughing) (M interview).  
 
Indeed, it would seem to be the case that despite having agreed on the fact that it was not 
feasible to develop a coherent conceptual law on derivatives, the legal experts still were 
not unanimous on how to proceed further: 
  
AC. [There was an idea that sounded as] ‘let’s make [cash-settled derivatives 
court] protected – it will instantly liven up the market’. Overall the idea sounded 
right. While there was no [court] protection [for cash-settled derivatives] 
foreigners considered this market as a market with high risk, [so] let’s make 
[derivatives] court-protected. [As a result] this problem will be dismissed. That is 
how it sounded. At the beginning. Then the question of how to make 
[derivatives] court-protected came up. […] There was very little agreement about 
what to do. However, FFMS understood the following: if they were to write [a 
legal text on derivatives], there should be someone who will write it. [But in 
FFMS] there was neither [enough] experts, nor time [for this]. [They thought] 
‘Let’s come up with something [doable]’ and this most simple idea appeared: 
‘Let’s make an amendment to Article 1062 [of Russian Civil Code]’ (From an 
interview with AC, a lawyer with various investment companies in Russia who at 
that time actively participated in the debates).   
 
One of the experts, struggling with the task, reasons:  
 
T. Everybody could see that it was necessary to regulate [the derivatives market], 
to solve the problem one way or another. Next came the understanding that it 
needed to take a small step and [the step] was to make an amendment to [Article] 
1062 so that [cash-settled derivative] transactions […] would be court protected 
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(From an interview with T, a financial lawyer with a Russian financial regulator 
who is known as an author of several financial statutes and who actively 
participated in development of the regulatory framework for derivatives).      
 
As was noted in Section B of this Chapter, the suggestion to amend the existing law, 
namely Article1062 of the Civil Code, had been put forward by Tarachev due to the fact 
that this Article had had been previously applied to cash-settled derivatives by Russian 
courts in their rulings on unenforceability of such contracts. However, there was further 
reasoning for amending Article 1062 of the Civil Code. It referred to the so called 
‘German way’ of developing a derivatives regulatory framework: 
 
J. For me, for example, [an initial familiarisation with the ways such framework 
was developed was] our work with German lawyers […]. When they had been 
coming to us [to Russia] every three month for two years and we had the 
opportunity to discuss all these [legal] technicalities of German derivatives 
market regulation directly with those who had been implementing it [in 
Germany]. […] And this [their way] bore so much resemblance to our Russian 
situation, Russian market. When I’d learnt it [the German way] in more detail, I 
had no doubts that our situation [was the same], from a legal point of view, in the 
way that we had the same mentality, the same way our market had internalised 
this financial innovation. I simply had no doubts on the fact that we had to do as 
the Germans did. […] [There was an opinion that] there was the most effective, 
developed American market [based on common] law, so let’s adapt, translate and 
plant it in to our soil […] and perhaps it will the best we have. Whereas the 
Germans and us… I was certain [of German way] based on my knowledge of 
German experience… I thought of this as of a sort of a German-American duel. 
They [those in favour of a conceptual law on derivatives] argued that the German 
[derivatives] market was ten times smaller than the American one […]. And yet 
it was hundred times bigger the Russian one. We wish we’d have such 
‘underdeveloped’ market (laughing)! (From an interview with J, a financial law 
expert with one of the Russian authorities). 
 
Z, a lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, 
protection, and control of securities market participants, but who is also known as an 
author of the amendment, confirms: 
 
Z. [To strike] a compromise [this was what] pushed us towards the German way. 
[Because] the German solutions were familiar to the authors of the [Russian] 
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Civil Code. That is why at some point we had to strike a compromise similar to 
the one the Germans had by that time. […] The Russian judicial system […] had 
not been able to deal with abstract terms. Besides, there were ambiguous 
definitions of gambling and betting [in the Civil Code]. To draw a line between 
an abstract notion of a derivative and the abstract of a bet, or more precisely the 
absence of it in [Russian] Civil Code, was not feasible to a Russian lawyer. No 
wonder in the USA they abandoned the idea to view the [cash-settled derivative] 
transactions as gambling as recent as in the [19]70s […]. The abstract definition 
of a derivative let Russian judicial bodies recognise cash-settled forwards as 
gambling. And we suggested not arguing with the Supreme Arbitration Court 
over the matter, but to […] claim that certain [derivative] transactions were 
court-protected. In this regard such an approach led to the amendment of 1062 
[Article of the Civil Code] (Z interview).  
 
So a decision on the further action was made and ‘then a long story of the text’s writing 
began’ (T interview): 
 
T. For some reason it is thought that it is very easy to write [redraft] a law. What 
is so difficult to write two-three lines! Every so often my bosses say to me 
‘Come on, T [names herself], could you do this quickly, it is just two lines [to 
write]!’ Well… It is hard to explain that if I am to write these two lines I have to 
read a lot, to look into a lot […] (From an interview with T, a financial lawyer 
with one of the Russian financial regulators, who is known as an author of 
several financial statutes and who actively participated in development of the 
regulatory framework for derivatives).     
 
However, eventually these lines were written and had to be approved by other ministries 
and authorities responsible for economic and financial policies. Oleg Vyugin, at that 
time a head of the Federal Financial Markets Service, did not view the necessity of such 
alignments as enhancing the effectiveness of the authority he was in charge of:       
  
FFMS is a small second tier authority in the system of state authorities. There is 
the omnipotent Minfin [The Ministry of Finance], there was and still is the 
Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation, there is a 
number of the powerful sectoral ministries. FFMS is a service with legislative 
power. Yet, to exercise this power it is required to get approval of all these 
almighty ministries, to whom these questions are minor, besides there is no 
necessary [for these specific issues] competence [at the ministries] (Vyugin 
2008).       
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Nevertheless, it needed to be done and ‘it took about eight months, may be longer; after 
that this text had to be approved by the Centre for Private Law [under the President of 
the Russian Federation]’ and the Council for the Codification and Improvement of the 
Civil Legislation under the President of the Russian Federation2 (T interview). These are 
authorities that provide legal expertise on the text. An official from the Federal Financial 
Markets Service explains:   
 
W. At the initial stage we are able to initiate anything in accordance with the 
[Russian] law. We can do this through the government; [through] members of the 
State Duma [on the FFMS initiative]. Eventually, however, there are a number of 
authorities that examine if the initiated draft is in accordance with the general 
principles of the law system, the Constitution and so on; whether it will blend in 
with the legal system or will not. […] They [the authorities] provide expertise on 
whether it is compatible with the [legislative] system, so the system will not 
produce a sort of mutants that by their basic construction are very similar to 
some already described legal concepts, but nevertheless the solutions suggested 
by the draft differ radically from the ones already existing in the legislation (W 
interview). 
 
The authorities providing legal expertise, the Council and the Centre, are very 
‘prominent organisations’ (K interview) composed of the Chairman of the Supreme 
Arbitration Court, authors of Russian Civil Code who are ‘truly smart, respected, 
qualified people – [Alexander] Makovsky for instance, or [Vasili] Vitryansky, and the 
others; however in some cases it is quite difficult to discuss new constructs that are 
originated in financial area with them’ (W interview). In fact, a few of my interviewees 
pointed out the following: 
 
R.  Frankly speaking, I think in Russia there is a problem of the existing divide 
between those who understand the subject area [of derivatives trading] and those 
who are active in different areas, such as lawyers […]. […] It’s just … I am 
familiar with the process [of amending Article 1062 of the Civil Code]. I mean, 
                                                
2 The Centre for Private Law is the Secretariat of the Council for the Codification and Improvement of the 
Civil Legislation under the President of the Russian Federation; it also provides organisational and 
information support for the Council (http://www.privlaw.h1.ru/statya_3.html, accessed March 10, 2007).  
180 
the geniuses of jurisprudence with three decades of experience were involved in 
the matter. Of course these word[s] ‘a derivative’ and ‘futures’ and the others 
were swearwords to them. There were their own constructs in their minds, which 
were ‘everything needed to be embedded [in to the legal constructs]’. It’s hard, 
therefore, to explain anything to them [regarding derivatives] (From an interview 
with R, an official from one of the Russian exchanges).         
 
J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian authorities, elaborates: 
 
J. In [Russian] legal community there is this very interesting schism. [There are] 
two worlds. You see, there are lawyers, successful guys, MGIMO [Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations] or MSU [Moscow State University] 
graduates, right? Usually they’re no older than thirty, with good English, they’ve 
managed to get trained at [law] offices in London, Europe, the US, some of them 
have got an MBA [degree]. They understand the legal aspects [of derivatives 
trading], the ways legal documents are composed, the ways the Western financial 
market works. They come [back] here [to Russia] and want to do something; 
they compose derivatives contracts for foreigners […]. They believe that 
everything… [They] grasp the ideology [of a financial market], [they think] it’s 
just needs to be fixed in Russian law. […] But the trick is that those who deal 
with [such] changes in legislation are a different group of lawyers. It’s 
understood that the pillars here [in the process of legislation altering] are the 
Presidential Administration, its experts, our Supreme Courts. […] And they are 
old-school Russian lawyers, authors of the Civil Code, normally fifty-seventy 
years old, who are specialists in a civil law of Soviet formation; who got their 
understanding of a civil law in the Soviet times, when there was not a civil law as 
such. […] Financial innovations of an Anglo-Saxon type are absolutely alien to 
them. […] And in this sense [they] are not prepared to modify the civil law. 
[They] take everything with a grain of salt. Add to this the beginning of [19]90s 
[events], perestroika: if you read [law] textbooks by our coryphaei in law, such 
as [Mikhail] Braginsky, [Vasili] Vitryansky, five volumes, any legal rules and 
norms are considered through the prism of some manipulations in there, some 
fraudulent abuse that took place at the beginning of [19]90s. And these two 
worlds [of lawyers], these as we say ‘fathers and sons’ do not intersect (J 
interview).                   
 
K, a leader of a self-regulatory association in Russian financial market, reflects on the 
standpoint of the Civil Code’s authors: 
 
K. Unfortunately, changes to Russian law are made with great difficulty, given 
that those ideas composing the Civil Code were originally general legal 
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principles. And [at the outset] nobody would have thought of placing a potential 
for regulation of a [future] financial market in to Russian law. […] It means any 
changes […] that require revision of the Civil Code, its Articles, they take years 
(K interview).  
 
‘Making changes to the Civil Code’, says M, ‘is one of the most difficult matters in 
terms of its approval’. He continues: 
 
M. [In Russia] it’s feasible to make an independent law, from scratch. And if you 
know the procedure it is enough for [it to be approved and enacted]. It is much 
more difficult to alter a comma in the Civil Code. It is a different procedure. […] 
Without an approval of the so called codifiers no changes to the Civil Code are 
made. There should be their approving resolution. So there’re these codifiers, 
these authors of the Civil Code, for whom the Civil Code is their own flesh and 
blood and [to whom] any intervention [into it] is painful to perceive. Therefore, 
[you] may have noted that amendments [to the Civil Code] are very rare. […] 
That is why it is considered to be special legal achievement [when someone 
claims] ‘I’ve managed to effect changes to the Civil Code!’(From an interview 
with M, an official from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation).     
 
And yet, ‘as a result of great efforts’ and the fact that ‘a very lengthy explanatory note’3 
that ‘captured the [experts of the] Centre for Private Law’ was attached to the draft, the 
codifiers approved those lines and the text ‘eventually was landed at the State Duma’, 
introduced by Duma members Vladislav Reznik, Anatolii Aksakov and senator Sergei 
Vasiliev (T interview). What was it exactly that FFMS had developed and Duma had to 
approve? Initially, Article 1062 of Russian Civil Code stated: 
 
Article 1062. Claims Connected with the Organisation of Games and  
Betting and Participation Therein. 
The claims of citizens and juridical persons connected with the organisation of 
games and betting or participation therein shall not be subject to judicial 
enforcement, except for the claims of persons who took part in games or betting 
under the influence of deceit, coercion, threat, or ill-intentioned agreement of 
their representative with the organiser of the games or betting… (RF 2002: 385).     
 
The suggested alteration was to expand the Article with the following: 
                                                
3 I could not get hold of this note since the note was for internal use only.   
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The rules of this Chapter shall not apply to claims related to participation in 
transactions envisioning the obligation of a party or parties to the transaction to 
pay monetary amounts depending on variations in prices for goods, securities, 
rates of currency exchange, interest rate levels, the level of inflation, or on 
indices calculated on the basis of the aggregate of the foregoing indicators, or on 
the occurrence of another circumstance which is envisioned by law and in 
relation to which it is not clear whether it will or will not occur. Such claims 
shall be subject to judicial enforcement, if at least one of the parties to the 
transaction is a legal entity holding a license for the conduct of banking 
operations or a license for the conduct of professional activity on the securities 
market, or at least one of the parties to a transaction concluded on an exchange is 
a legal entity holding a license on the basis of which the conclusion of 
transactions on an exchange is possible.  
 
Claims related to participation of individuals in the transactions identified in this 
clause shall be subject to judicial enforcement only on the condition that they are 
concluded on an exchange (RF 20074).   
 
In short, such an alteration suggests keeping the legal status of cash-settled derivative 
contracts as betting. However, these specific bets, namely cash-settled derivative 
transactions, are to be court protected. The authors of the text admit the disputability of 
such a position and acknowledge that ‘the amendment would not come as [they] 
wanted’: 
 
Z. Do not think that I believe derivatives are bets. I simply favour the most 
pragmatic and rational approach [to derivatives regulation] to make [cash-settled] 
derivatives enforceable. I am certain that future legislation will demarcate these 
terms [betting and derivatives] (From an interview with Z, a lawyer whose 
current professional activity is concerned with coordination, protection, and 
control of securities market participants and who is known as one of the authors 
of the amendment).  
 
Meanwhile, market participants also questioned the alteration. In broad terms approving 
the alteration as a positive change that will restore credibility of ‘the onshore derivatives 
market’, Roman Goryunov, President of the Russian Trading System Stock Exchange, 
challenged the specificity of the amendment: 
                                                
4 English version of the Federal Law quoted from Davidovski and Runova (2007: 4).   
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It is not quite clear why members of the State Duma have itemised the court 
protected derivatives. New derivative products that are attractive for investors 
keep emerging, whereas this regulation imposes unnecessary barriers [to it] (R 
Goryunov cited by Mikheev 2006).       
 
Furthermore, Sergei Avramov, a financial law expert and a counsel of BNP Paribas in 
Russia, argues there is inexactness in the amendment’s wording: 
 
Given that the amendment does not make clear where and by whom banks and 
stock market professional participants ought to be licensed, […] it is reasonably 
safe to suggest that court protection is granted to identified Russian, not foreign 
counterparties5 (Avramov 2007: 50).   
 
Given the complexity of the matter and all the difficulties of the approval of the legal 
draft, one would expect the same heated debates, if not rejection of the bill in the State 
Duma. Yet, on June 16, 2006 the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation approved the bill ‘On Amending Article 1062 of the Part Two of the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation’.  Anticipating to find bitter differences among members 
of the parliament over the amendment I looked at the parliamentary session’s report. 
Surprisingly, the typescript of the debates in the State Duma revealed no fierce dispute 
as such. Moreover, the voting in favour of the amendment was unanimous: 
         
The Speaker of the State Duma: Thank you [to Vladislav Reznik, chairman of 
the parliamentary committee on credit organisations and financial markets and a 
presenter of the statutory draft]. Are there any questions to the presenter and the 
co-presenter [to the members of the State Duma]? [After a pause] No questions. 
Is there anyone wanting to address the meeting? [After a pause] There is not. Is 
there a need for the Plenipotentiary of the President and the Plenipotentiary of 
the Government to address the meeting? [After a pause] There is not. The 
                                                
5 I asked my interviewee T, who is one of the authors of the amendment, if T is aware of this viewpoint: 
‘Of course I am. [I] would agree with him. [It would be] better to amend it, but it isn’t essential.  The best 
is the enemy of the good. Where were they when it [the text] had been [in a process of] negotiation? […] 
If things were to be done twice all would be wise. It is the same for me with many statutes I wrote. When I 
read them now I think “Why did I write this way?” […] Because you amend one thing and then think “Oh 
well, this person wants it this way, let’s change it then”. Whereas afterwards it turns out we were wrong to 
change it. But anyway that’s how it goes’ (T interview).   
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statutory draft ‘On Amending Article1062 of the Part Two of the Civil Code of 
the Russian Federation’ goes to the vote on the first reading. Those in favour? 
Please vote. Switch on voting mode, please [to the technicians]. 
The voting results (1:22:35 pm): 
Those who voted in favour: 401 
Those who voted against: 0 
Those who abstained: 0 
Voted (total): 401 
… 
The result: Passed (SDFARF 2006).    
 
On the same day the State Duma approved six and decided against four pieces of 
legislation. There were long heated debates over the bill ‘On Gas Export’ where nine 
members of the Duma challenged it with their questions and five members had to 
address the meeting. There was also sharp criticism of the bill ‘On Veterans’ resulted in 
its rejection. The same happened to the bill ‘On Education’ (SDFARF 2006). What 
caused such unanimity regarding the legislation on derivatives? 
 
I would argue that unanimity arose from three factors. Firstly and most crucially, as a 
result of the 2003 parliamentary elections the ruling party ‘United Russia’ gained 
complete control over the State Duma6. In effect, ‘the core lobbying shifted in to the 
government. […] In the course of the last four years of the current session of the State 
Duma systematic, effective cooperation between [Duma] members and the government 
has been developed. It mainly took the form of the Duma rubber-stamping most of the 
significant legislative drafts either developed or approved by the government’ 
(Vedomosti 2007). My interviewee J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian 
authorities, argues this affected not just ‘significant’ pieces of legislation; it was now the 
way the Duma functioned: 
 
J. [Duma members] do not care, they all do not care. There is such situation at 
the State Duma… The Duma is indeed the authority that rubber-stamps 
government decisions. It would seem the [bill] text was introduced by [Duma] 
                                                
6 For the 2003 parliamentary election results see the website of the Central Election Commission of the 
Russian Federation (http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/gd2003/gdrf4_engl.html, accessed May 15, 2007).  
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members, whereas in fact [it] had been approved by FFMS and Presidential 
Administration. The enrolled bill had been approved by Presidential 
Administration and brought before [the Duma] by FFMS lawyers so to speak, 
[…] [in order] not to be ping-ponged within the government, thus to speed up the 
process. And this situation indicated that all policy makers understood that this 
initiative had been approved by Kremlin and the government. From then on all 
the rest is simply a formality (J interview).  
 
But, as noted, some bills were nonetheless vociferously opposed. There is therefore a 
second aspect of the consensus over the amendment in the Duma. A, a financial lawyer 
with various legal and audit firms in Russia, reasons that this subject does not appeal to 
the general public, thus does not have a potential to enhance political popularity among 
the voters: 
 
A. It is all very simple. […] Staying away from the politics… The legislation                         
‘On Veterans’ has an impact on [their] constituency; whereas… pardon my 
rudeness, what the hell one needs the derivatives law for (A interview).   
 
Thirdly, before the voting, the Duma members had been presented with a report on the 
amendment.  It could be argued the report quite unequivocally claimed the amendment, 
which dealt with a specific financial activity that required knowledge of the way 
derivatives work juristically and thus demanded expertise in finance and legal 
regulation, had been placed in the highly professional hands of legal experts. According 
to MacKenzie (2005b: 557), such ‘recognised expertise […] is a black box’, that is ‘a 
device whose internal structure can be disregarded […] [as long as it] transforms given 
inputs into predictable outputs: how it does this can be ignored. It can thus be treated as 
opaque, as if its content cannot be seen’. Indeed, the report on the amendment contained 
a vague definition of non-deliverable derivatives contracts as ‘financial instruments, 
which are settled by payment of a price difference’ and in emphasising the importance 
of the bill used a specific term ‘risk hedging’ with no explanation. At the same time it 
repeatedly referred to a high legal authority, the Constitutional Court of the Russian 




As a result, in December 2006 the amendment got final approval by the Duma and was 
sent to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly, namely the Federation Council, 
where ‘as far as I am aware [the senators] also have no idea what a derivative is and is 
needed for’ (A interview). To the great surprise of all involved, on December 27, 2006, 
the Federation Council put a veto on the legal draft. J, a financial law expert with one of 
the Russian authorities, suggests an explanation: 
 
J. Once the bill whooshed out from the Duma, neither we nor FFMS doubted it 
would be rubber-stamped by the Federation Council. It had nothing to do with 
the amendment; it was all about the current politics. However. Given that the 
amendment’s author Sergei Vasiliev is a senator… But he is a chairman of the 
council committee on financial markets and monetary circulation. [Whereas] this 
is an amendment to [the] CC [Civil Code]. […] [Thus] it ended up in the 
committee on judicial and legal affairs. There were people […] who had no 
knowledge of derivatives whatsoever; in this context the bill seemed to them to 
be legal innovation, [since] they had not been involved in the process [of 
negotiation]. Now, it had plopped down to them, yet nobody had come from the 
government or from the Duma [to explain]. […] So, it was discussed by the 
committee. Then, […] decisions to put a veto on a particular bill were made at a 
level of the chairman of the Federation Council. […] It was thought that the 
Federation Council had to monitor and prevent faulty bills going for the 
President’s approval. […] The committee chairman held a consultation [with the 
Council chairman Sergei] Mironov and given that there were legal corrections [to 
the bill] and nobody came to advocate it [they rejected the bill] (J  interview).   
 
T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators and one of the authors 
of the amendment, was also surprised: 
 
T. […] Actually, the veto was kind of weird. […] It seemed to me that it is just 
Mr Mironov wanted to show his worth. Otherwise I could not see real reasons [to 
veto], the ones that would arise from the market [participants]. I think 
individuals, ambitions […] were behind this. Then, well, yes, the Federation 
Council took it out on [somebody]… Using this law. It was such legislation that 
could be used in this, […] it was a matter that nobody cared for. It affected [some 
few people]… It was difficult to explain what a derivative is. I explained it to my 
daughter just because our cat was called so…  
S.M. Called what? Derivative? 
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T. Futures [smiling]. Thus she knew what it is [laughing]. Otherwise it [the 
amendment] was of no significance [to the Federation Council] (T interview).  
 
J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian authorities, agrees with T and explains 
further: 
 
J. A viewpoint of Mironov was like this. It was a group of [Duma and] United 
Russia members that initiated the amendment [in the Duma]. The view of 
Presidential Administration was not clear on this […]. From the viewpoint of a 
leader of A Just Russia [also pro-government but at that time the rival of United 
Russia, which dominated in the Duma], Sergei Mironov, it was a perfect chance 
to flick on the nose those from United Russia. At the moment [in January 2007] 
the current politics is [like this]… Since there is virtually no A Just Russia in the 
Duma, a [political] discussion [between the rivals] is not possible in the Duma. 
Whereas speakers of the both chambers [S Mironov and B Gryzlov] are 
representatives of the two pro-government oppositional parties [A Just Russia 
and United Russia]. You should have seen what was happening in the Duma on 
that day (December 27, 2007 when the Federation Council vetoed the 
amendment)! I was so happy for derivatives, because from members of United 
Russia viewpoint it was like ‘What?! Who? Mironov? What derivatives? Did he 
veto us [our bill]?’ I don’t know… there would be any bill, whatever… It was a 
matter of honour to override Mironov’s veto7. It did not matter what the bill was. 
[Duma members] lined up in re-passing the bill over the veto by 400 or so votes. 
[…] In so doing nobody was interested in what [the bill] was about (J interview).  
 
The veto was overridden by 399 votes out of the 402 who voted on January 12, 2007 
(SDFARF 2007). On January 26, 2007 the President enacted the bill that made cash-
settled derivatives enforceable under Russian law.   
                                                
7 According to Article 105 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation ‘in case the Council of the 
Federation rejects a law, the chambers may create a conciliatory commission for overcoming the 
contradictions that arose, after which the federal law shall be recognized by the State Duma’ (RF 1993). 
However, the derivatives law was once again recognised by the State Duma: ‘As we know there was no a 
conciliatory commission. […] Indeed, if we look at the dates, [the Federation Council] vetoed [the bill] on 
the last [working] day of the year [of 2006], […] and [the Duma] overrode [the veto] on the first [working] 
day of the new [2007] year. This is a unique situation, but it is [a matter of] the politics’ (S interview).     
 
Chapter 7.  Conclusion 
 
Eight months after cash-settled derivative contracts became enforceable under the 
Russian law, on October 11, 2007 Roman Goryunov, President of the Russian Trading 
System Stock Exchange, shared his view on the developments that followed: 
 
Goryunov. Changes in Russian law have a material effect on the market. Take 
the recent amendment to the Civil Code that makes [cash-settled] derivatives 
enforceable. Mind you, from the viewpoint of the exchange this amendment has 
a psychological effect: it affects mainly over-the-counter transactions, whereas 
exchanged-based deals are not questioned. […] However, a considerable part of 
the market participants had thought that all derivatives were unenforceable in 
Russia, therefore they thought of any segment of the market as an insecure one.  
For this reason the amendment resulted in the sense of security on the market 
[…]. 
Business Guide. Were you [the Russian Trading System Stock Exchange] 
affected by this? 
Goryunov. Yes, we were. In the way that quite a number of global banks have 
started trading since then. Before that they had been authorised [to trade] but had 
not been trading. But as soon as [the Russian Civil Code] was amended they 
started [trading].      
Business Guide. How did it affect the trading volume? 
Goryunov. The market had been bullish in any case, thus one would be hard 
pressed to measure the effect of the law change specifically. Yet, I think it is tens 
of per cents. So far. But later on it will have a more significant impact, because 
this [the unenforceability of cash-settlement] had been problematic for the large-
size Western market participants and they’ve got a significant time lag in 
entering the market (Goryunov 2007).       
 
To sum up, the sense of legal security obtained by the large Western banks resulted in 
their willingness to transact with Russian counterparties. This outcome was precisely 
what the authors of the amendment aimed at and the market participants had been 
waiting for. Furthermore, since the amendment made the legal status of cash-settled and 
deliverable derivatives equal – both became enforceable under the Russian law – it also 
enabled netting: both types of derivative transactions could now be covered by a single 
Master Agreement, which makes it possible to net or lower all outstanding obligations 
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between two parties, thus minimising the final sum to be settled between the parties. 
Netting raises liquidity in the market; moreover, given that the market is a complex and 
convoluted nexus of deals and netting reduces parties’ exposure to one another, and thus 
interdependency, it was seen (at least until the last year) as an effective measure against 
systemic risk, that is a danger that a failure of one party to meet its obligation will lead 
to a chain of failures in the market and result in its collapse (Hudson 2002)1.    
 
However, having a significant practical effect on the rouble interbank forward market, 
the enforceability of cash-settled derivatives under the Russian law or, more precisely, 
the law-making process which resulted in this outcome, is also an excellent site to 
understand what the derivatives market is made of. The examination of the interbank 
non-deliverable USD/RUB forward market, and its evolution through the prism of legal 
enforceability of cash-settlement, undoubtedly helped to escape the impression of a 
‘cold, implacable and impersonal monster’ - a global derivative market (Callon 1998: 
51) - which caused the confusion in attempting to understand what it comprises, and 
served as a starting point of this research. This research site revealed that the notion of a 
derivative market cannot be essentialised: such a market does not hold its own built-in 
features. Derivatives, as instantiated by cash-settled currency forwards, do not exist ‘out 
there’, outwardly, as autonomous entities with their intrinsic features. They obtain their 
meaning in part by practices of judicial definition, i.e. application of existing statutes, as, 
for example, the courts’ reference to Article 1062 of the Russian Civil Code, which was 
read as classifying them as gambling transactions. Derivatives also change their initial 
meaning through practices of altering legislation, in the same way as the amendment to 
the Civil Code transformed derivatives from being unenforceable gambling deals into 
enforceable financial contracts. It emerged that the interbank cash-settled forward 
market is a lively, dynamic and, indeed, social domain2. The social was ‘assembled’ and 
revealed through the scrutiny of the above-named practices of obtaining and changing 
                                                
1 A year on, at the time of writing the thesis, amid the current financial crisis, perhaps it is still hard to 
assess the extent to which liquidity increased as triggered by the amendment to the Russian Civil Code. 
However, the current financial crisis makes the issue of netting very salient.    
2 Although Latour (2005) would rather prefer to use the term ‘collective’. 
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the meaning of derivatives, that is through looking searchingly at actors and the 
‘associations’ between them (say, in setting up currency auctions in the 1990s in 
Russia), or the ‘connections’ existing in the market (Latour 2005). The link thus 
revealed between technologies and politics can serve as an example of such a 
connection: the brokers in London, who trade Russian roubles through the electronic 
brokerage system (EBS), find fault with the real time gross settlement system (RTGS) in 
Russia that is linked to the EBS, and hence consider the rouble trading as problematic. 
They argue that the Russian RTGS is ‘archaic’ and ‘it is not a technological problem, 
it’s a political one’: the Russian local authorities favour the old settlement system and 
‘still want to settle through [the] IRS [Interbank Remittance System], because it really 
maintains their political power in the regions’3 (B interview).     
 
Being a part of social studies of finance, i.e. a perspective that, in its narrow sense, 
investigates the role of science and technology in financial markets, the thesis 
nevertheless suggested that one could understand science in a wider sense, as an expert 
knowledge domain. The study, then, can be broadened out into an investigation of the 
different ways in which expert knowledge shapes financial practices. Following Jasanoff 
(2008) and Latour (2004), I argued that legal expertise is another instantiation of expert 
knowledge in the sense that both (science and law) are different forms of power; 
therefore this research aimed at answering the question how, or in what way, finance is 
shaped by legal expert knowledge.  
 
To do so, I employed a method recommended by MacKenzie (2005b): the technique of 
‘opening the black box’ of regulation in which legal expertise is embodied. The moment 
for the research could not have been better. In January 2007 the amendment to Article 
1062 of the Russian Civil Code was enacted, thus a legal ‘black box’ was produced in a 
                                                
3 B explains that when the BESP system (a Russian equivalent of the RTGS) starts working, ‘what will 
happen is that each of these regions should be writing [a] contract with [the] BESP to basically use it as a 
settlement service, and as one of the first ones to do that should be Moscow… […] Obviously the 
international banks are going to come through Moscow predominantly. […] The perfect world is that 
everyone would come in through the BESP, but it will not happen’, thus Moscow banks are going to 
dominate in the cross-border market (B interview).     
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form of a statute, or a legal device, which should be applied if there is a legal dispute 
over enforceability of non-deliverable derivatives under the Russian law.  However, the 
controversy about the way it had been done or, in other words, about the mechanics of 
the device that makes cash-settlement enforceable, was still fresh, thus the technicalities 
of the law-making process were still available for exploration.      
 
It is through the examination of these technicalities that this research demonstrated a link 
‘between the apparent “detail” of regulation and larger issues in the construction of 
financial markets’ (MacKenzie 2005b: 567).  The logic of the narrative employed in the 
thesis – the legal and law-making technicalities examined in Chapter 4 and 6 and also 
their financial implications described in Chapter 5 – facilitated the claim I made. I 
argued that ‘just’ a concise amendment to Article 1062 of the Russian Civil Code, the 
adjustment which states that cash-settled derivatives are legally enforceable under the 
Russian law, has had significant ramifications for the interbank USD/RUB cash-settled 
forward market: the legal security of cash-settled forwards encouraged cross-border 
transactions, and thus enhanced the market’s liquidity; it also made possible the 
introduction of netting as a risk management tool in the market.   
 
Moreover, by examining these technicalities I addressed a significant theoretical claim 
made by the social studies of finance field that is the performativity of economics. If 
economics, as an academic discipline, was an ‘engine’ for certain derivatives markets 
(MacKenzie 2006), I reasoned, then can such an expert knowledge domain as law also 
be performative with regard to finance? Although it is clear in principle that successful 
law is performative (and that is almost a tautology)4, the processes by which this 
happens deserve further investigation, as does the question of which law is brought into 
being, and which market this law affects and in what way. Can a regulatory statute, as a 
quintessence of legal experts’ labour, trigger a particular trade, play a crucial role in the 
creation of a market? Being the ‘products [the markets] have not been able to trade’ 
                                                
4 Many of the clearest examples of performative utterances are drawn from the sphere of law (such as 
marriage, outlaw, etc.).  
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(MacKenzie 2005b: 567), cash-settled forward contracts were legally unsafe under the 
Russian law which defined them as wagers. The introduction of legal enforceability for 
these derivatives has had a direct effect on the inclination of the large Western banks to 
trade in the market in question. As Roman Goryunov (2007), President of the Russian 
Trading System Stock Exchange, put it, the amendment to Article 1062 of the Russian 
Civil Code materialised the cross-border cash-settled currency derivatives market. I 
would argue that such materialisation of the market confirmed by market participants 
can serve as evidence for the statement that legal expertise, embodied in a regulatory 
statute, can indeed ‘engineer’ a market. Law, along with science, can be performative 
and legal experts, as well as economists, do make markets.  
 
Another important theme the thesis addressed is the ‘material production of virtuality’ 
with respect to derivatives: regarded as highly virtual, cash-settled derivatives are, in 
fact, an outcome of a material making, where the adjective ‘material’ means manifold 
technicalities and aspects of production in a wide sense (such as legal procedures and 
cultural practices), as well as technological equipment (MacKenzie 2007b, 2009). It is 
particular ‘cultural geographies’, as MacKenzie (2007b, 2009) puts it, and legal 
techniques are among them, that are of great importance to the derivatives markets. 
Local legal cultures vastly affect financial markets, for example by differentiating 
between sound financial activities and gambling, and such differentiation has not yet 
proved to be an entirely settled legal matter. It does indeed ‘remain[…] unstable and 
continues to haunt modern credit practices’ (de Goede 2005: 85). The latest example of 
it is the 2007 amendment to the Russian Civil Code that made non-deliverable currency 
forwards enforceable and hence a legitimate financial activity under the Russian law. 
The Russian legal environment was modified in such a way that it justified cash-settled 
derivatives, and separated them from gambling, thus establishing conditions for the trade 
or, to put it differently, produced the market. The legal debates and ultimate amendment 
to the existing legislation in Russia confirmed that ‘the exigencies of keeping derivatives 
separate from wagers […] have been critical aspects of their material production’, since 
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‘they have affected which derivatives can be traded and which cannot, and the extent to 
which a derivative can be abstract and virtual’ (MacKenzie 2009: 65).  
 
An equally significant aspect of the materiality of derivatives markets is the importance 
of technological equipment. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 of the thesis, technical 
equipment is crucial to the interbank currency derivatives trade. Whether a system that 
provides an informational pool and brings market-makers together (an electronic 
brokerage system), or a system that processes payments and facilitates settlement of 
transactions (a real time settlement system), the technological tools in the market are 
various components of a consolidated market infrastructure that makes the market 
possible. Take, for example, rouble trading: theoretically, the Russian currency became 
available for unrestricted, free worldwide trading the moment it was announced as 
convertible in 2007. Hence, it is logical to assume that the announced convertibility of 
the rouble would cancel the necessity of non-deliverable trade. Practically, though, the 
Russian rouble is not yet tradable, given the infrastructural problems in the Russian 
settlement system, and market participants still favour cash-settlement over delivery of 
the currency. This example reveals the importance of the infrastructure which might not 
be apparent at first sight; however, as soon as some link in this integrated technological 
whole fails to provide what expected, the criticality of it immediately becomes clear.   
 
There is also another aspect of the statement that physical objects are of crucial 
importance to the way markets are constructed. Objects, as Latour (2005: 85) puts it, do 
act in their own ‘varied’ ways, existing not just as items ‘simply “reflecting” social 
values or being there as mere decorum’. Serving as mediators, as in the above example, 
they aid other actors’ functioning in the markets. However, there is more to it: objects 
also change the way, redirect the whole process of market construction. A good case in 
point is the constraining presence of such a ‘textual entity’ (Latour 2005: 85) as the 
Russian Civil Code. As I described in Chapter 6 of the thesis, the debates concerning the 
legal enforceability of the cash-settled derivatives, thus directly affecting the interbank 
non-deliverable currency forward market, were focused on two contending viewpoints 
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on the way these derivatives should be regulated under the Russian law: to make an 
amendment to the Russian Civil Code (the ‘German way’), or to write an all-embracing 
law ‘On Derivatives’ (the ‘Anglo-Saxon way’). When asked about the reason for such 
longstanding debates about how to make cash-settled derivatives enforceable under the 
Russian law, a few of my interviewees summed up in a similar way:  
 
U. Conceit! Conceit (U interview)! 
X. A personality factor (X interview).  
M. In this case there was the ambitiousness of the decision makers (M 
interview).  
 
Certainly, all the given answers support an interest-based approach to investigation of 
market regulatory framework (Fligstein 2001). However, there was another factor that 
crucially affected the outcome of the debates. The Russian legal system is a system of 
civil or codified law, with the Civil Code being the very epitome of it. This already 
existing textual entity could not simply be disregarded in the ongoing conflict of 
interests. In fact, the Civil Code turned out to be the entity that tipped the balance: the 
‘German-American duel’ was won by the ‘German way’ of developing a derivatives 
regulatory framework. It happened because those legal experts who had to guard the 
systematic character, and thus the coherence of the Russian law, could not approve the 
abstract terms in which financial contracts had been described in the law ‘On 
derivatives’. These terms existed neither in a legal organism called the Russian civil law, 
nor in the Civil Code as the very core of it. Indeed, such an object as the Russian Civil 
Code became an actor in a sense, that ‘any thing that does modify a state of affairs by 
making a difference is an actor’ (Latour 2005: 71, emphasis in original).  
 
Alongside the introduction of an object into the picture, the analysis of the law-making 
process – the enforcement of cash-settlement under Russian law – also demonstrated the 
constitutive power of the state with regard to the market. The research confirmed that it 
is wrong indeed to separate the state and the market, seeing the state as an authority that 
from time to time intervenes in a market, acting as a power that influences the 
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functioning of markets, seen as external to the state. Quite to the contrary, through 
initiation of the particular form of regulation in the financial markets, by means of 
specific distribution of the regulatory power among the market’s regulatory authorities, 
and by way of the allocation of human (legal experts) and financial resources, the state 
acts as a key, constitutive actor in the market. The market is not a context; it is an entity 
constituted by the state, yet also constitutive of the state. The state and the market are, as 
Callon (1998: 8) puts it, ‘two sides of the same coin’. 
 
There is also another question concerning the ‘state-market condominium’ (Underhill 
2000) to which this research suggests an answer. In the context of globalisation, did the 
state lose its constitutive power regarding financial markets5? In other words, did 
financial globalisation make the state-market condominium less obvious? The results of 
my enquiries into the technicalities of the process of law-making, which has turned to be 
a market making practice, enables me to argue it did not. In fact, in the case I discuss, by 
rendering cash-settled derivatives enforceable under Russian law, and thus making 
netting possible under a Master Agreement, the state became an agent, a propulsive 
force in the process of ‘the legal constitution of globalisation’ (Riles 2000: 23).     
 
Based on the evidence obtained from the study of the legal development which resulted 
in the amendment to the Russian Civil Code, the thesis confirmed that the politics of the 
law-making process, the so called ‘meta-bargaining’ (Carruthers and Halliday 1998), 
alongside shaping the outcome, can in equal measure be disruptive and result in a delay 
in legal changes that the market participants felt were much-needed. Take, for example, 
the regulatory competition between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) which caused the long term 
absence of futures on single stocks in the U.S. (Esau 2001, Brodsky 2001, Partnoy 
2001). As this research showed, a similar ‘turf war’ took place between the Central Bank 
                                                
5 Although it seems that the current financial crisis defuses the controversy over this issue, given, for 
example, the increase in government stake in a number of British banks, which was dictated by the 
necessity to prevent these banks from collapsing.     
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and the Federal Financial Markets Service in Russia and had the same powerful 
influence over the interbank currency derivatives market. The regulators’ attempts to 
retain their influence on this market, which, in different ways, they both have had, led to 
the legal debates that lasted nearly eight years obstructing the cross-border rouble 
derivatives trade. Evidently, meta-bargaining is a process which is strongly affected by 
the ‘struggles among professions […] for control of jurisdictions’ (Carruthers and 
Halliday 1998: 54, emphasis in original).  
 
As can be seen from the above, although originally conceived as an attempt to eliminate 
the uncertainty about global derivatives, i.e. to understand what global derivatives 
market are made of, this research took a specific route: it delved into one specific 
derivative market. I examined the events which occurred in a particular market, the 
USD/RUB interbank non-deliverable forward market. I also followed the developments 
at the particular time, analysing just over fifteen years of the market’s history. Focusing 
my research attention on a certain kind of derivatives trading and, what is more, on 
debates which occurred in a local legal environment, I unavoidably limited the range of 
data, thus confining the investigation to specific findings. However, my aim has not 
been to make all-encompassing generalisations as such. On the contrary, what I sought 
was to produce a thorough enquiry into technicalities that lead to the social appearing in 
the picture of global, highly virtual derivatives. But the technicalities were peculiar     
material to work with: one could find them only by research in depth in a particular 
setting, which had the consequence of requiring a thesis that focused on a certain 
locality, whether it was a particular market, or a particular legal system6.  
 
Drawing primarily on technicalities in my research, there was one certain type of data I 
wish I could have obtained, that is statistical data on non-deliverable USD/RUB forward 
contracts. Yet, as was explained in Chapter 3, regrettably, the Bank of Russia does not 
                                                
6 In fact, much work, perhaps a majority of the work in the social studies of finance is focused in this way, 
and for this reason, e.g. (this list of examples is not, of course, exhaustive) Caliskan 2007, Holm and 
Nielsen 2007, Muniesa 2008.  
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specify the turnover of these contracts in its Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivatives Market Activity7. Using these data to measure the precise increase of 
liquidity in the market, perhaps I would have been able to do more to check the market 
participants’ accounts by quantitative evidence.  
 
So, the explored technicalities of the events and their implications, as well as 
controversies about legal development, have all been assembled in the account of the 
market’s construction. The market, I argue, needed a device, a ‘black box’ which would 
help the market’s functioning. The box stayed idle and open for several years; the 
market was quiet too. In 2007 the box was closed, the device called the amended Article 
1062 of the Russian Civil Code started working, the market revived. Indeed, this account 
of events is just a metaphor but, certainly, a powerful one. Amid the current financial 
and economic recession, derivatives markets’ functioning proved to be of a great 
consequence to the lives of all of us, considering the scale of negative processes some 
derivatives contracts ignited. If making markets is making laws (amongst other 
constructing actions),   the opening of the black box called ‘regulation’ can facilitate our 
understanding of how derivatives markets come into existence, what they are made of, 
why they function or malfunction in the way they do.  In this context I would identify 
the next move in my work on financial markets as the search for and opening of more of 
the black boxes that make those markets happen.  
                                                
7 The Survey, which is published monthly (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/), contains the 
so called Complementary Information where the Central Bank specifies the turnover of ‘forward contracts 
for difference (incl. non-deliverable forwards)’; however there are no data on cash-settled forwards alone, 




List of Interviewees 
 
A, a financial lawyer with various legal and audit firms in Russia. – Moscow, February 
12, 2007.   
 
AC, a lawyer with various investment companies in Russia. – Moscow, September 6, 
2007. 
 
B, an emerging market manager in a brokerage company in the City (London). – 
London, June 20, 2007. 
 
D, a broker in a broker in a brokerage company in the City (London). – (1) London, June 
26, 2007; (2) by telephone, May 02, 2008. 
 
E, a deputy managing director of one of the leading investment banks in Russia. – 
Moscow, September 03, 2007. 
 
F, a market participant and who set up currency trading, or dealing, in one of the 
commercial banks in Moscow in early 1990s. – London, June 19, 2007.  
 
G, a broker in a brokerage company in the City (London). – London, June 26, 2007. 
 
H, a lawyer in Russian branch of a big European bank. – Moscow, September 4, 2007. 
 
I, a managing director of a Russian derivatives news and analytics agency. – Moscow, 
February 15, 2007.  
 
IJ, an independent British journalist who followed the development of a regulatory 
framework for derivatives in Russia. – by telephone, May 10, 2007.    
 
J, a financial law expert with one of the Russian authorities. – Moscow, February 21, 
2007. 
 
K, a leader of a self-regulatory association in Russian financial market. – Moscow, 
February 20, 2007 
 
KK, an official from the Central Bank of Russia. – by telephone, March 24, 2008. 
 
L, a former non-resident investment banker. – Edinburgh, May 1, 2008. 
 
199 
M, an official from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. – Moscow, 
September 4, 2007.  
 
MA, a deputy head of a derivatives department of a big Russian bank. – Moscow, 
September 6, 2007. 
 
MC, a financial lawyer in a Moscow branch of a large global law firm. – Moscow, 
September 5, 2007.  
 
MI, an official from one of the Russian exchanges. - Moscow, February 19, 2007.   
 
MR, a financial columnist in a Russian commerce-oriented newspaper. – Moscow, 
September 10, 2007.  
 
N, a head of a treasury research in one of the top Russian banks. - Moscow, September 
12, 2007.  
 
O, a broker in a broker in a brokerage company in the City (London). – London, June 
26, 2007.  
 
OR, a legal columnist in a Russian commerce-oriented newspaper. – Moscow, 
September 14, 2007. 
 
P, a sales manager in a derivatives department of a big Russian bank. – Moscow, 
September 6, 2007. 
 
Q, a lawyer with an association of market participants in Russia. – Moscow, September 
5, 2007. 
 
R, an official from one of the Russian exchanges. – Moscow, February 22, 2007.   
 
S, an official from a Russian legislative authority. – Moscow, September 11, 2007.  
 
T, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators. – Moscow, September 
18, 2007.  
 
U, an official from the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation. – 
Moscow, September 10, 2007.   
 
V, a broker who trades USD/RUB NDFs in a brokerage company in the City (London). – 
London, June 26, 2007.  
 
W, a financial lawyer with one of the Russian financial regulators. – (1) Moscow, 
February 22, 2007; (2) Moscow, September 12, 2007. 
200 
 
X, a head of a legal department in a Moscow branch of a large European bank. –
Moscow, September 13, 2007. 
 
Y, an official from the Central Bank of Russia. - Moscow, September 12, 2007.  
 
Z, a lawyer whose current professional activity is concerned with coordination, 




In this Glossary the terms are defined for the purposes of the thesis, i.e. in the context of 
the foreign exchange (Forex) trade, so some of the given definitions are not 
comprehensive; they may have either a different or broader meaning in other financial 
settings.       
 
Arbitrage  Trading that aims at profiting from the price difference in different 
markets, for example between over-the-counter and exchange-based markets .   
Broker  A market participant who facilitates trading by connecting buyers and 
sellers, charging a fee which typically is incorporated in his/her quotes. 
Clearinghouse A system that settles completed transactions on an exchange.  
Derivative A contract (security, instrument), whose value is based on the 
performance of an underlying asset, which may be a commodity (e.g. oil), a financial 
security (a stock, a bond, a currency), a financial index (e.g. the Dow Jones index).  
EBS  Electronic Broking Services Dealing System, an electronic tool for 
foreign exchange trading: brokers’ electronic screens display anonymous prices - bid 
and ask orders of the market participants, thus providing an informational pool and 
brining buyers and sellers together. 
Forward An agreement in which a buyer and a seller take on an obligation to 
exchange currencies. However, delivery of the currencies takes place on a stated date in 
the future and an exchange rate (or the price) is agreed upon in advance, i.e. at the time 
the forward transaction took place.  
Future  A standardised forward contract which is traded on an exchange.  
GKO  Gosudarstvennaya Kratkosrochnaya Obligatsiya, or State Treasury 
Obligation. A short-term Russian government bond. 
Liquidity A characteristic of the market in which a large number of buyers and 
sellers results in a low spread between a price which a dealer is ready to pay for an item, 
and a price the same or another dealer asks for to sell the same item.  
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Netting A technique that lowers all outstanding obligations between two parties 
thus minimizes the final sum to be settled between the parties; it cancels out mutually 
offsetting obligations.  
Non-deliverable (cash-settled) forward A forward transaction, in which there is no 
physical delivery of the principal amount of the contracted currency: on the day the 
contract is due the buyer or the seller pays the difference between the contracted 
exchange rate and the exchange rate at that point of the currencies in question. 
RTGS  Real Time Gross Settlement System, a system which instantaneously 
settles currency transactions between individual banks. 
Spot market transaction A transaction between a buyer and a seller of a currency. 
Delivery of this currency and payment in another currency takes place within next two 
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